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Kansas Open Books Preface

Blame avoidance gets a bad rap. In everyday life, we are told to own our mistakes and accept responsibility for our actions; any other course seems unethical
and cowardly. And it is natural that we feel politicians should be governed by
the same set of ethical rules as the rest of us. We certainly do not want leaders
who do not take responsibility for their actions. “The buck stops here,” President
Harry Truman famously insisted—and so it should, we all think. A president who
dares to declare “I don’t take responsibility at all,” as President Donald Trump did
when asked whether he took any responsibility for the lag in the nation’s testing
capability for COVID-19, seems downright unpresidential and rightly invites ridicule and scorn. The president, after all, is the head of the executive branch and
the leader of the country, so of course he should be held responsible for what the
federal government does. Democracy seems to depend on that accountability.
Why in the world then would we want to encourage or advise the US president,
of all people, to avoid blame? It is clear why presidents might desire blame avoidance, if they can get away with it, but what is in it for the rest of us? Particularly in
2020, when the problem seems less “the beleaguered presidency” that my mentor
and thesis adviser Aaron Wildavsky worried about than an out-of-control presidency busting through long-established constitutional and normative guardrails.
:HOOEHIRUH7UXPS¶VSUHVLGHQF\ERRNVKHOYHVZHUH¿OOHGZLWKERRNVVRXQGLQJWKH
alarm about The Executive Unbound, The New Imperial Presidency, Presidential
Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced, and Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive
Power Threatens American Democracy.1 And since Trump’s inauguration, those
alarms bells have rung ever more loudly. Not the presidency but constitutional
democracy now seems beleaguered. More transparency and accountability, not
more evasion and blame-shifting, seem the only appropriate remedies.
And yet the presidency, despite its undeniably awesome powers and Trump’s
unprecedented abuse of those powers, is in fact more beleaguered than it was
when Wildavsky published The Beleaguered Presidency in 1991. For Wildavsky,
what made the presidency beleaguered was rising criticism, declining approval
ratings, and demands “impossible to meet.”27KRVHGHPDQGVRQWKHRI¿FHKDYH
only ratcheted higher in the intervening decades, the criticisms have only grown
more partisan and strident, and not only have the approval ratings sunk lower
but also the intensity of the disapproval has climbed higher. Trump’s average
approval ratings are the lowest of any president for whom we have records—and
vii

viii
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his approval rating, according to FiveThirtyEight’s polling average, has never
exceeded 46 percent. Lest you think this is just about Trump, recall that outside
RIKLV¿UVW\HDUDQGWKHODVWVL[PRQWKVRIKLVSUHVLGHQF\2EDPDKDGDQDYHUDJH
approval rating under 50 percent for virtually his entire eight years, apart (luckily
for him) for the few months surrounding his reelection in 2012. Obama’s average
approval rating was a little bit better than Jimmy Carter’s and about the same as
Gerald Ford’s but every other president dating back to Dwight Eisenhower had a
higher average approval rating than Obama. And the intensity of the opposition
to—and loathing of Obama—was unlike anything Carter and Ford dealt with.
Gallup polls found that Obama’s approval rating was the most polarized along
party lines on record, although Trump has more than matched that record (the
Gallup poll for June 2020 showed that 91 percent of Republicans approved of
Trump’s job performance, compared with only 2 percent of Democrats, an unprecedented 89 percentage-point gap). And that is despite the fact that Obama’s
record, measured by DW-Nominate scores, arguably made him the most moderate
Democratic president since World War II.3
In contemporary politics, a president has only to propose something for his
critics to denounce it. The more the president tries to persuade, the more the other
side resists.4 Trump is not immune to this dynamic: the more he tweets about an
issue, the less willing Democrats are to support it. Presidential persuasion is limited by partisan tribalism. Obama’s response to this dynamic was sometimes to
keep his hand hidden from public view, à la Eisenhower, in hopes of providing his
administration and Congress room to negotiate bipartisan deals, but that left him
vulnerable to charges from his opponents that he was weak and left his supporters
feeling he was not doing enough for the cause, as they were convinced that one
more brilliant speech would do the trick. Leading from behind did not seem like
anybody’s idea of leadership.
Political scientist William Howell is among those who contend that the only
way for beleaguered presidents to meet a rising tide of expectations and demands
is to act decisively and demonstratively “and, whenever possible, swift[ly].” The
president can never hide, and can rarely afford delay because that is seen as weak
and unpresidential. No president can hope to reverse those expectations or shrink
the demands placed on the president, so they have no choice but to project mastery of their environment and always to “appear in command.” They must “do so
for all to see, visibly, forthrightly, and expediently.” There is no realm of public
life, Howell writes, where the president will be “given a pass—where he can
either hesitate before acting or forgo action without incurring the media and the
public’s wrath. . . . Constantly Americans berate their presidents to say more, to
do more, to be more.”5 On this view, presidents cannot escape blame for events,
so the only rational response is to accumulate all possible power in the hands of
the president and the White House. The imperial presidency is a logical outgrowth
of the beleaguered presidency—they are two sides of the same presidential coin.
With blame avoidance out of the question, credit-claiming seems like the only
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possible response for a president. If they will be blamed for the bad, presidents
should at least make sure they get credit for the good. Donald Trump is arguably
the logical if farcical culmination of this line of thinking. His desire for praise
and demand for credit seems insatiable. Trump never wants the spotlight to leave
him. An adviser who blocks that spotlight or, as was the case with Anthony Fauci,
director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, seems to receive too much credit, is quickly sidelined, or at least taken off television, which
Trump obsessively monitors. Trump’s constant attention-seeking tweets are a
ZD\RIPDNLQJVXUHWKHPHGLDDQGWKHSXEOLFVWD\¿[HGRQKLVZRUGVDQGDQWLFV
Never was his spotlight-seeking, credit-claiming leadership style clearer than in
KLVLQVLVWHQFHRQEHLQJWKHFHQWHURIDWWHQWLRQDWWKHGDLO\EULH¿QJVRIWKHDGPLQistration’s Coronavirus Task Force in April 2020. The public health experts were
reduced to bit parts while Trump made himself the real star of the show, the one
in command. And why not? He claimed to know at least as much as the so-called
experts. As he boasted to reporters in a tour of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention in Atlanta, “I like this stuff. I really get it. . . . People are really
surprised I understand this stuff. Every one of these doctors said, ‘How do you
know so much about this?’ Maybe I have a natural ability.” Perhaps, he suggested,
it came from the genes he inherited from his “great, super-genius uncle” who
taught at MIT.6
Trump’s credit-claiming strategy leaves him little room to concede that things
are going poorly. Instead, he resorts to fabricating reality: insisting that 99 percent of COVID-19 cases were “totally harmless”; that anybody who needed a test
could get one; that the number of COVID-19 cases was “going down” or “fading
away” when it was in fact rising; that the increase in COVID-19 cases was merely
because there was more testing, when positive test rates were increasing; and that
the United States had the “lowest Fatality (Mortality) rate in the world” when,
at the time of Trump’s July 6, 2020, tweet, US case-fatality was only middle of
the pack and its mortality rate was ninth worst in the word.7 Of course, all White
Houses rely on spin, but none have relied as brazenly on propagating falsehoods
as Trump’s. But when policies go awry and the news is bad, the credit-claiming
president has little alternative. Having made himself the face of the pandemic
response, efforts to shift blame—“I don’t take responsibility at all”—were, unsurprisingly, met with peals of derision.
Ironically, Trump possessed several attributes that potentially were well-suited
for an effective blame-avoidance leadership strategy, including his unprecedented
lack of political experience, limited knowledge of public policy, and indistinct
public position on many issues. Among modern presidents, only Eisenhower had
QHYHUKHOGHOHFWHGRI¿FHEHIRUHDVVXPLQJWKHSUHVLGHQF\DQGKHXVHGWKDWGLVWLQFtive background to highlight his role as a unifying chief of state rather than a mere
party leader. As president, Trump chose the opposite course, forsaking almost
entirely the head of state role in favor of a partisan (and cultural) warrior, sowing
division and erasing any remaining ambiguity in his issue positions. Moreover,

x
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whereas Eisenhower delegated authority and power to those with expertise in
public policy and politics, Trump proved to be an “unfocused micro-manager”
who denigrated the experts and demeaned subordinates.8 A relentlessly partisan
micromanager can hardly hope to avoid blame when things go wrong. And, of
course, the chances of things going wrong increase dramatically when a politically inexperienced and ill-informed president insists on micromanaging and disregards expertise.
When set against the perils of a maniacally credit-claiming president like
Trump, the more modest blame-avoidance model starts to appear rather more appealing. Of course, we do not want leaders who dissemble or lie to us. But no
president has lied more than the credit-claiming Trump. We do, however, want
leaders who defer to experts who know more than them and who defer to advisers
who see farther than they do or bring perspectives that they lack. The president is
rarely the smartest person in the room, and even the smartest person in the room
may not be the wisest. Perhaps what we the people need is not presidents who
project mastery and assure us they have everything under control; rather, instead
we may need presidents who have a robust imagination for what can go wrong
and a keen sense of their own limitations and failings. Presidents who put a premium on blame avoidance rather than credit-claiming may be exactly the sort of
presidents who keep not only themselves out of trouble, but also the nation.
Richard J. Ellis
Salem, Oregon
July 2020
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The Lore of Lightning Rods

Criticism, Harry Truman once said, "is something [a president] gets every
day, just like breakfast." 1 Few people, if any, who have occupied that high
office would disagree with Truman's judgment (although not all would be as
sanguine about receiving their daily diet). Given that it is criticism rather
than deference that usually goes with the office, some commentators have
suggested that it behooves a president to position members of his administration on the front lines to absorb blame for unpopular policies. 2 Presidential advisers might thereby function as "lightning rods," deflecting criticism
away from the president and onto themselves.
The idea, and practice, of advisers serving as lightning rods is probably as
old as governing itself. In The Prince, Machiavelli taught "that princes must
delegate distasteful tasks to others; pleasant ones they should keep for themselves. " 3 Francis Bacon observed that one of the uses that kings make of
their advisers is "to interpose them between themselves and the envy or malice of their people; for kings cannot err; that must be discharged upon the
shoulders of their ministers; and those who are nearest unto them must be
content to bear the greatest load."•
Presidents, it hardly needs noting, are not kings. One essential difference
is that to directly criticize a king (or sultan or czar or emperor or dictator)
can land one in jail or worse, whereas criticizing a modern American president is more likely to land one on the front page or television news. The
greater the social and political sanctions against criticizing the ruler, the
greater the incentive to denounce advisers for leading the ruler astray rather
than directly attacking the ruler. Because the sanctions against criticizing an
American president are so radically different from those that have existed
during most of the rest of world history, I have resisted the temptation to
survey lightning rods of past historical eras. My analysis is instead confined
1
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CHAPTER ONE

to modern American presidents, although some of my conclusions may have
wider applicability.

THE CONTRADICTORY CERTAINTIES OF
PRESIDENTIAL LORE

Some fifty years ago Pendleton Herring in his seminal, if seldom read, Presidential Leadership stated the lightning rod hypothesis in the context of the
American presidency. To be effective, Herring argued, a president "must be
guarded from the frictions that his administration creates." By becoming
too closely identified with "policies or actions which the voters may decide
to repudiate, he runs the constant danger of becoming discredited before his
term of office has expired." A president can deflect blame, Herring reasoned, by acting "as a generalissimo who devolves upon his generals the responsibility for the attainment of particular objectives. If they fail they can
be disgraced and removed; or kicked upstairs to posts of less crucial importance." As an example, Herring pointed to the "notable procession of
scapegoats" who "retreated from office [during the New Deal] under a
weight of popular disapproval," while President Roosevelt remained popular.5
This argument seems plausible enough. But so too does the opposite case,
argued by Harold Laski in his classic The American Presidency, published in
the same year (1940) as Herring's treatise. An American president, Laski
maintains, cannot deflect blame onto subordinates. A president's position as
head of the executive branch, Laski insists, "makes him a target to be attacked by every person or interest at all critical of his purposes. He is there,
in all cases, to be blamed; and there is no one, in any real sense, who can
help to bear the burden of the blame." In contrast to England, where
we blame an anonymous entity 'the Government' if things go wrong,
.. . in the United States it is the president who is blamed. A decision of
the Supreme Court is regarded as adverse to his policy; a defeat in Congress is a blow to his prestige; the mid-term congressional elections affect his policy, for good or ill. No one thinks of them in terms of their
effect upon his cabinet.
Laski takes the argument a step further by suggesting that those presidents
who do not defer to subordinates will be more popular than those who do.
"A masterful man in the White House," Laski suggests, will "be more to the
liking of the multitude than one who is thought to be swayed by his colleagues .... The mere fact that the president insists upon being the center
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of the stage continuously strengthens his position." Like Herring, Laski
points to the example of Franklin Roosevelt to support his proposition. 6
Who is right, and how would we decide? Are cabinet members, as Laski
argues, of no help in protecting a president? Or can they, as Herring suggests, prevent him from being beaten down by daily political struggles? Is
the White House, as Patrick Anderson has asserted, "so constructed that
credit flows upward and blame downward, " ' or is it the case, as Lord James
Bryce insisted, that a president "cannot avoid responsibility by alleging the
advice of his ministers, for he need not follow it, and they are bound to obey
him or retire? " 8 Is it true, as Arthur Krock would have it, that "subordinates
are always available in profusion to take the gaff, or, without diminishing
[the president], the credit, " 9 or is John Ehrlichman correct in holding that
"if a Secretary makes political waves it's his President who gets wet?" 10
Which if any of these contradictory propositions (one is tempted to say
proverbs) are correct?
Such contradictory claims are characteristic of much of the literature on
the presidency. Propositions about the presidency are too often put forth as
if they were self-evident truths rather than hypotheses needing to be investigated. Unsubstantiated assertions, such as those enumerated above, are often repeated in textbooks, but rarely is an attempt made to demonstrate the
validity of the claim (or even to show how the claim might in principle be
validated) . As a result, little work on the presidency is cumulative in character.
Instead, judgments about the presidency often swing in reaction to the
travails or triumphs of the latest president. Harry Truman showed that the
office ennobled the man; Lyndon Johnson showed that the office corrupted
the man. Richard Nixon demonstrated that a president should not have a
chief of staff blocking access to the president; Gerald Ford demonstrated
that a president needs a chief of staff restricting access to the president.
Jimmy Carter proved that presidents need to focus on the big picture, delegating the rest to subordinates; Ronald Reagan proved that presidents could
not afford to become too detached from the details of day-to-day policy
making. Franklin Roosevelt established that the public loved a political master in the White House; Dwight Eisenhower established that the public loved
a detached, apolitical leader in the White House.
Surveying the state of the field, Fred Greenstein has recently written that it
is "more appropriate to speak of lore than of laws in discussing the conduct
of the presidency." " With so few presidents and so many variables, laws may
be more than we can hope for, but perhaps we can still aspire to something
better than the current presidential lore. My aim is to improve upon existing
lore by treating the competing claims made by Laski, Bryce, Herring, Patrick Anderson, and others as rival hypotheses to be tested. These contradic-

4
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tory assertions can be reconciled by specifying conditions under which a
president can deflect blame onto subordinates.
The task of stating such conditions is complicated by the lack of agreement among observers about which presidential advisers have served as
lightning rods and which as liabilities. 12 A first step in evaluating the competing hypotheses is to distinguish an adviser who deflects blame away from a
president (and thus acts as a lightning rod) from one who attracts blame toward a president (and thus serves as a liability).
Before proceeding with this line of inquiry, however, I want to address the
peculiar neglect that students of the presidency have shown toward the question of the effect that advisers (whether cabinet members, staff, or vice presidents) have on a president's public (mass or elite) support. Although one
can cull a collection of suggestive, if contradictory, sentences and even paragraphs, nowhere has the subject been given sustained, let alone rigorous,
analysis. 13

BETWEEN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

The topic of presidential lightning rods has been a casualty of the division
within political science between public administration, which considers its
proper domain of inquiry to be modes of executive decision making, management techniques, leadership styles, and the like, and political behavior,
which concerns itself largely with statistical analyses of mass political attitudes and behavior. Models of presidential popularity have thus remained
the province of those versed in mass political attitudes, while the study of
presidential leadership styles has been left almost entirely to those with a
public administration bent.
The lightning rod concept is premised on the assumption that the behavior of leaders affects how the public perceives and attributes responsibility.
This possibility has been largely ignored by students of presidential popularity, who have instead focused on the impact of war, inflation, unemployment, and other real world events on the public's evaluation of presidential
performance.•• Largely missing from the debate over the relative influence of
these factors on presidential popularity is an appreciation that what cannot
be explained by events may be at least as important as what can. The lightning rod hypothesis suggests that where there is only a loose fit between
events and popularity, one might profitably look to leadership style for an
explanation.
This neglect of the role of presidential behavior by students of presidential
popularity is particularly surprising in view of the conclusion reached by
John Mueller in his pioneering essay, "Presidential Popularity from Truman
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to Johnson." Mueller's work is usually remembered, and rightly so, for introducing such variables as the "coalition of minorities," "economic
slump," "war," and "rally around the flag." Largely forgotten, however, is
Mueller's conclusion that any "analysis of Presidential popularity cannot
rely entirely on [these] ... variables ... , but must also incorporate parameters designed to allow for the special character of each administration."
Mueller found that a high degree of fit could be achieved only "by allowing
the special character of each Presidential administration to be expressed in
the equation." 15 Mueller's model thus not only left plenty of scope for presidential behavior, it required that presidential behavior be incorporated.
Rather than explore what it is that more popular presidents do to maintain their popularity, the dominant tendency among researchers in this field
has been to try to improve the fit between events and popularity by turning
to more refined statistical techniques. This research has shown Mueller's
findings to be marred by statistical errors and, building upon his edifice, has
constructed superior models of the effect of events on popularity. 16 But as
Richard Brody, a leading student of the determinants of presidential support, has recently pointed out, "In no study-no matter how sophisticated
the econometrics employed-is the link of the economy to evaluations of the
president at a level of strength which would justify the conclusion: 'Now we
have the explanation, we need pursue the question no further.' " 11
Existing models of presidential popularity are particularly poor in accounting for Dwight Eisenhower's pattern of public support. "Only for
Eisenhower," Samuel Kernell finds, does his "equation fail to explain a substantial share of fluctuation in his public support." A one-percentage-point
increase in prices, for instance, lowered Eisenhower's popularity by one percentage point, while reducing Lyndon Johnson's by more than four points. 18
Similarly, Charles Ostrom and Dennis Simon find that "the economic problems of the late 1950s ... cost President Eisenhower significantly fewer
points ... than the penalty imposed on President Nixon for similar conditions in the 1970s." 19 Because Eisenhower's popularity was not a hostage to
events (or time), I have chosen to pay particularly close attention to his presidency in evaluating the lightning rod hypothesis.
Faced with an incomplete fit between real world events and presidential
popularity (not to mention the statistical problems presented by time-series
analysis), 20 a number of researchers have turned their attention to the individual perceptions that mediate between real world events and evaluations of
presidential performance. 21 The attribution of blame, these scholars have
shown, is not a reflexive response to objective events. Rather, blame is assigned by filtering events through a perceptual screen. This research marks
an important step away from "the assumption of automatic political
blame" 22 that has informed so much of the research on presidential popularity.
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Recognizing the contingency of blame compels one to look not only at
how followers attribute responsibility but also at the "blame g_ames" 23
played by politicians that are geared to altering the perceptions of followers.
The use of advisers as lightning rods is only one of a number of blameavoidance strategies a president can pursue.2• Where the opposition party
controls one or both houses of Congress, for example, presidents may try to
deflect blame onto the legislative branch. Or, particularly at the outset of a
term, a president might blame the previous incumbent for negative outcomes. My contention is that our understanding of the dynamics of presidential popularity can be enhanced by analyzing the process through which
presidents attempt to shift blame onto others.
If the study of presidential popularity has been hampered by a neglect of
how presidential behavior mediates between events and the perceptions of
followers, the study of presidential subordinates has suffered from slighting
advisers' interaction with the public. Members of the president's cabinet,
when studied at all, are conventionally viewed as either advisers to the president or administrators of public policy. The first Hoover Commission report, for instance, observed that departmental heads have a "dual function
.. . as advisers to the President, and administrators of the departments. " 2s
Similarly, Leonard White writes of heads of departments as occupying the
"dual position" of adviser and administrator. 26
For those interested in the cabinet member as adviser (or president as decision maker), the relevant topics include the extent to which a cabinet member has direct access to the president and whether the department head's advice is proffered in a formal or informal setting. Such scholars commonly
contrast a "formalistic" or "bureaucratic" decision-making style, in which
advice is funneled up through a formal hierarchy, with a "collegial" or
"competitive" model of organization, in which advisers at every level have
direct access to the president. 21 These alternative advisory structures are
compared for the range of options and quality of information with which
the president is presented.
Students concerned with cabinet members as implementors (or saboteurs)
of presidential policy are interested in the degree of congruence between the
policies of the president and those pursued by a cabinet member. A standard
question is whether members of the cabinet, because of the "many masters"
they must serve-Congress, interest groups, the department itself-are "a
President's natural enemies. " 28 Such scholars pay particular attention to the
strategies a president may pursue to secure compliance from the department
head. 29
Understanding a cabinet member's contribution to the formulation and
execution of public policy is, of course, essential to a study of presidentialcabinet relations. But cabinet members, indeed all presidential advisers and
assistants, can also be usefully studied from the perspective of how they con-
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tribute to, or detract from, a president's public standing inside and outside
of Washington. The adviser as lightning rod-defined as a relationship in
which an unpopular adviser deflects criticism away from the president-is
only one of at least four possible forms that the relationship between president, adviser, and the public may assume. The other three forms are a popular adviser bolstering a president's popularity (the adviser as asset); a popular adviser detracting from a president's popularity (the adviser as upstager);
and an unpopular adviser diminishing a president's popularity (the adviser
as liability).

FOUR HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS

In his classic book The President's Cabinet, Richard Fenno hypothesizes
that a prominent cabinet member adds prestige to an administration, thus
boosting support for the president. Those few cabinet members who achieve
prominence, Fenno argues, "add to the public confidence and public prestige which are the fundamental underpinnings of the President's success as
Chief Representative of the Nation." It is unlikely, Fenno continues, "that a
Cabinet member could achieve national standing without its redounding to
the net credit of the President. " ' 0 This positive-sum conception of the relationship between president and adviser treats the well-regarded adviser as an
asset to the president.
An adviser's favorable reputation, however, may not necessarily bolster a
president's popularity. An alternative possibility is that the favorable reputation of an adviser may be gained at the expense of the president. Many in
the Johnson White House felt that Press Secretary Bill Moyers had this sort
of negative-sum relationship with President Johnson. As one staffer put it:
"Moyers became the White Hat and Johnson was the Black Hat. If anything good happened in the government, it was Moyers. If anything bad
happened, it was Johnson."" Jim Baker's relationship with George Bush
was sometimes seen in a similar negative-sum light: "If Baker is the great
poohbah and savior," comments Lynn Nofziger, "it makes George Bush
look weak." 32 The relationship between Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger,
examined in Chapter 5, provides an additional illustration of an admired adviser upstaging the president.
A third type of interaction between adviser and president is, at first
glance, somewhat difficult to distinguish from the lightning rod relationship. Here the adviser attracts criticism but, rather than deflecting blame
away from the president, generates dissatisfaction with the president.
Reagan's interior secretary James Watt, I argue in Chapter 3, is an archetypal example of this type of adviser who so angers critics that he becomes a
liability to the president.
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The distinction between a liability and a lightning rod is sometimes muddied in everyday discourse by using the term "lightning rod" to indicate the
attraction of controversy, shorn of its connotation of deflecting criticism.
For examples, a journalist reports, "It is understandable that the White
House had no desire to send an Administration bill to Congress to become
the lightning rod for environmentalists' ire. " 33 At times, the term "lightning
rod" seems to become virtually a synonym for liability, as, for instance, in
the remark that "everyone realized that the Democrats would be unable to
attack the beloved President directly, yet the combative Nixon remained a
lightning rod for controversy; would it not be better to choose someone else
to serve as Ike's running mate?" 34 Reagan's first press secretary, Larry
Speakes, appears to use the term in a similar fashion when he writes, "We
certainly had our share of lightning rods, like Watt, who drew constant fire
from the environmentalists; Ray Donovan who could never establish rapport with the labor unions; and Ted Bell over at Education. All three were
decent gentlemen who were unsuited for their posts. " 35 Equally confusing is
the usage of the term adopted by a conservative activist who, before the 1992
New Hampshire primary, explained that "if [Pat] Buchanan runs, then
[John] Sununu is a lightning rod. " Because "people [Sununu] antagonized
.. . might be drawn to Buchanan," Bush needed to jettison his lightning
rod and "be standing there by himself" come February.36
In this book, I use the term "lightning rod" to designate not merely the
attraction of criticism but the deflection of criticism away from someone or
something. The term "liability" is reserved for those individuals whose
actions not only engender criticism of themselves but of others. Whether an
adviser is a lightning rod thus depends not only on the volume or intensity
of criticism aimed at an adviser, but also on the effect that criticism has on
support for the president.

PITFALLS OF A METAPHOR
To identify an adviser as a "lightning rod" is to engage in the use of metaphor. A metaphor, as defined in Webster's dictionary, is "a figure of speech
containing an implied comparison, in which a word or phrase ordinarily and
primarily used of one thing is applied to another." Metaphor enables us to
move from the familiar to the unknown. Yet there is always the danger that a
metaphor may conceal as much or more than it illuminates. 37 More precisely,
the peril of taking a metaphor literally is that one confuses attributes of the
analogy with attributes of reality.
To begin with, presidential advisers are not inanimate objects. They have
agendas, ambitions, and aspirations that may or may not coincide with the
president's. The metaphor leads one to assume that an adviser is providing
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political cover for a president, but it may well be that the adviser is pursuing
a policy about which the president cares little or perhaps even disagrees
with. One needs therefore always to ask whether the adviser is taking the
heat while pursuing the president's or his own agenda.
Just as likening advisers to lightning rods may lead one to overlook the
strategic calculations of the adviser, so it may result in neglecting the strategic interests of presidential adversaries, particularly members of Congress.
The metaphor presumes that the president has positioned his adviser in such
a way that the adviser rather than the president absorbs the criticism. Neglected is the possibility that it is the strategic calculations of the president's
political opponents that explain why the adviser rather than the president is
criticized.
The costs to a congressman of attacking an unpopular president are lower
than those of criticizing a popular president. As one pundit, writing about
President Eisenhower, put it, "In politics, you can't kick a man when he's
up. " 38 The obverse is also true. As Lyndon Johnson explained, "If some
folks think a fellow is winged or crippled, they pile into him .... If you've
got an enemy, it gives him a lot of hope. " 39 The thesis that it is the opposition's strategic interests, rather than a president's behavior, that accounts for
the lightning rod phenomenon is advanced by a former member of the
Eisenhower administration, who suggests: "I think whether he [Eisenhower]
had delegated or not ... it was simpler not to attack him. This made the
next line fair game, and the next line was Cabinet members. " 40
We need therefore to distinguish the "strong" lightning rod hypothesispeople attack an adviser because they believe that person is corrupting a
president's good intentions-from a "weak" version of the lightning rod hypothesis-opponents, for tactical reasons of their own, criticize the adviser
rather than the president. Examples of the weak lightning rod hypothesis include the assertion by a GOP pollster that Vice President George Bush "is a
lightning rod for all those constituencies angry at Ronald Reagan," or journalist Robert Donovan's suggestion that Sherman Adams "has been a whipping-boy for extreme right-wing Republicans who dislike the direction in
which Eisenhower is taking the party but who have found it safer to hit Adams with blows intended for the President. " 41 The weaker version submits
that the lightning rod phenomenon is not only, as the metaphor implies,
something constructed and manipulated by the president, but is also manipulated by an opposition trying to influence the policies of a popular president, the unintended consequence of which is to help sustain a president's
popularity.
When we refer to an individual as a "lightning rod," there is a further presumption that the individual was placed there by the president with malice
aforethought. The danger again is that the metaphor leads us to assume
what needs to be demonstrated. A president's intentions (like those of his
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opponents) must remain an empirical question. It cannot be presumed that
the president is cognizant of the lightning rod phenomenon in making appointments or organizing his government. It may be, for instance, that a
president chooses cabinet members with the aim of increasing the administration's prestige (the adviser as asset), with the unintended consequence of
providing highly visible members who can function as lightning rods.
Finally, literal adherence to the metaphor may obscure the costs attached
to using advisers as lightning rods. Even when an adviser is pursuing policies
the president approves of, one must still ask whether a president's public detachment from a policy entails a sacrifice in the president's effectiveness. To
what extent does the president have to put himself in the line of fire to persuade others to go along with the administration's plans? Chapter 7 addresses questions about the limits of a lightning rod strategy through an examination of the relationship between President Eisenhower and Attorney
General Herbert Brownell during the battle over civil rights legislation.

PUBLIC VISIBILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS

Unknowns cannot function as lightning rods. If people don't know who a
president's advisers are they can hardly blame those advisers for policies
gone awry. How publicly visible, then, are a president's cabinet and staff?
The only systematic treatment of this subject, Fenno's The President's Cabinet, comes to the conclusion that "the activities of Cabinet members simply
do not get reported in the public press. " 42 If Fenno is right, then there might
seem to be little point in pursuing the lightning rod hypothesis any further.
Fenno's evidence for this contention comes from the New York Times Index from 1912 to 1932. During Woodrow Wilson's administration, for instance, Fenno finds that the secretaries of agriculture, interior, commerce,
and labor got their names in the Times an average of no more than once a
week. With the exception of a single year, the same was true for the postmaster general. Their appearances on the front page were even rarer, ranging
from a low of about once a year for the secretary of agriculture to a high of
almost ten times a year for the attorney general. The same held true for the
Republican administrations of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover. Two-thirds of Hoover's cabinet, for example, averaged less
than one appearance a week in the Times and less than one appearance a
month on the front page. 43
The pattern of news coverage that characterized the cabinets of Wilson,
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, however, seems to be substantially lower
than the coverage of "modern''-i.e., post-Franklin Roosevelt-presidents.
Whereas Fenno reports that for the "outer cabinet" posts of agriculture, interior, commerce, labor, and postmaster general the norm was less than one
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TABLE 1.1 . Average yearly number of front-page mentions of department
heads in the New York Times.

Agriculture
Interior
Postmaster
General
Labor
Commerce
Total

Wilson
1912-1920

Harding/
Coolidge
1921-1928

Hoover
1929-1932

FDR
1933-1940

1.4
4.1

3.3
3.4

7.0
1.8

10.6
14.8

6.9
6.1
2.3
4.2

4.9
5.6
31.6
9.8

2.8
6.0
9.3
5.4

33.8
10.8
12.1
16.4

Sources: The Wilson through Hoover averages are computed from data presented in
Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The President's Cabinet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1959), 165-66, with the exception of the number for the secretary of commerce under Harding and Coolidge, data for which are not presented in Fen no. The latter figure
and the FDR averages have been computed by the author from the New York Times Index.

mention a week in the Times, the evidence for Franklin Roosevelt's first two
terms is startlingly different. 44 No secretary of any of these departments averaged less than one mention a week during the first eight years of the
Roosevelt administration. Indeed, only in one year (1938) did a department
head (Labor Secretary Frances Perkins) average less than one mention a
week. The least prominent of the six posts (commerce and agriculture) averaged close to two mentions a week, and the most prominent post (postmaster general) averaged five mentions a week. The other two (interior and labor) averaged between two and two-and-a-half mentions a year. 45 As Table
1.1 shows, front-page stories reveal a similar contrast in coverage. The cabinet heads during the Roosevelt presidency received something in the order of
a threefold increase over the coverage of cabinet heads during the preceding
presidencies. Most telling of all, of the "outer cabinet" heads who served between 1912 and 1932 only Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (19211928) received more coverage than the least visible of FDR's cabinet heads.
In any event, the validity of the lightning rod hypothesis depends not on
the average visibility of administration officials but rather on the visibility
of a few extraordinary officials. During Roosevelt's first term, for instance,
Postmaster General James Farley got his name in the New York Times an
average of 355 times a year, or almost once a day, and received a front-page
mention almost once a week. During the first year of the Eisenhower administration, to take another example, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson appeared in the New York Times 274 times, an average of more than five
times a week. In marked contrast to President Wilson's secretary of agriculture, who appeared on the front page eleven times in eight years, or the secre-
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TABLE 1.2. Top ten administration officials and members of Congress in
television coverage.

J.

Baker
Cheney
Quayle
Fitzwater
Sununu
Thornburgh
Bennett
B. Bush
Scowcroft
Darman

1989

1990

322
148
119
85
53
100
88
70
52
34

503
217
117
94
102
48
50
45
56
66

825
365
236
179
155
148
138
115
108
100
2,369

89
80
103
78
149
42
37

143
122
63
84
4
59
59
46
55
47

232
202
166
162
153
101

Administration Total
R. Dole
Mitchell
Nunn
Foley
J. Wright
Gingrich
Kennedy
Glenn
Gephardt
Rostenkowski
Congressional Total

44

32
27

Two-Year Total

96

90
87
74
1,363

Source: Calculated as the total number of entries in the Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts.

tary of agriculture during the Harding-Coolidge period, who was front-page
news twenty-six times in eight years, Benson appeared in a front-page story
thirty-five times in his first year alone. 46
Relative to members of Congress, moreover, top cabinet members and
other high administration officials do very well in terms of media coverage.
During President George Bush's first two years in office, as Table 1.2 indicates, no senator or representative received nearly as much television coverage as Secretary of State Jim Baker or Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. And
the top ten administration officials easily outdistanced the top ten senators
or representatives in terms of television news coverage. Indeed the ten most
visible administration officials received close to twice as much coverage as
the ten most visible senators and representatives.•1
Just because newspapers or even television news report the activities of
administration officials does not, of course, mean that the public knows
who these people are. 48 Indeed, one might object to the lightning rod hypothesis, in so far as it pertains to the mass public, on the grounds that it re-
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Public awareness of administration officials (in percentages).

Wilson
Dulles
Durkin
Brownell
Dodge
Benson
Mitchell
Humphrey
Weeks
Summerfield
McKay
Hobby
Stassen
Seaton
Folsom
No Opinion

Feb.
1953

Nov.
1953

July
1954

July
1955

Sep.
1956

91

81
85

84

83
92

85

85

92

93

96

72
41
79
47

76

68

67

68

83
53
56

81

84
66
51
47

79

72

48

48

51
35
51
32
57

55
35
52
32
78
71

5

3

3

54
66

41

39

52

59

88

81
29
39
1

30
5

Jan.
1957

37
2

Source: Opinion Research Corporation; data provided by Roper Center. The question
was, Which of these members of the present administration have you heard or read
about?

quires an unrealistic degree of political knowledge on the part of the general
public and thus ignores decades of public opinion research demonstrating
minimal public awareness of the political realm. As Richard Neustadt
warns, "One never should underestimate the public's power to ignore, to acquiesce, and to forget, especially when the proceedings seem incalculable or
remote from private life. " 49 Any thesis that requires most people, most of the
time, to be informed and concerned about politics is unlikely to be valid.
Equally vital, though, is the need to differentiate "the" public. As Neustadt himself recognizes, " 'the' presidential public is actually an aggregate of
publics as diverse and overlapping as the claims Americans and allied
peoples press on Washington. " 50 In thinking about lightning rods, it is essential to be clear about which of these diverse publics one has in mind. To
function as a lightning rod, an administration official must be known to the
subpopulation that is antagonized by an administration policy. The relevant
population for evaluating whether a secretary of agriculture has served as a
presidential lightning rod, for instance, is probably the subpopulation of
farmers rather than the population as a whole.
Just as one cannot reduce the public to an undifferentiated, and largely
apathetic, ill-informed mass, one cannot regard all administration officials
other than the president as equally unknown to the public. As suggested earlier, press coverage of administration officials varies dramatically, and as a
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result so too does public awareness of administration officials. In Eisenhower's administration, for instance, anywhere from 80 to 95 percent of the
public ordinarily claimed to have heard or read about Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. In a totally different category, as Table 1.3
shows, were the likes of Interior Secretary Douglas McKay or Commerce
Secretary Sinclair Weeks. Only about a third of the population even claimed
to have heard of either of these two cabinet secretaries. In evaluating the validity of the lightning rod thesis, at least at the mass public level, we need not
concern ourselves with how little is known of the least prominent officials
but instead should focus on those extraordinary few who are highly visible
and well known.
In the next two chapters, I examine two of the most prominent and controversial cabinet members in recent history-Reagan's first secretary of the
interior, James Watt, and Eisenhower's secretary of agriculture, Ezra Taft
Benson. In comparing the tenures of these two men, I show how one might
distinguish a presidential lightning rod from a liability, and I identify some
of the conditions necessary for an adviser to deflect blame away from the
president.

2
Ike's Lightning Rod:
Secretary of Agriculture
Ezra Taft Benson

Any exploration of the lightning rod phenomenon must begin with the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. No modern president has maintained such
high levels of popularity for so long, and no modern president has so successfully insulated himself from bad news and controversy. ' In a tremendously influential book, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as
Leader, political scientist Fred Greenstein argues that Eisenhower's success
in insulating himself from the day-to-day controversies of his administration
was a direct result of his "hidden-hand" leadership style, which kept "the
controversial political side of the presidential role largely covert" and accented his role as "an uncontroversial head of state. " 2 A key component of
Eisenhower's hidden-hand style, as described by Greenstein, was his use of
advisers as lightning rods to take the heat on controversial policies. 3
That President Eisenhower thought in terms of lightning rods and the deflection of blame onto subordinates is suggested by the much-quoted recollection of Press Secretary James Hagerty. According to Hagerty: "President
Eisenhower would say, 'Do it this way.' I would say, 'If I go to that press
conference and say what you want me to say, I would get hell.' With that he
would smile, get up and walk around the desk, pat me on the back and say,
'My boy, better you than me.' " 4 In a similar vein, Attorney General Herbert
Brownell recalls Eisenhower telling him in their first official meeting: "It's
your responsibility, you know, as well as your authority. Now if anything
goes wrong, you know who's going to get it, don't you. " 5 And Emmet
Hughes, a speech writer for President Eisenhower, recounts a conversation
late in I 957 in which Eisenhower defended keeping John Foster Dulles as
secretary of state: "People just don't like the personality of Foster's, while
they do like me .... I know what they say about Foster-dull, duller,
Dulles-and all that. But the Democrats love to hit him rather than me . " 6
The crux of Eisenhower's leadership strategy was to allow trusted cabinet
15
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members significant autonomy in formulating and administering policy. By
delegating the authority to make decisions, Eisenhower hoped also to delegate responsibility for the results of those decisions, thereby allowing him to
maintain a noncontroversial or nonpolitical public profile. That Eisenhower
understood this connection is clear from his underlining of a passage in Arthur Krock's memoirs critical of President Lyndon Johnson's leadership
style. Krock wrote (and Eisenhower underlined): "Johnson, as much as any
president in our history, has closely identified himself and his office with the
disasters, foreign and domestic, economic and social, into which the United
States has become more and more deeply involved in his time .... [A]
source of this close identification with all acts, policies and thorny situations
is a passion to control every function of government, though subordinates
are always available in profusion to take the gaff. " 1
Foremost among the Eisenhower administration lightning rods Greenstein
identifies is Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson. 8 "Farmers who rankled at the moves toward decreasing subsidization of agriculture," Greenstein suggests, "blamed the zealous Mormon elder, Ezra Taft Benson . . .
not Eisenhower. " 9 The claim is suggestive, even plausible, but Greenstein
provides no evidence to support it. That Benson was the target of heated
criticism by farmers is beyond doubt to anyone familiar with the period, but
that Benson deflected blame away Eisenhower is far from self-evident. Indeed the conventional wisdom among press and politicians during the 1950s
was that Benson was a damaging liability for President Eisenhower. Farmbelt congressmen complained constantly that Benson undermined farmers'
confidence in Eisenhower. 10 Many on the White House staff shared this view
of Benson as a political liability, 11 and it was frequently repeated by journalists and academics. Writing in the closing years of the Eisenhower administration, Richard Fenno, to take one prominent example, asserted that "more
than any other member of the Eisenhower Cabinet, [Benson] has been a political liability." 12
How might one mediate between these rival claims? How is one to determine whether Benson was a liability or a lightning rod? The question is important for how one judges the quality of Eisenhower's leadership. If Benson was a liability, Eisenhower's decision to retain Benson throughout his
two terms seems to indicate incredible political naivete if not obtuseness. If
Benson was a lightning rod, that same decision seems to be evidence of devilish cleverness. In answering the question of whether Benson served as a
lightning rod, this chapter (1) examines available survey evidence of farmers'
opinions in the 1950s, (2) compares these survey results with farm surveys
taken in later administrations, (3) investigates elites' reaction to Benson's
tenure, and (4) looks at Eisenhower and Benson's behind-the-scenes relationship. The aim of this intensive examination of the Eisenhower-Benson
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relationship is both to judge the validity and utility of the lightning rod construct and to gauge the effectiveness of Eisenhower's leadership.

EISENHOWER, BENSON, AND THE FARMERS
When Eisenhower entered the presidency, he inherited an agricultural system
that established price supports at 90 percent of parity (a government-set
"fair" price) for six basic crops : wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and
rice. Established during World War II to boost food production, price supports quickly became seen as the farmers' due. As the supply of crops increased (a result of technological innovations as well as government subsidies), the price of crops fell. The further prices fell, the more crops
government had to buy at 90 percent of the parity price. For the government, declining prices meant storing immense surpluses that were difficult
to unload without further depressing agricultural prices (by 1954 the government had enough wheat and cotton and other crops to supply the market for
a full year); '3 for taxpayers it meant increasing subsidies for farmers; and for
farmers declining prices meant economic hardship.
Eisenhower's long-term objective was to restore a free market in farm
products; his short-term goal was more modest-to reduce price supports by
instituting a flexible system of payments ranging from 75 percent to 90 percent of the parity price. But even such modest reforms brought howls of protest from farm-state congressmen and important agricultural groups. Agricultural interests' unhappiness over the specific reforms proposed by the
Eisenhower administration was exacerbated by the prolonged downturn in
farm prices. In contrast to the national economy as a whole, which was relatively favorable for Eisenhower most of the time, the farm economy remained a trouble spot throughout the 1950s.
Given the state of the agricultural economy and the administration's chosen course it is not surprising that Secretary Benson would be, as Chief of
Staff Sherman Adams described him, "the most unpopular and the most
harshly criticized figure in the Cabinet." 14 What is surprising is that by and
large President Eisenhower remained remarkably popular among farmers.
Surveys of farmers conducted during the 1950s strongly support Greenstein's contention that Benson's unpopularity among farmers did not translate into disapproval of Eisenhower. A substantial proportion of farmers,
these polls show, simultaneously liked Ike and disapproved of the performance of Secretary Benson.
A Gallup poll taken at the outset of 1958, for instance, found that twothirds of farmers approved of Eisenhower, while slightly less than 30 percent
approved of Benson. Among those farmers who held an opinion about both
Benson and Eisenhower (three-fourths of the sample), moreover, more than
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two in five combined disapproval of Benson with approval of Eisenhower. 15
A similar discrepancy between attitudes toward Eisenhower and attitudes toward Benson shows up in surveys of farmers at the state level.
A particularly rich source of farmers' opinions during the Eisenhower
years are the surveys of Iowa farmers conducted by Wallace's Farmer, which
periodically asked farmers to evaluate the performance of President Eisenhower and Secretary Benson on a scale of "good," "fair," or "poor." 16 In
none of these polls did more than 14 percent of Iowa farmers judge Eisenhower's performance as poor, while, in contrast, no more than 15 percent
ever rated Benson's performance as good.
In the fall of 1953, 88 percent of Iowa farmers judged the president's performance as either good or fair, while only 8 percent gave the president a
poor rating. In contrast, 33 percent believed the secretary was doing a poor
job. " By the end of 1954, only 3 percent of Iowa farmers judged Eisenhower
to be doing a poor job, compared with 28 percent who believed Benson's
performance was poor. Close to 60 percent rated Eisenhower's performance
good, while only 15 percent were willing to give the same grade to the secretary of agriculture. 18
Although discontent among Iowa farmers increased as farm prices fell,
the disparity between attitudes toward Eisenhower and Benson remained
large. In the summer of 1957, for instance, 55 percent believed the secretary
was doing a poor job, while only 14 percent rendered the same judgment
about the president. More than 80 percent believed the president was doing
either a good or fair job, while only one-third of the sample would say the
same about Benson. A poll conducted the following summer revealed almost precisely the same pattern of support. 19
Another survey, conducted less than a month before the 1958 midterm
elections, found that only 8 percent of Iowa farmers believed Eisenhower
was doing a poor job, compared with 44 percent who disapproved of Benson's performance. Fifty-five percent believed the president was doing a
good job, and only 13 percent gave the secretary of agriculture the same high
mark. Moreover, of the 88 percent who had an opinion about both Eisenhower and Benson, two-thirds gave Eisenhower a higher rating than they
gave Benson, one-third judged the performances of Eisenhower and Benson
the same, and less than 1 percent viewed Benson more positively than Eisenhower. 20
These surveys suggest that Benson's popularity among farmers was highly
susceptible to changes in the farm situation. This connection did not go unnoticed by Benson, who lamented "the discouraging correlation between the
level of farm prices and my level of popularity. " 21 When prices fell, elite demands for Benson's resignation increased and his popularity among farmers
fell. What is remarkable is that Eisenhower's popularity among farmers re-
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mained relatively impervious to changes in Benson's popularity or drops in
prices.
Eisenhower's relative insulation from farmers' distress is particularly evident in a special survey of midwestern farm households conducted by Gallup in the spring of 1956, which found that although 76 percent believed
farmers were worse off than they had been a few years ago, 62 percent still
expressed approval of Eisenhower's performance. The widespread perception that the farmers' situation had deteriorated during Eisenhower's first
term was evidently blamed on Benson, who received only a 32 percent approval rating.22
These surveys tend to belie one farmer's confident report that "those that
had a good year are still all for Ike, and those who didn't ain't. " 23 Instead
what they show is that although attitudes toward Benson were closely tied to
the state of the farm economy, attitudes toward Eisenhower were relatively
independent of conditions on the farm.

BLOCK, BERGLAND, AND BUTZ

The extraordinary nature of the Eisenhower-Benson pattern can be more
fully appreciated by contrasting it with farmers' attitudes toward the recent
administrations of Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and Gerald Ford. Surveys
of farm opinion taken during these three presidencies suggest that, by and
large, farmers tend not to distinguish much between the secretary of agriculture and the president. 24
Among Iowa farmers, for instance, the popularity of President Reagan
and Secretary of Agriculture John Block closely coincided. Throughout the
first term, both Reagan and Block were approved of by a modest majority of
Iowa farmers. At no point was the percentage of farmers who disapproved
of the two men more than three percentage points apart. 25 In the opening
year of the second term, as discontent rose sharply, Iowa farmers soured on
both Block and Reagan. By January 1986, 61 percent of farmers disapproved of Block's performance and 56 percent disapproved of Reagan's. 26
In Illinois, Block's home state, both Block and Reagan were well liked
during the first term, but to the extent that there was a discrepancy in attitudes toward the two, Block tended to be less unpopular than Reagan. On
average, about 5 or 6 percent more Illinois farmers disapproved of Reagan
than disapproved of Block. 27 Indiana farmers showed a similar tendency
during the first term to evaluate both Block and Reagan positively, with
Reagan's unpopularity running, on average, a few points lower than Block's.
Neither Carter nor his secretary of agriculture, Bob Bergland, were very
popular among farmers, but to the extent that a divergence of opinion existed, Bergland tended to be less unpopular than his beleaguered chief.
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Among Iowa farmers, for instance, Carter's disapproval rating averaged
about 47 percent, almost 7 percent higher than disapproval of Bergland. 28
Similarly, averaging the results from Illinois polls shows that slightly more
than half of Illinois farmers expressed disapproval of Carter, while
Bergland's unpopularity was roughly 5 percentage points lower. Among Indiana farmers, the average disapproval rating of Carter was 47 percent, and
for Bergland 40 percent. 29
In the case of Gerald Ford and his secretary of agriculture, Earl Butz, surveys again suggest a tight coupling of farmer attitudes toward the president
and secretary of agriculture, with a slight tendency toward greater disapproval of the president than the secretary. Averaging the four Illinois polls
taken in 1975 and 1976 reveals that virtually the same number of Illinois
farmers disapproved of Butz (27 percent) as disapproved of Ford (28 percent). 30 Indiana farmers tended to express slightly higher levels of dissatisfaction with Ford's performance (32 percent), while only 26 percent said they
disapproved of Butz.
In comparing the attitudes of farmers toward the Reagan, Carter, and
Ford administrations with those toward the Eisenhower presidency, the most
striking feature is the extent to which farmers' evaluations of the president
and the agriculture secretary are joined in the case of these other three presidents and divorced in the case of Eisenhower. There was sometimes as much
as a 40 (and never less than 20) percent difference between disapproval of
Benson and disapproval of Eisenhower. In contrast, Reagan, Carter, and
Ford rarely had disapproval ratings that were more than five or six percentage points lower than the secretary's and, more often than not, the president's disapproval rating was actually higher than that of the secretary's.

BLAMING BENSON FIRST

Farmers did not connect Eisenhower with Benson in large part because elites
either did not perceive or were reluctant, for strategic reasons of their own,
to make such a connection. The message farmers consistently received from
opinion leaders was that it was Benson, and not Eisenhower, who was responsible for declining farm prices and the reduction of price supports.
In the halls of Congress, Benson was routinely blamed for any number of
maladies that afflicted the farmer, while Eisenhower usually went unmentioned or was absolved from blame. 31 'Iypical in this respect was a Senate resolution submitted by Texas Democrat Ralph Yarborough, which stated that
it was the sense of the Senate that the secretary of agriculture should be fired
because his "oppressive policies . .. have failed." The sixteen-point resolution asserted, among other things, that "Mr. Ezra Taft Benson has depressed
the prices received by farmers, . . . stirred up economic civil war between
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producer groups of different farm commodities, .. . [and] tried to eliminate
the small family-type farm in America. " 32 This indictment was characteristic
of anti-Benson sentiment in that it (1) blamed Benson for falling farm
prices, (2) portrayed Benson as a heartless enemy of the family farmer, (3)
identified the administration's farm policies as Benson's policies, and (4)
made no mention of President Eisenhower.
Although few believed, as one congressman did, that Benson was "evil
personified, " 33 many were convinced that the secretary was unsympathetic
to the small farmer's plight. Benson's public image as a heartless ideologue,
who lacked sympathy for small farmers, can be seen in Missouri Senator
Thomas Hennings's complaint that "no relief, or even sincere sympathy, can
be expected from the Department of Agriculture by farmers who face
drought disaster, " 34 as well as in Montana Democrat James Murray's plaint
that "Secretary Benson's administration of farm programs has been uniformly callous and heartless. " 35 In the words of South Dakota Republican
Francis Case, "The great difficulty which Mr. Benson has had all along has
been to persuade the farmers that he has been on their side. " 36
Many critics found it only a short step from the view that Benson didn't
care about declining prices to the view that the secretary's policies were actually designed to bring about lower prices. Senator Hubert Humphrey, for instance, argued that it was "Benson's deliberate objective ... to force farm
prices down." Benson, Humphrey concluded, had "not merely mismanaged
our Nation's farm programs; he has deliberately wrecked them. " 37 Others
accused Benson of pursuing policies that were aimed at "driving the farmer
off the land, " 38 while still others attacked him for being "dedicated to the
creation of a scarcity of food. " 39
Listening to some congressmen, one could come away with the impression
that it was Benson's administration. The maverick senator from Oregon,
Wayne Morse, declared that "more than a million farmers have left the
farms since Benson came into power in 1953, and under his policies American agriculture will continue to be depressed." The time has come, Morse
concluded, to "repudiate the Benson program. " 40 When Eisenhower's name
was drawn into the debate, usually because of some presidential action such
as a veto, his decisions were often attributed to the "bad advice" of Secretary Benson. For instance, after Eisenhower vetoed the "freeze bill" (so
called because it would have frozen all price supports for the coming year at
1957 levels), William Proxmire told his colleagues that he was sure that "the
motives of the President are excellent. I have always assumed this to be
true .... He is, of course, interested in the welfare of farmers. But the President of the United States . . . is ill-advised. " 41 Yarborough concurred with
this view, recalling that he had " served under the President in the European
theatre during the war. I admire him as a great leader, and also
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personally.... If he knew what was going on at the economic front, we
would have had his signature of approval instead of his veto." 42
Even Hubert Humphrey, one of the most vocal and partisan critics of administration farm policy, for the first few years blamed Benson and not
Eisenhower for administration decisions. 43 After the reduction of price supports for dairy products from 90 percent to 75 percent of parity, for instance,
Humphrey called upon the president, "who is a good man, a considerate
man, to reconsider the action which has been taken by his Secretary." Prefacing his remarks with the observation that "the people of my state . ..
have high regard and true affection for the President," Humphrey pleaded
that "if my voice could reach the White House this afternoon . .. I would
ask him [Eisenhower] not to permit one of his agents, one of his department
heads, to disavow a pledge which the President made to the people of my
state and to the people of the Nation. " 44
The heavily Democratic National Farmers Union, although not above
taking swipes at Eisenhower, reserved the great preponderance of its considerable venom for Benson, whom they vilified as "the chief advocate of the
farmer's oppressors, ... the major instrument in the efforts to destroy the
farmers' programs, [and] ... the chief prophet of the ideology which has
been constructed to rationalize the oppression and doom of independent
family-scale agriculture." In contrast, "President Eisenhower's role in the
farm situation is primarily innocent," suggested the editor of the Farmers
Union's Washington Newsletter. "Ike neither knows nor cares much about
what is going on in agriculture. " 45
The belief that Eisenhower was not paying much attention to what Benson was doing is evident in a cable the newly elected Senator Proxmire sent
to President Eisenhower. Proxmire called on Eisenhower "to take immediate
action to replace Ezra Taft Benson as secretary of agriculture. Secretary
Benson's unwise and unsound policies have brought many American farm
families close to ruin. " 46 How was this belief that Benson rather than Eisenhower was responsible for the administration's farm policies sustained? The
answer lies in Eisenhower's capacity to be different things to different people
as well as in his willingness to delegate authority.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING AMBIGUOUS

To sustain a successful lightning rod a president must keep his intentions
ambiguous, thereby allowing opponents to believe that if the president paid
closer attention he might behave differently than the overly zealous aide.
Eisenhower succeeded in keeping his intentions ambiguous enough for
farmers to feel that, despite Benson's policies, the president was on their
side.
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Eisenhower projected an image to farmers that was sharply at variance
with the image projected by Benson. While Benson went around the country
preaching the virtues of self-reliance and free markets and his unalterable
opposition to programs that foster dependence on government, Eisenhower's public statements on agriculture tended to "muddle through." Consider, for instance, the contrast between the president's first annual message
to Congress, which promised that "the Secretary of Agriculture and his associates will ... execute the present act faithfully and thereby seek to mitigate the consequences of the downturn in farm income, " 47 and Benson's
"General Statement on Agricultural Policy," issued only a few days later at
his first press conference. In a sweeping statement of first principles, Benson
declared:
Too many Americans are calling on Washington to do for them what
they should be willing to do for themselves. . . . It is doubtful if any
man can be politically free who depends upon the state for sustenance.
A completely planned and subsidized economy weakens initiative, discourages industry, destroys character and demoralizes the people ....
The principles of economic freedom are applicable to farm
problems .... Farmers should not be placed in a position of working
for government bounty rather than producing for a free market. 48
Eisenhower's public statements on agriculture avoided the doctrinaire attacks on the dangers of government intervention in the marketplace that
characterized many of Benson's speeches. 'Iypical in this respect was Eisenhower's first agricultural address, which came in October 1953 at the annual
convention of the Future Farmers of America. In the speech, Eisenhower
stressed his affinity with, and sympathy for, the small family farmer. He reminded his audience of young farmers that he "worked on the farm during
my boyhood in Abilene, some 160 miles west of here," "grew up among
farmers," and currently owned a farm in Pennsylvania. The president
stressed that he understood and was "deeply concerned" with the problems
facing farm people who had been hurt by the "economic grinding machine"
of declining prices and rising costs. Eisenhower talked up the invaluable role
the federal government was playing in helping cattle farmers of the Southwest survive the drought and assured his audience that "the federal government is continuing, and will continue as long as necessary, to assist in meeting the misfortunes of our people, in the drought areas." The president
artfully fuzzed over the "extremely complex" question of price supports by
vowing that his administration would propose no program "that fails to provide solidly for the national interest by continuing prosperity in American
agriculture." "All of us know," he concluded reassuringly, "that the price
support principle must be a part of any future farm program. " 49
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This speech might lead one to conclude that Eisenhower disagreed with
the free-market message his secretary of agriculture was spreading to farm
groups across the country. But that conclusion would be erroneous. Indeed,
in the early stages of the formulation of this very speech, Eisenhower had rebuked Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall, telling him, "I don't
believe for a minute the farmer wants the government to be his boss. " 50 In his
memoirs, Eisenhower unambiguously endorsed "the fight to free the
farmers and make the agricultural industry more responsive to the competitive market. " 51
Although Eisenhower and Benson were in agreement about the need to
get government out of agriculture, Eisenhower was attuned to the need to
devise policies that would allow the president to appear as a defender of the
small farmer. Meeting with Benson, during the president's convalescence at
Fitzsimmons Hospital in the fall of 1955, Eisenhower insisted on the need to
show that "we are sympathetically concerned with the [farm] situation. " 52
This desire to project his sympathy for the plight of the small family farm
led Eisenhower to champion the Soil Bank program. 53
In meetings with farm leaders and farm-belt congressmen, Eisenhower
succeeded in conveying an impression of compassion and sympathy that
contrasted with the heartless, close-minded image projected by Benson.
Minnesota Republican Senator Edward Thye, for instance, tells of meeting
with Benson to protest the secretary's decision to lower dairy price supports
and finding that Benson "paid no attention" to his pleas. In contrast to Benson, who "you could sense ... wasn't sympathetic to your views," Thye recalls that "once you reached the President, and he became aware that you
may be right and his administrators wrong, he was as positive as, you might
say, a rocket on the target. " 54
A similar tale is related by the master of the National Grange, Herschel D.
Newsom. "I knew darn well," Newsom reports, "that basically, philosophically, he [Eisenhower] wanted to do what the Grange wanted to do ." Eisenhower fed this impression, telling Newsom after one meeting: "Well, frankly
Herschel, I think I find no disagreement with your philosophy and it sounds
to me as though the Grange has worked out some mechanics pretty well.
Now you go talk to Ezra." The obstacle, in Newsom's view, was that Benson
was stubbornly committed to a rigid, free-market ideology, and Eisenhower,
because of his "military philosophy," was unwilling to go over the head of
his political lieutenants. 55
Another Benson critic and Eisenhower admirer, North Dakota Senator
Milton Young, recalled a debate over wheat price supports, in which he and
other farm-state congressmen were pushing for full parity while Secretary
Benson urged low price supports. Eisenhower, Young reported, "finally settled it himself by setting it at $2 a bushel." To Young, this scene showed that
on farm policy Eisenhower was not "nearly as conservative as secretary Ben-
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son" and that in contrast to Benson, whom Young described as "stubborn,"
"immovable as a rock," and "irritating," Eisenhower was "tolerant" and
"considerate. " 56 By casting himself as the compassionate conciliator and
Benson as the heartless ideologue, Eisenhower was able to shift criticism
onto Benson while still pursuing his goal of reducing price-support payments for farmers .
In meetings with congressional leaders, Eisenhower let Benson defend the
administration's position. On one such occasion, House Minority Leader
Joe Martin and ranking Republican of the House Agricultural Committee
William Hill came to the White House to press for a softening of the administration's position on reducing price supports for dairy products. According
to Benson, after Martin and Hill made their appeal, "the President looked
at me and again, for the umpteenth time, I had to say no . " 57 By deferring to
Benson's "expert" judgment, Eisenhower shifted congressional resentment
onto the secretary.
Periodically, however, Eisenhower found it necessary to defend his secretary of agriculture publicly in order to maintain Benson's effectiveness. Defending a subordinate in the face of demands for that individual's resignation threatens to undermine the lightning rod relationship by making it more
difficult for others to believe that significant policy differences exist between
the leader and adviser. If a president is to sustain the adviser as lightning
rod, he must defend the adviser in a way that leads critics to believe that the
decision to retain the adviser is based on grounds other than agreement on
policy.
This is precisely what Eisenhower tried to do. He defended Benson without identifying himself with Benson's policy positions. Typical were Eisenhower's comments at a 1958 news conference, in which the president defended Benson on the grounds that "when we find a man of this dedication,
this kind of courage, this kind of intellectual and personal honesty, we
should say to ourselves, 'We just don't believe that America has come to the
point where it wants to dispense with the services of that kind of a person.' " 58 An even more masterful combination of firmly defending Benson's
character while still distancing himself from Benson's policies can be seen in
Eisenhower's response to Minnesota Senator Edward Thye's call for Benson's dismissal. Eisenhower wrote:
Naturally I am not unaware of your strong feelings in this matter; yet it
seems to me that upon reflection you will concede to Mr. Benson not
merely the right but more importantly the obligation vigorously to set
forth the programs and concepts which, in his best judgment, are essential to the well being of our farm people. It is my opinion that if he
failed to do so, he would be derelict in his responsibility, and though so
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doing may understandably create some difficulties, I hardly see how he
could effectively carry out his responsibilities in any other manner.59
Judging by the explanations that key figures, including Thye, later gave
for the president's decision to retain Benson, it would appear that Eisenhower was successful in defending Benson in a way that allowed him to
maintain a sense of distance between himself and Benson's farm policies.
Some years after the end of the Eisenhower administration, Thye was asked
during an interview why he thought the president resisted calls from congressmen and farm leaders to fire Benson. Thye responded by telling the interviewer that he believed that Eisenhower thought: "I've delegated you as
Secretary of Agriculture. It's your responsibility to administer that office,
and I'm not going to interfere with you." This attitude, Thye reasoned, was
probably leftover from Ike's military training. 60
Even more revealing is the explanation that North Dakota Senator Milton
Young, one of Benson's most vocal congressional critics, gave in answer to
the same question. Young attributed the decision to retain Benson to Eisenhower's "lack of experience in political life." As a result, Young explained,
Eisenhower was not "as familiar as most Presidents are with .. . the problems that arise from having Cabinet officials who have a different political
philosophy than you have." Furthermore, Young suggested that Eisenhower
was "a very tolerant, kindly, considerate person, [not] . .. the kind that
would ... fire someone ... if he disagreed with him. " 61 Thus despite publicly supporting Benson, Eisenhower persuaded key elites that Benson and
Eisenhower disagreed on farm policy.

THE STRUGGLE OVER PRESIDENTIAL
INVOLVEMENT

Although Benson was relatively successful at deflecting blame away from
the president, uncritical acceptance of the lightning rod metaphor can obscure important questions about Eisenhower's strategy and Benson's role.
Cabinet members are not inert objects, as the lightning rod metaphor implies, but strategic actors with objectives of their own. They may welcome
the autonomy that delegation brings and willingly absorb the blame for unpopular policies, but they may also periodically require a president's public
backing if they are to achieve their policy objectives. The president's need to
distance himself from day-to-day controversies can thus conflict with the
cabinet member's need to draw the president into the political fray.
Eisenhower was quite content for Benson to be "on the front lines, taking
the blows, " 62 but Benson was not always so content to have Eisenhower
maintain his distance from policy disputes. In his memoirs, Benson notes
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that from the outset "it was evident that the President expected to choose his
men, give them sufficient authority, and Jet them work out proposed solutions to their problems which he could either approve or reject." While conceding this to be "good executive procedure," Benson believed that "in the
case of agriculture the strength of the opposition and its readiness to do battle indicated that we needed the support of a President who himself had
strong policy convictions. . . . Even the President's sympathetic understanding would not be enough; we had to have fighting support" (emphasis
in original). If opponents succeeded in portraying the president and himself
as divided, Benson realized that "our farm proposals would die of political
malnutrition. " 63
Benson was consequently engaged in a continuous tug-of-war with members of the White House staff, who wanted to keep a safe distance between
the president and Benson, over the public visibility of the president. 64 Typical
of such wrangling was the struggle over the form in which the 1954 agricultural message should be delivered to Congress. The administration's proposal to abandon the fixed price supports established during World War II
in favor of flexible supports was bound to create intense opposition. Desiring to maximize the distance between the president and controversy, some
members of the White House staff wanted to have the department send up
an agricultural message, accompanied only by a covering letter from the
president. Benson insisted that the president should send the agricultural
message, believing it was essential that we "get it across to Congress and the
country that this wasn't a Benson recommendation, but an Eisenhower program." Benson explained to the president that "this message must be yours
with no attachments. There should be one program-the administration's
program, with no Benson plan." Eisenhower eventually relented and decided to do it Benson's way.65
Although the agricultural message was sent to Capitol Hill over the president's signature, Eisenhower managed to maintain some public distance
from the program by having Benson hold a press conference immediately afterward to explain the proposals. The following day, the New York Times
carried the text of the message accompanied by a picture not of the president
but of Secretary Benson defending the message at the news conference. 66
Benson's public profile was further heightened by an extensive speaking tour
he undertook to sell the administration's farm program. 67 With Benson having "carried the ball on farm policy, " 68 it is hardly surprising that friends
and foes alike commonly referred to the administration's program as "Secretary Benson's farm program."
Although wary about drawing too close to Benson's agricultural policies, 69
Eisenhower also recognized that if he wanted to achieve his objective of reducing federal government involvement in agriculture he would periodically
have to weigh in on the side of his farm program. Although Eisenhower
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carefully meted out his public involvement, he occasionally did assent to
Benson's requests for public presidential backing. When things looked bleak
for the administration's 1954 farm program, for example, Eisenhower consented to go on television to make a public appeal for the administration's
bill.10
Without the president's public support for the 1954 program, it would undoubtedly, as Benson foresaw, have gone down to defeat. At the same time,
more overt activity on the part of Eisenhower also opened him up to criticism from the opposition. The trade-off between policy objectives and personal popularity can be seen in congressional reaction to the president's vetoes of agricultural legislation.

AVOIDING THE VETO

In general, Eisenhower used the veto relatively sparingly (at least before
1958), particularly considering that for six years of his eight-year tenure
both houses of Congress were controlled by the opposition party." His reluctance to exercise the veto power was consistent with a leadership strategy
aimed at keeping the president off the firing line. A veto threatens to undermine a lightning rod strategy by placing the president prominently and unambiguously on the front lines. 72
Eisenhower's first veto of agricultural legislation did not occur until the
spring of 1956. The Democrats, with at least one eye on the upcoming presidential election, had attached more than one hundred amendments to the
administration's farm bill, many of which demanded a rigid 90 percent parity.73 Eisenhower followed the advice of Secretary Benson and vetoed a bill
that the president considered "less a piece of farm legislation than a private
relief bill for politicians. " 74
Congressional Democrats immediately jumped on the president's veto as
evidence that it was Eisenhower, and not just Benson, who was responsible
for the administration's farm policy. Oklahoma Senator Robert Kerr, in typically extravagant language, declared:
No longer can any outraged American say that Eisenhower is not to
blame for the farm policy of this administration .... Mr. Benson has a
great many skirts, ... but Ike can no longer hide behind them. The
mask of hypocrisy has been stripped, and now he must stand forth in
the full glitter of the shining truth that he is the implementor and architect of this farm policy. The nails that have been driven into the
farmer's hands, the cross upon which he is being crucified, may have
been furnished by Benson, but the hammer that drove those nails into
the farmer's hands was wielded by the hand of Eisenhower. The hand
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that placed the crown of thorns upon the farmer's head was the hand of
Eisenhower.75
Senator Allen Ellender, a Democrat from Louisiana, hammered away, although in a more restrained manner, at the same theme: "Heretofore Secretary of Agriculture Benson has been blamed for the present depressed plight
of our agriculture, but now the farmers of the country will blame the President. They have no other alternative." 76 Hubert Humphrey, too, believed the
veto exposed the reality that "it is Mr. Eisenhower's farm program, not poor
Benson's. It is Mr. Eisenhower who is responsible." " South Carolina Senator Olin Johnston also felt himself "dutybound to take the President of the
United States to task for his veto." He denounced Eisenhower for having
"completely broken his word and faith with the farmers of the Nation. "
Eisenhower, Johnston concluded, had become "totally infected with the disease of the Republican Party that has plagued the little people of this country since the first Republican drew breath. " 18
Democratic efforts to pin the blame on Eisenhower failed, however, because Eisenhower, in a nationally televised address, took advantage of his
above-politics image to persuade farmers that the blame lay with Congress
for passing a "bad bill" that he had "no choice" but to veto .79 His success in
defining the bill as a political "hodge-podge" that was bad for the country
was revealed by a subsequent Gallup poll of midwestern farmers, which
showed that fewer than three in ten respondents disapproved of the president's veto. 80 Although Eisenhower had come through the incident relatively
unscathed, the veto had left him more exposed to personal criticism than he
preferred. 81
Two years later, when Benson again recommended a presidential veto, this
time of the "freeze bill," Eisenhower expressed exasperation with his secretary. Although Eisenhower decided to back Benson's decision , he was
clearly upset that Benson was forcing him back onto an exposed stage. To
White House aides, Eisenhower complained that he was "unhappy and irritated" about the position Benson had placed him in, and he told them that
he "hated to veto the bill" because "his action would be taken as 'kicking
the farmer in the teeth.' " 82 When Benson sent a letter to the president setting
out the reasons why the legislation should be rejected, 83 Eisenhower sent
back a testy reply reminding Benson that "there is little need for you to enumerate again all of the advantages both of us believe should result from our
present farm program. I am not only familiar with these but have time and
time again supported them publicly." Eisenhower went on to give Benson a
lengthy lecture on politics, recalling the aphorisms: "Never lose the good in
seeking too long for the best," or as some say it "The best is always the enemy of the good." "In future," Eisenhower advised, "we should avoid ad-

30

CHAPTER TWO

vanced positions of inflexibility. We must have some room for maneuver, or
we shall suffer for it. " 84

LIGHTNING RODS HAVE PREFERENCES TOO

The preceding exchange, and others like it,85 suggest that although Eisenhower and Benson were in agreement on the general direction of farm policy,
Benson was not simply doing Eisenhower's bidding. If it was true, as Eisenhower told Benson, that "you and I rarely, if ever, had any difference of conviction as to the basic principles we should follow in our attempt to establish
the proper relationship between the government and agriculture, " 86 it was
also true that the two often had significantly different views about the pace
of change.
The difference between the president and secretary manifested itself immediately after Eisenhower's election in a debate over whether price supports should be maintained at their current level until the current law expired
in 1954, or whether flexible supports should instead be instituted immediately. Believing that his campaign pledge obligated him to maintain price
supports for at least a year, Eisenhower refused to follow Benson's recommendation that fixed price supports be abandoned right away.81 The same
conflict over the pace of change was evident in a dispute in the summer of
1954 concerning the appropriate level for wheat price supports. At a meeting
with legislative leaders, Benson suggested that
the impact [of a drop to 75 percent] would be softened by virtue of the
fact that the price for wheat is now at 82 percent of parity rather than
the theoretical 90 percent and that the drop to 75 percent would thus be
limited to merely 7 percent. The President refused to accept that reasoning and called attention to the important psychological factor involved
in dropping the formula's upper level from 90 percent to 75 percent. 88
In both of these cases Eisenhower overruled Benson. But at other times,
Benson's preference for more rapid change won out, as, for instance, when
he decided at the outset of 1954 to reduce dairy price supports from 90 percent to 75 percent. This action, although consistent with Eisenhower's general position of reducing price supports, moved more precipitously than
Eisenhower thought wise. In. a private letter to his long-time friend Swede
Hazlett, Eisenhower confessed that "I personally think that the Secretary of
Agriculture made a mistake in failing to take smaller bites." 89
Other elites sensed this difference between Eisenhower's emphasis on
gradual reductions in price supports and Benson's preference for more
sweeping changes. August Andresen, a Republican congressman from Min-
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nesota, wrote to Eisenhower that he believed "the recent action of Secretary
Benson to lower the support price on dairy products from 90 percent to 75
percent ... was a terrible mistake. It was anticipated," Andresen continued, "that the Secretary of Agriculture would follow your suggestion by
making a gradual reduction in the support price rather than to go the full
limit allowed by law. " 90 In a similar vein, Herschel Newsom, master of the
National Grange, praised Eisenhower's call for gradual reduction of price
supports, adding that "I have not seen recognition by the Department of
Agriculture of the President's own emphasis on gradualism. " 9 1
Benson served as a target of criticism, then, because there were genuine
differences of opinion between the president and the secretary of agriculture. The elite perception that Eisenhower was more disposed to "go slow"
than Benson was grounded in reality. This important kernel of truth sustained the lightning rod by making it plausible for elites to blame Benson
while appealing to Eisenhower to rein in his secretary.

EISENHOWER AND BLAME AVOIDANCE

Eisenhower's political sagacity did not lie solely, or even mainly, in his recognition that advisers could serve as lightning rods. Few are the presidents who
have been unaware of the utility of deflecting blame onto subordinates.
Rather, what distinguishes Eisenhower from other presidents is that his behavior made it possible for his subordinates to become plausible lightning
rods.
Critically important to Eisenhower's ability to insulate himself from Benson's actions was the president's willingness to delegate significant decisionmaking authority to department heads. 92 Although Eisenhower played the
pivotal role in shaping the administration's commitment to reducing price
supports, the all-important details of this general policy (how fast, how far,
which crops, and so on) were largely left to Benson. Like most department
secretaries, Benson ran into conflict with White House staff members who
felt his decisions did not conform with the president's policy. In his memoirs, Sherman Adams reported that Benson, "enveloped in a kind of celestial optimism, ... convinced that his big decisions were right," would often
carry out his plans without getting White House clearance. 93 Others (voicing
the usual staff complaint about departmental sabotage) accused Benson of
actively undermining presidential decisions. 9'
What differentiated Eisenhower from President Nixon or President Johnson was that he did not react to such reports of departmental subversion by
drawing decision making into the White House. There are, of course, costs
attached to this strategy: granting cabinet members autonomy means that
public policy may not always develop in precisely the direction the president
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prefers. 95 But Eisenhower reaped advantages also. Allowing subordinates to
exercise significant discretion made it plausible (rather than seeming disingenuous) to blame a cabinet member for a controversial policy, a claim I attempt to bolster in Chapter 4, which compares Eisenhower's use of Vice
President Richard Nixon with Lyndon Johnson's use of Vice President Hubert Humphrey.
No less important in making Benson a successful lightning rod was Eisenhower's capacity to cloak his underlying intentions and principles in ambiguity, thus allowing those on different sides of an issue to read into Eisenhower's political views their own political preferences. Eisenhower's studied
ambiguity allowed Secretary Benson and his allies to come away convinced
that Eisenhower was a fervent believer in applying free-market principles to
agriculture. 96 At the same time, supporters of continued high price supports,
like Senators Edward Thye and Milton Young, continued to believe that
Eisenhower was sympathetic to their viewpoint that government had an important role to play in helping farmers. Both sides thus believed that were
the president to become more involved he would side with them.
The importance of this ambiguity in sustaining a lightning rod can be better appreciated by contrasting Benson's eight-year tenure as secretary of agriculture with James Watt's two-and-a-half years as secretary of interior under President Ronald Reagan. Watt's viability as a lightning rod, the
subsequent chapter argues, was severely handicapped by the ideological clarity of Reagan's environmental vision.

3
Reagan's Liability:
Secretary of Interior James Watt

Lightning rods figured prominently in the strategic thinking of top officials
in the Reagan White House. Reagan aides were determined to avoid what
they perceived to be the prior administration's error of overexposing the
president. "One of the most destructive aspects of the Carter administration," observed David Gergen, Reagan's first director of communications,
"was that they continually let him go out there and be the point man, on everything!" 1 Unlike Carter, Reagan would delegate authority and responsibility to subordinates. As one presidential aide told a New York Times reporter: "The President feels that he ought not to be answering questions
about the B-1 bomber or anything else that specific. . .. His job is to announce broad policy. Let Cap Weinberger take the heat on the B-1 or let Ted
Bell take the heat for cuts in school aid. We believe in the delegation of authority. " 2 "It is terribly important," Gergen explains, "that the President
not be out on the line every day, particularly on bad news. . . . You only
have one four-star general in battle, but you've got a lot of lieutenants who
can give blood. And if the going is getting hot and heavy, it is far better to
have your lieutenants take the wounds than your general." This meant that
"on the budget issue, we intentionally put [David] Stockman out front" and
"on environmental issues, as controversial as [James] Watt was, it was better
to have Watt out talking about environmental issues than the President. " 3
White House staff took care to have bad news or unpopular policies announced at departments. Press Secretary Larry Speakes explained ("mostly
tongue-in-cheek" he insisted later): "What's good news, we announce at the
White House; bad news comes from Interior or Education. " 4 James Baker,
Reagan's first chief of staff, made sure that proposed Social Security reforms in the spring of 1981 were announced by Health and Human Services
Secretary Richard Schweiker rather than by the White House, and, as negative congressional reaction mounted, White House staff began referring to
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the package on background as "Schweiker's Folly. " 5 Baker's successor, Don
Regan, told Secretary of Agriculture John Block that it was the department's job to get the farm credit story out to the press. "We were keeping the
President away from it," Regan later explained, because it was "a no-win
situation in which the President can be damaged because there literally is no
way to help these farmers. " 6 When Watt resigned in the spring of 1983,
Reagan's staff canceled a scheduled environmental address "because it
would shift the attention to the President" and opted instead for a low-key
appearance at the swearing-in ceremony of Watt's successor, William P.
Clark. "The idea," explained a presidential aide, "was, 'Get it over there [in
the Interior Department].' When we have something developed that we can
go out and talk about in a positive way, then bring it back to the White
House."'
The administration's lightning rod strategy was facilitated by Reagan's detached leadership style. Avoiding blame on a policy gone awry was bound to
be easier for a president who was widely reported to be inattentive to and uninformed about the details of policy. Claims of noninvolvement that would
have seemed disingenuous if not dishonest coming from a Carter or a Johnson were believable coming from Reagan. Of course, the style itself invited
criticism from those who felt this degree of detachment to be unbecoming a
president of the United States. As was the case with Eisenhower, Reagan absorbed a steady stream of elite criticism disparaging him for being a caretaker president who simply ratified decisions reached by his advisers. 8 When
these criticisms reached a crescendo, as in the case of Reagan being allowed
to "sleep through" the 1981 downing of two Libyan fighter planes, White
House staff vigorously worked to dispel the public image of Reagan as disengaged by emphasizing the president's involvement in the decision-making
process.9
For the most part, however (at least before the Iran-contra scandal),
Reagan and his aides generally seemed comfortable with the image of a relatively detached president, willing to sacrifice credit on some issues if it
meant avoiding blame on most issues. 10 Reagan and his aides made a conscious effort not to have Reagan equated with everything that occurred in
the government. "The President does not strictly speaking 'run the Government,'" one aide told a New York Times reporter. "He makes the key decisions, but the Government is 'run' in the department and agencies." 11 As
Reagan himself, in a 1986 interview with Fortune magazine, explained his
leadership philosophy, "I believe that you surround yourself with the best
people you can find, delegate authority, and don't interfere as long as the
policy you've decided upon is being carried out." 12
In several respects, Reagan's public persona closely resembled Eisenhower's. 13 Both were widely viewed as passive executives, detached from the
specifics of policy, affable but not particularly bright, and even somewhat
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befuddled. But in at least one critical respect Reagan and Eisenhower's public images and leadership styles were decisively different. Reagan came to office with a well-defined policy agenda and a past history of ideological commitment. 14 Eisenhower had never even voted before 1952, and his policy
message often lacked definition. Few could have doubts about where
Reagan stood on the issues that were dear to his heart; few ever did figure
out exactly what Eisenhower or "modern" republicanism stood for.
One should be careful not to exaggerate Reagan's ideological clarity of
purpose. 15 For one thing, as Bert Rockman points out, that clarity was "often .. . greater in rhetoric than in operations." 16 If the broad direction was
clear, Reagan rarely offered much in the way of specific guidance about the
policy implications of these general objectives. 11 Moreover, clarity of purpose was not characteristic of every policy area nor was it a constant
throughout Reagan's tenure. In marked contrast to the clear policy agenda
of the 1980 campaign, for instance, Reagan's 1984 reelection campaign was
notably vague on specific issues. '8 And when it came to foreign policy, particularly in the second term, Reagan's position was often difficult to pin
down. Did "letting Reagan be Reagan" mean following the path of confrontation with "the evil empire" or did it mean pursuing nuclear arms control?
His cold warrior instincts coexisted with his desire to be remembered by history as a man of peace. '9 This lack of clarity, as Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus report, meant that "Schultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Mcfarlane all
interpreted the president's will according to their own, often conflicting inclinations. Each insisted that he alone knew the true mind and meaning of
the president; each insisted he was doing what the president truly wanted. " 20
In domestic policy, however, particularly during the first term, Reagan's position was rarely ambiguous, even when his directives were framed broadly.
Reagan's well-defined agenda had its benefits. Because Reagan had made
it clear to others where he stood on such issues as taxation and national defense, he was able to plausibly (even if incorrectly2 1) claim a mandate and
push Congress to enact sweeping tax cuts and defense increases. But there
was a downside to having a "clear and polarizing agenda that let everyone in
government know what the broad objectives of the Reagan administration
were." 22 Where Reagan's position was popular, as with taxes, clarity served
him well. But in other areas where his position was unpopular, as with the
environment or funding for the Nicaraguan contras, clarity often left
Reagan exposed to criticism despite his detached governing style.
This chapter is a case study of how clarity of purpose can undermine a
president's attempt to distance himself from policy conflict and thus thwart
the attempt to deflect blame onto subordinates. The particular vehicle chosen for analyzing this phenomenon is the tenure of Reagan's first secretary
of the interior, James Watt. Because Reagan unambiguously signaled to attentive elites that he favored economic growth over environmental protec-
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tion, development over conservation, it was difficult for Watt (or Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] director Anne Gorsuch Burford) to
provide effective cover for Reagan. Having a clearly defined ideology and
agenda thus worked to undercut Watt's viability as a lightning rod. 23

LIGHTNING ROD OR LIABILITY?

Was Watt a lightning rod or a liability? Proponents can be found on both
sides of the question. Watt often referred to himself as a presidential lightning rod, 2• and his claim has been repeated by a number of commentators,
among them Laurence Barrett and Hedrick Smith. 25 No evidence, however, is
marshaled to support the contention. Others have argued the opposite thesis
that Watt was a liability to President Reagan, bringing criticism to the president, 26 but again it is usually presented as a self-evident fact rather than a
proposition needing to be established.
One of the aims in this chapter is to show that evidence can be brought to
bear on these competing claims. In the case of Watt, the answer depends on
the time period under investigation. During the first year of his tenure there
is support for Watt's view of himself as a presidential lightning rod. Beginning in 1982, however, Watt afforded Reagan little, if any, protection from
critics of the administration's environmental and public land policies, and
by the third year of the Reagan presidency, Watt's high-voltage politics was
unmistakably burning the president. In contrast to Secretary Benson, who
served to deflect criticism away from Eisenhower throughout his eight-year
tenure, Watt quickly became a liability for the president.

"THE SINS OF WATT"

During the summer of 1981, it was standard fare among political pundits
and strategists to refer to Watt as a lightning rod for the president. Writing
in August 1981, Kenneth Walsh of the Denver Post, for example, argued
that Watt "is the lightning rod for the president's philosophy on natural resources, energy and the environment." Reagan, Walsh pointed out, "can
look down from his lofty perch at the White House and watch Watt doing
the dirty work for him. " 21 A California Republican strategist agreed that
Watt was serving Reagan as a lightning rod. "Watt's critics aren't striking at
Reagan himself, are they?" he asked rhetorically. 28
These claims accurately reflected the reality that during the first year, by
and large, critics of the administration's environmental policies targeted
Watt, not Reagan. 29 'fypical in this respect was a much publicized speech delivered on May 2, 1981, by Nathaniel Reed, a Republican and former assis-
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tant secretary of interior under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Reed told his Sierra Club audience that "my quarrel is not with Ronald Reagan. I think he
will be a good President and a notable environmentalist." Rather the source
of the problem was James Watt and other appointees who "have broken
faith with the Republican Party and betrayed their President." Pointing to
the "significant environmental progress . . . California made ... under the
leadership of Governor Ronald Reagan," Reed suggested that Watt's reckless approach was at variance with "the environmental philosophy and the
record of his President," which he characterized as "very good." Even "the
Watt budget," Reed maintained, was "an aberration from ... the true
Reagan philosophy." Having reached the conclusion that Watt was "utterly
lacking in the vision and judgment necessary to continue as Secretary of the
Interior," Reed closed by reaffirming his belief that not only was "President
Reagan ... a good man ... who knows and cares for the outdoors," but
"that when he has fully recuperated [from the assassination attempt], he
will steer the natural-resource policies of his Administration back in the direction of the great Republican leaders of the last two centuries. " 30
Even among those less sympathetic to Reagan, Watt was the primary target. California Senator Alan Cranston, for instance, called for Watt's resignation on the grounds that "his policies are reckless and irresponsible [and]
a radical reversal of a long-standing bipartisan California tradition of love
and respect for the land that includes probably as many Republicans as
Democrats-in some cases even Ronald Reagan. " 3 '
The entire "dump Watt" movement, which was sponsored by the leading
environmental organizations and climaxed during the late summer of 1981,
focused almost exclusively on what the movement termed the " sins of
Watt. " 32 The Sierra Club opened the campaign against Watt in April by accusing him of "sabotaging conservation goals supported by a vast majority
of the American people. " 33 Environmental policies of the administration
were commonly referred to as "Watt's policies." The president of the Wilderness Society, for example, called "Mr. Watt's policies . . . the gravest
threat to the integrity of the national park system in its entire history. " 34
This separation that environmental and political elites drew between Watt
and Reagan was reflected in public opinion polls taken during 1981. A CBS/
New York Times poll, conducted during September 1981, for instance,
found that half the respondents believed they could "trust President Reagan
to make the right kind of decision about the environment," while only a
third did not. 35 Gallup polls conducted in June and October found more
people approving of Reagan's handling of the environment than disapproving.36 On the basis of a California Field poll conducted in August 1981, Mervin Field concluded that "President Reagan's popularity does not seem to be
adversely affected by Watt's poor image. The public seems to separate the
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very favorable view it has of the president from that of the secretary of the
interior." 37

"RONALD REAGAN IS THE REAL JAMES WATT"

This separation between Watt and Reagan did not persist, however, much
beyond the first year. Criticism of Watt increasingly became coupled with
criticism of the president. Environmentalists came to see Reagan and Watt
as a team bent on squandering the nation's natural resources. 38
After the "dump Watt" movement of the summer of 1981 failed to produce Watt's dismissal, the notion that Watt was being flogged for what were
in fact Reagan's policies became a recurrent theme in environmental circles,
starting first with the more radical groups such as Friends of the Earth and
then rippling out to more mainstream conservation groups, such as the
Audubon Society and the National Wildlife Federation. A letter to the editor published in the October 1981 issue of the Friends of the Earth publication, Not Man Apart, strenuously objected to "the environmental movement's attacks on James Watt," who was only the president's "front man."
The letter stressed that it was "a fundamental error" to blame Watt for what
were after all "Mr. Reagan's policies." In closing, the letter called for environmentalists to "shift our fire from Mr. Watt and focus our efforts on Mr.
Reagan and his administration. " 39 This view was echoed by another reader
who believed that "Watt is the symptom, Reagan is the disease. " 40
After a year of limiting themselves to criticizing Watt, Friends of the
Earth launched a direct assault upon Ronald Reagan with a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, charging that "Mr. Reagan is the real
James Watt." The advertisement scored Reagan for failing to make additions to the endangered species list, blocking additions to the national park
system, and encouraging more oil drilling, logging, and strip mining. President Reagan, the ad continued, "is taking apart nearly every institution that
protects planetary and human life. His actions and rhetoric are consistent:
Destructive, disdainful and uncomprehending of environmental values. " 41
This shift in focus from Watt to Reagan was dramatized by the decision to
rename the "Watt Watch" column in Not Man Apart "Administration
Watching." The sacrifice in alliteration was necessary, the editors felt, because although Watt is "the most colorful of the Washington wrecking crew,
he is by no means the only one." Accompanying the new monthly column
was a telling picture of Ronald Reagan revealing himself behind a mask of
James Watt.4 2 Similarly, the Sierra Club announced in early 1982 that the
campaign against Watt was being broadened into a "war on WATTism-the
whole panoply of anticonservation policies of the Reagan administration. " 43
The changing focus among environmental groups can also be seen in the
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contrast between The Watt Book, published in August 1981 by the Wilderness Society at the height of the dump Watt movement, and an "indictment" released in March 1982 by ten leading environmental groups-including the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, National Audubon Society,
and the Sierra Club 44 -entitled Ronald Reagan and the American Environment. While the former publication had stressed Watt's betrayal of a bipartisan tradition of environmental protection, the latter never mentioned Watt
and instead pinned the blame squarely on the president's shoulders. "President Reagan," the 1982 book begins, "has broken faith with the American
people on environmental protection." Rather than calling for Watt's resignation, as The Watt Book had done, Ronald Reagan and the American Environment demanded that "President Reagan be called to task. " 45
Representatives of the ten environmental organizations that produced the
1982 report subsequently held a joint press conference in San Francisco, in
which they sharply criticized Reagan for what they characterized as his "war
on the environment." William Turnage, executive director of the Wilderness
Society, blamed Reagan for the "incredible pattern of destruction of environmental programs" that amounted to a "counterrevolution." A representative of the Natural Resources Defense Council echoed Turnage's view, explaining that the decision to "indict" the president was made on the basis of
"an across-the-board pattern of lawlessness and heedlessness with regard to
the nation's natural resources." Repeating the charge made earlier by the
Friends of the Earth, Turnage declared that "Ronald Reagan is the real
James Watt. " 46
This anti-Reagan message was repeated by Russell Peterson, president of
the Audubon Society, a former Republican governor of Delaware, and chair
of the Council on Environmental Quality under Presidents Nixon and Ford.
Writing in the New York Times Magazine, Peterson attacked Reagan personally for having "repudiated what I hold to be a Republican tradition of
conservation and protection of natural resources that goes back to Theodore
Roosevelt." "No other President in my experience," Peterson continued,
"has seemed to be less caring about the need to protect the nation's natural
beauty and natural resources." Peterson recounted the environmental movement's realization that Watt was "no maverick Cabinet officer whose zealous policies might embarrass the President," but rather "was doing exactly
what he had been hired to do," which was prosecute "the President's war
against environmental protection. " 47
Further evidence of this change in attitudes exists in the very different reactions that accompanied the 1981 scheme to increase oil drilling off the
coast of California and Watt's announcement in August 1982 of the intention to sell off 35 million acres of "surplus" public lands to private companies. The former plan was widely portrayed as a product of Watt's "anti-environmental extremism," while the latter initiative was attributed directly to
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the Reagan White House, even though Watt, and not the White House, announced the plan. 48
By 1983, the tendency among environmentalists to blame both Watt and
Reagan was even more pronounced. When Watt announced a coal-leasing
plan in the summer of 1983, for instance, the Sierra Club immediately went
after Reagan in an article entitled "Coal Leasing: More Reagan Giveaways. " 49 In the minds of environmentalists, Reagan was so closely identified with the cause of privatization that they saw Watt's role as little more
than announcing the president's policy.
Another full page advertisement taken out by Friends of the Earth, this
time in early 1983, showed just how intimately connected Reagan and Watt
had become in the minds of the group's leaders. Under pictures of the president and the secretary, the ad declared:
After two years, it's clear that Ronald Reagan and James Watt do not
believe in preserving publicly owned land for the future. They have
made unconscionable "sweetheart" leases to oil, mining and timber
companies within your national forests and wilderness. They have
refused to add to the national parks .... Reagan and Watt have shown
virtually religious devotion to converting public land to private
use .. .. Their minds are set in concrete and their hearts are cold to the
natural world. To them, the only values in nature are commercial ones.50
More moderate voices followed in stressing the consistency between
Watt's statements and actions and Reagan's preferences. John Seiberling (DOhio), chair of the House Interior subcommittee on public lands, concluded
that "it begins to appear that Mr. Crowell and Mr. Watt are not acting on
their own but are part of an Administration-wide broadside assault on the
nation's wilderness heritage." 5' In the summer of 1981, former President
Jimmy Carter had publicly criticized "the misguided and radical new policies of the Department of Interior" without ever mentioning Reagan by
name, but two years later he lambasted Reagan personally for "a deliberate
across-the-board abandonment of United States leadership on environmental issues." 52
Editorials in the Los Angeles Times, which had begun by reserving criticism for Watt, eventually felt forced to conclude that the "only ... reason
why President Reagan would continue to tolerate Watt in his cabinet" is that
"he must agree with Watt's policies. " The Times described "Watt's, and
Reagan's, policies" as "totally unacceptable to a majority of Americans."
Watt, the Times concluded, was only "the whipping boy for the wrongful
conservation policies of the Reagan Administration. " 53
The reaction among environmentalists to Watt's resignation in the fall of
1983 provides additional evidence that Watt had long since ceased to func-

REAGAN ' S LIABILITY

41

tion as a lightning rod. Watt's departure, according to Sierra Club president
Denny Shaffer, meant "the insults to the nation's intelligence will end, but
not the assaults on the environment." Liz Railbeck, legislative analyst for
Friends of the Earth, acknowledged that "we are delighted to see Watt go"
but quickly added that "we feel Ronald Reagan has the responsibility for
three years of environmental wreckage. You don't change Ronald Reagan by
getting rid of James Watt. The mouth is gone, but the policies are apt to be
the same." These sentiments were echoed by Rafe Pomerance, president of
Friends of the Earth, who stated that "Ronald Reagan bears the responsibility for nearly three years of mounting environmental wreckage left by James
Watt. The general in charge of Ronald Reagan's war on the environment
may be gone but the Commander-in-Chief and just about all the officers remain." Marion Edney, head of the League of Conservation Voters, agreed
that Watt's resignation "doesn't change the fact that Ronald Reagan remains personally responsible for the actions of his agents." Democratic
party national chair Charles Manat reminded people that "James Watt has
been speaking for Ronald Reagan. . . . The President has been letting Watt
be Reagan. " 54 Believing that Watt was only executing the Reagan agenda,
Democratic elites and environmental activists did not view Watt's departure
as likely to result in policy changes.
The elite view stressing the similarity between Watt and Reagan trickled
down to the mass public. Increasingly the public connected Reagan personally with antienvironmental positions. In contrast to the Gallup polls taken
in June and October of 1981, which had shown slim pluralities approving of
Reagan's handling of the environment, surveys conducted by Gallup in 1982
and 1983 found increasing disapproval of Reagan's handling of environmental issues. Whereas in June 1981, 39 percent had approved of Reagan's handling of the environment and 33 percent disapproved, by the following June
the numbers had reversed, with 35 percent approving of Reagan's performance and 41 percent disapproving. By the following April, the public perception of Reagan's performance had slipped even further, with only 33 percent approving and 49 percent disapproving. 55 Only after the firing of Watt
did a plurality again express approval of Reagan's handling of environmental issues. 56
Even more telling was a Washington Post/ABC News poll, conducted in
February 1983, which found that by a two to one margin (54 to 27 percent)
the public believed Reagan "cares more about protecting the firms that are
violating antipollution laws than he cares about enforcing those laws. " 51 Virtually the same percentage (60 percent) of the public answered the same way
when asked the identical question about Anne Gorsuch Burford, suggesting
that Reagan's public image on environmental matters was not much different from that of his environmental advisers.
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THE COSTS OF IDEOLOGICAL CLARITY

If Eisenhower's behavior encouraged the impression that the president was

following the judgment of his secretary, Reagan's behavior often fostered the
opposite belief that Watt was following the ideological dictates of the president. In contrast to Eisenhower's studied ambiguity, Reagan did little to cultivate an image on environmental issues that was distinct from Watt's. ' 8 If
President Reagan's EPA director, Anne Gorsuch Burford, could reach the
conclusion that the president "doesn't care about the environment, " 59 then
it is hardly surprising that others less sympathetic to Reagan arrived at the
same conclusion.
One of the most important factors working to undercut Watt's status as a
lightning rod was the Reagan administration's highly ideological pattern of
appointments to key environmental posts.6() Because a president's appointments are carefully scrutinized by elites as indicators of a president's intentions, they play an important role in sustaining a lightning rod. For environmentalists, Watt was only "the largest sparkler in this diadem of Republican
rhinestones," which included Anne Gorsuch Burford as head of the EPA;
John Crowell, an outspoken critic of restrictions limiting timber cutting in
national forests, as the man in charge of the United States Forest Service at
the Department of Agriculture; Robert Burford, a leader of the Sagebrush
Rebellion, as Bureau of Land Management chief; and James Harris, who as
an Indiana state senator had argued that the federal law to control strip mining was unconstitutional, as head of the Office of Surface Mining. 6 ' By filling so many top positions with people perceived as antienvironment (and by
centralizing appointments in the White House), Reagan telegraphed his intentions to environmentalists and thereby undermined Watt's utility as a
lightning rod.
During Watt's tenure, Reagan made only occasional, half-hearted efforts
to persuade environmentalists of his good intentions, with little success. 62
Toward the beginning of 1982, Ed Meese and other White House aides met
with three prominent environmental leaders-Russell Peterson of the National Audubon Society, Jay Hair of the National Wildlife Federation, and
J. Michael McCloskey of the Sierra Club-to persuade them that Reagan
was a "good environmentalist." Instead, Peterson reported, the meeting
served only to provide "confirmation of the complete disrespect on the part
of the President and his team for what ... the conservation and environmental movement stand for." "To describe President Reagan as a good environmentalist, as Meese did," Peterson said later, "is a claim that would
never meet the truth-in-advertising standards. " 63
In July 1983, President Reagan tried to reach out to the environmental
community by meeting with the famous photographer and naturalist Ansel
Adams. According to Adams, Reagan told him that "we are not so far apart
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as you think we are. I've always been an environmentalist." Adams remained unconvinced, however, telling the press afterward that the president
had a "totally different concept of the world and it is very hard to break
through. " 64 The effort was too little, too late.
Reagan's campaign statements made it even more difficult to persuade environmentalists that his intentions toward them were ambivalent, let alone
benevolent. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan had publicly identified himself with the Sagebrush Rebellion-"count me in," he told a Utah audience.65 His assertions during the campaign that air pollution in the United
States had been "substantially controlled" and that nature rather than industry was the chief cause of air pollution helped to sow distrust toward
Reagan among those attentive to environmental issues. 66
Reagan's vigorous public defenses of Watt further eroded the ambiguity
of his position. Here it might be objected that Reagan was behaving no differently than President Eisenhower, who also forcefully defended his secretary of agriculture against critics. The difference is that Eisenhower defended Benson without attacking his opponents, and often without even
siding with Benson's policy positions. Reagan, in contrast, joined Watt in attacking the secretary's critics. In August 1981, for instance, as anti-Watt sentiment was reaching a peak, Reagan not only pledged his "full support" for
Watt, but expressed his opinion that Watt was correct that "we have been
victimized by some individuals that I refer to as environmental extremists. " 67
By accepting Watt's definition of his opposition as "extremists," Reagan
hardened environmental attitudes toward himself. The more closely Reagan
identified himself with Watt the more difficult it became for critics to follow
Nathaniel Reed's lead of defending the president while attacking Watt's policy.
A notable exception to Reagan's pattern of identifying himself with Watt
in opposition to "environmental extremists" came in the March 23, 1983,
press conference announcing William Ruckelshaus's appointment as head
of the EPA. In this conference, Reagan tried to stake out a middle position
between the "zealots on both sides." Some people, Reagan acknowledged,
"won't be satisfied unless they can pave over the entire countryside. " 68 The
conciliatory rhetoric, as well as the act of selecting the highly respected
Ruckelshaus, made Reagan seem more sympathetic to the environment than
his secretary of interior and thus might have been a first step in making Watt
a more plausible lightning rod.
This press conference, however, remained an isolated incident and never
became part of a consistent strategy for distancing himself from Watt. Indeed only ten days earlier, Reagan had encouraged direct attacks upon his
person by attacking, in words reminiscent of Watt, his opponents' motives.
"The lobbyists for the environmental interests," Reagan suggested at a
March 12 press conference, "feel that they have to keep their constituents
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stirred up or they might not have jobs anymore." Those who attacked Anne
Gorsuch Burford, Reagan continued, were not concerned about the environment or wrongdoing, but rather were motivated by opposition to the administration and its policies. 69 In an interview at the end of the month, a week
after announcing the Ruckelshaus appointment, Reagan repeated his belief
that "professional" environmentalists who criticized Watt weren't interested
in solving problems, only in making sure "their careers will go on. mo
Reagan's behavior contrasts strikingly with that of Eisenhower who, as
Fred Greenstein has pointed out, studiously avoided calling into question
opponents' motivations. 11 A key ingredient in getting others to believe that
his intentions were good, Eisenhower reasoned, was to resist the temptation
to call into question the intentions of those with whom he disagreed.
The lesson of Reagan's experience in the environmental arena is that a
willingness to delegate, although probably a necessary condition, is not sufficient for a presidential lightning rod to work successfully. If distance from
day-to-day operations tended to protect Reagan, his ideological orientation,
as read by others through campaign statements, appointments, and attacks
on the environmentalists, kept him more closely identified with policy than
his hands-off management strategy might have suggested. Reagan's words
and actions created a sense that, as a writer for Audubon put it, "if Jim
Watt did not exist, Ronald Reagan would have had to invent him. Watt is everything Reagan wanted at Interior. " 72 In sum, Reagan was too closely connected ideologically with the schemes that Watt and Burford were carrying
out, such as privatization and deregulation, to allow him to maintain the
same degree of separation between the policy and the person that Eisenhower achieved in the area of agriculture.

A SELF-INFLICTED LIGHTNING STORM

Although Watt's failure as a lightning rod was importantly connected to
President Reagan's leadership style, Watt's own actions also contributed to
that failure. In the first place, Watt himself furthered the impression of a
close link between Watt and Reagan. When faced with criticism, Watt frequently stressed his ideological affinity with Reagan. The president and he,
Watt insisted, were "soul mates" on environmental issues. 73 In an early interview with Public Opinion, Watt suggested that "no other Secretary of the
Interior, in recent times at least, has had a President who understands my
department like Ronald Reagan does .... When I said, 'I want to do this, I
want to do that,' he replied, 'Sic 'em.' " 74 Watt's repeated insistence on portraying himself as a presidential lightning rod, 75 ironically, undermined his
ability to function as a lightning rod, for, as Fred Greenstein comments, "an
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aide viewed as a lightning rod ... will not keep bolts from striking the president. " 76
Watt's failure to function as a successful lightning rod was also due to his
penchant for controversial public gaffes on matters totally unrelated to environmental policy. Too often the creation of controversy is taken as a sufficient indicator of the existence of a lightning rod effect. But Watt resembled
less a lightning rod than a storm creator, as his one-liners-from his comments about the Beach Boys, to his letter to Moshe Arens, to his joke about
the coal lease advisory commission as including "a black, a woman, two
Jews, and a cripple'!._sent the White House scrambling for cover. A presidential aide deserves the appellation "lightning rod" only for absorbing
heat in the pursuit of a president's objectives or for absorbing blame for
negative outcomes, not for generating gratuitous controversy.
To be sure, many of the policies Watt pursued were bound to generate controversy. No interior secretary could aggressively promote oil drilling off the
coast of California, accelerate the leasing of western public lands for coal
mining, and attempt to open up national wilderness areas to mineral exploration, and hope to avoid becoming embroiled in controversy." Interviewed
in 1990, Reagan indicated that Watt had done what Reagan wanted done. "I
appointed him," Reagan explained, "with the understanding that he was going to do those things that he and I had talked about. . . . And he knew
when he took the job that he would turn enough people off that pretty soon
he would lose any effectiveness that he had if he did the things that we
wanted done .... And I have to say, if you look back and analyze point by
point the things that were done, he was darn good. "'8
Even viewed solely from the perspective of Reagan's own strategic and
programmatic interests, Watt's tenure was far from the success Reagan
claims. As Paul Portney points out in a review of the Reagan administration's environmental record during the first term, although many of the administration's public land and water resource policies were "inherently controversial," "they became more so because of Secretary Watt. " 79 Much of
the criticism of Watt, Portney argues, stemmed as much from style as from
substance, particularly from Watt's unwillingness to consult with state government officials and congressional committees or subcommittees and their
staffs. 80
To be sure, style is not so easily separated from substance. It is difficult to
be inclusive and cooperative while pursuing policies that radically break
with existing expectations and constituencies. The style-confrontation and
exclusion-stems from the substance-radical change in the direction of
public policy. But in refusing to permit political realities to shape strategic
calculations, Watt squandered opportunities to restore the balance between
commercial versus natural uses of public lands that the Reagan administration believed had been lost in the preceding decade. Watt expected to be able
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to trade on Reagan's support; he failed to understand that success depended
in large part on building support so that the president could then afford to
back his preferences. 8 1
Portney identifies a number of areas where it would have been possible for
a more politically skillful secretary to enact significant changes in directions
consistent with the Reagan administration's basic philosophy. There was, for
instance, "a large measure of expert consensus" on reducing federal spending in areas such as federal water projects. There was also substantial support for increased leasing of energy resources on public lands; indeed the
Carter administration had already pledged to increase such leasing in a second term. In addition, a number of long-time observers of public land management had concluded that some federal lands were too difficult to manage
and not worth the trouble; support also existed for selling or exchanging certain lands to local or state governments. Moreover, even some of those sympathetic to the environmental movement felt that the multiple-use mandate
had been supplanted by "the ideological fantasy that the only decent and
harmonious natural relationships were nonconsuming ones. " 82 Had Watt's
definition of his policy goals combined judgments about what is desirable
with estimates about what is possible, he might have been able to advance
significantly the Reagan agenda. 83
Instead, Watt's attempt to radically recast governmental policy created so
much controversy that relatively little change actually occurred, a fact celebrated by liberals and lamented by conservatives but agreed upon by both. 84
Writing toward the close of Reagan's first term, one expert concluded that
despite the liability that environmental and natural resource policy had become for Reagan, "less happened, for good and for ill, than either the administration promised or the public believes." "In spite of the administration's intention to greatly increase public land sales," for instance, "such
transactions have been no greater than in previous administrations because
of adverse public and congressional reaction." "In spite of all the Sturm
und Drang, ... no truly fundamental change" took place at the Interior
Department. 85
Such an outcome was not preordained by the nature of contemporary
public opinion on the environment. Public support for the environment is
widespread, but the issue is not highly salient for most people most of the
time. Although during the 1980s a substantial majority of Americans, for
instance, agreed that environmental protection standards "cannot be too
high" and believed environmental improvements must be made "regardless
of cost," only a small fraction named the environment as one of the most
important problems facing the country. 86 In such situations where public
opinion is characterized by a "permissive consensus," Riley Dunlap explains, the government ordinarily "has considerable flexibility in pursuing
the goal and is not carefully monitored by the public." Only if administra-

REAGAN ' S LIABILITY

47

tion policy becomes "obviously out of tune with the public consensus" does
the administration risk incurring substantial political costs.87 By violating
that zone of indifference, Watt helped to create a backlash against the administration's policies and to discredit antienvironmental positions in a way
that continues to hamper the Republican party. 88

SEDUCTION BY METAPHOR

It is one thing to shoulder the blame for a controversial policy; it is quite another to push an agenda so recklessly that one discredits a president's policy
objectives. One of the great dangers of the lightning rod metaphor is that its
uncritical use can lull cabinet members into a false sense of usefulness. To
claim lightning rod status is to suggest that the criticism one is receiving is a
sign that one is serving the president well . Little wonder then that Watt
rushed to endorse the description of himself as a lightning rod for it allowed
him to wear controversy as a badge of honor. But the label begs some tough
questions.
To say, as David Gergen does, that "on environmental issues, as controversial as Watt was, it was better to have Watt out talking about environmental issues than the President" sidesteps the question of whether Reagan
would have been better served by another interior secretary (a la Donald Hodell) who would pursue the same basic policies in a less confrontational and
controversial manner. 89 Even if criticisms of Watt had been completely insulated from perceptions of the president (which, we have seen, they were not),
we would still need to ask about the effect that Watt's actions had on the administration's ability to achieve its policy objectives. The danger of the lightning rod metaphor is that it tempts us to avoid asking this all-important
question .
The answer in Watt's case is clear enough. As Paul Portney, among others, has pointed out, Watt's "style created a backlash that came to stand in
the way of achieving his substantive objectives. " 90 In the face of mounting
criticism, the Reagan administration had to retreat from many of its policy
objectives. Not only did public support for environmental positions and
groups increase in the wake of Watt's tenure, 91 but sensible antienvironmental positions became tarnished with the brush of antienvironmental extremism. To have Watt out front on environmental issues did not so much deflect
blame away from the president as to caricature antienvironmentalism in
such a way as to make it easier for environmentalists to mobilize support
and to thwart administration objectives. To speak of Watt as a lightning rod
is thus not only to misstate Watt's effect on public support for Ronald
Reagan but, more important, to lose sight of Watt's monumental failure as a
public manager and political strategist.
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LESSONS FROM THE BUSH PRESIDENCY
In a recent paper, political scientists Michael Kraft and Norman Vig ask,
"Why So Little Applause for the Bush Environmental Record?" 92 As they
surveyed the Bush environmental record toward the end of the summer of
1990, they found a president who had attempted to strike a judicious balance between decisions that supported environmental values and decisions
that gave priority to economic development. Despite Bush's substantial environmental achievements and his markedly better environmental record than
Reagan's,93 Kraft and Vig found that "Bush gets surprisingly little credit
from the environmental community or from the public at large." The environmental community focused on those decisions that favored economic development and gave the president little credit for those decisions that came
down on the side of environmental values. 94 Just a few months before the
president would sign the Clean Air Act in November 1990, for instance, a Sierra Club official could blast Bush for his "shameful lack of leadership on
the global environment. " 95 Toward the end of his term, as the debate about
the president's role at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro reached its peak,
criticism of Bush among environmentalists reached a crescendo. Many environmentalists had come to believe that "Mr. Bush is no environmentalist."
A few even insisted that he would go "down in history, second only to
Ronald Reagan, as America's anti-environmental President. " 96
The rising tide of negative elite evaluations trickled down to the mass public. Although the American public rated Bush better on the environment
than it had Reagan, it still did not view Bush's environmental performance
particularly positively.97 Even when Bush's overall approval scores were high,
62 percent of the public said that Bush had "mostly just talked about" protecting the environment rather than having "really made progress. " 98 By the
summer of 1992, only 31 percent approved of Bush's handling of the environment. 99 Cued by elite interpretations, the public came to see the gap between Bush's rhetoric and his administration's actions not as a sign that the
president was well intentioned but rather that he was insincere.
Kraft and Vig attribute Bush's failure to get credit for the environmental
achievements of his administration in part to poor salesmanship on the part
of the Bush White House. But Kraft and Vig also argue that a large part of
the answer lies in the "demanding and highly critical environmental community." 100 Bush's failure as a leader, in other words, cannot be explained
without looking at his would-be followers. Why were these followers so unwilling to accept the mixed record of the Bush administration? Why were
they so unforgiving of the president when the administration leaned in the
direction of economic growth? And why were they so unappreciative of the
president when the administration leaned in an environmental direction?
Before explaining Bush's failure, though, it is worth recalling the good will
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initially shown toward Bush in the environmental community and the words
and deeds through which Bush earned that good will. Bush self-consciously
set out to differentiate himself from the more divisive, partisan politics of
Reagan, not only in the area of the environment but also in such areas as
civil rights and education. 101 The "kinder, gentler" phrase was meant to convey Bush's intention to govern by inclusion and conciliation rather than
through polarization and confrontation. 102
Throughout the first year or so of the administration, Bush appeared to
be quite successful in persuading environmentalists that his heart was with
them even when his policies always weren't. After meeting with presidentelect Bush, Jay Hair, president of the National Wildlife Federation, told reporters that he found the difference between Mr. Bush and President
Reagan's "ideological shrillness and lack of commitment to good stewardship of the land" to be like "night and day. " 103 Shortly into the new administration, journalist Jack Germond commented that he thought "Bush's heart
is in the right place on environmental questions. His record is not up to this
point, but I think it is too soon to tell. " 104
Bush's appointments, particularly the selection of William Reilly as head
of the EPA but also the choice of Michael Deland as head of Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and Robert Grady as associate director of the
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) for natural resources, energy,
and science, helped to signal the president's sympathy for environmental positions. 105 The appointment of Reilly gave Bush something Reagan never had
in his first two and a half years: a prominent administration official with
credibility in the environmental community who could try, as one official
close to Mr. Reilly put it, "to reassure his friends that he believes that the
President has his heart in the right place." 106 When the White House weakened a wetlands agreement to take into account objections raised by Alaskan officials and development interests, for instance, Reilly explained to a
reporter that "the President's commitment to no net loss of wetlands is one
he believes in quite strongly." 107
The portrayal of Bush as a president with environmental instincts opened
the way for advisers to play the role of lightning rod when administration
policy did not match presidential rhetoric. Several people within the administration played this role but none so visibly or with such gusto as Chief of
Staff John Sununu. 108 As early as February 1990, leaders of eight national
environmental groups wrote to Bush to complain that "the direct, personal
involvement of your chief of staff [is] reversing your pledges [and] driving a
wedge between you and conservationists. " 109 "You have articulated laudable
goals," the signers continued, "but it appears your chief of staff is not committed to meeting them." Sununu was identified as the "nation's chief environmental foe" and as "the new James Watt. " 110 Sununu's "idea of open
space," joked one critic, "was a K Mart parking lot." Sununu was charged
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with "isolating President Bush from other world leaders on environmental
issues." A New York Times editorial scored Sununu for an "impatience with
environmentalists [that] stops just short of contempt. " 111 Columnist Tom
Wicker excoriated Sununu, "the White House chief of everything," for his
"myopic approach to energy," and columnist Leslie Gelb held Sununu responsible for Jim Baker's and William Reilly's unwillingness to speak their
minds in public and to the president. 11 2
Sununu attracted perhaps the most intensive criticism for his role in the
dispute over global warming. The press carried the story of an arrogant
chief of staff high handedly overriding the considered opinion of not only
the relevant experts within the administration but within the entire scientific
community. 113 Sununu's skepticism of the models upon which predictions of
greenhouse warming are based was genuine; what was misleading was the
implication that Sununu was a rogue elephant. In fact Sununu expressed the
misgivings of important elements within the Republican party who feared
that warnings of "global warming" and impending doom were being used
by environmentalists to justify government regulation of private enterprise.
Because the debate over global warming has critically important consequences for how we choose to organize our social lives-if nature is resilient,
individuals should be left to their own devices; if nature is fragile, individuals should be regulated in the name of the collective good-it is understandable that the controversy is politically charged. 11 • It is also understandable that a president who conceives of himself as an environmentalist and
wants others to do so would give Sununu running room on an issue that is
central to the Republican party's self-definition and yet also has proven
troublesome for Republicans who have not yet figured out how to package
this skepticism without seeming to be indifferent to "the fate of the earth."
The environmentalists' view of Bush as a president whose good intentions
were being thwarted and diverted by scheming aides was genuine. It was not
just dissembling designed to avoid antagonizing a popular president. Even
relatively dispassionate observers, like Kraft and Vig, for instance, felt that
"Bush's advisers may be pulling him back from his political instinct to support environmental efforts. " 11 5 Kraft and Vig's harshest condemnation is reserved for Sununu. The chief of staff, they argue, "has clearly exerted personal influence on climate change policy that goes . .. beyond his own
technical competence. He has imposed his own judgment against others' on
scientific issues in a manner that reflects his biases and values." 116
This sense that Bush, unlike his immediate predecessor, possessed environmental instincts is what enabled Sununu to be an effective lightning rod.
Many environmentalists seemed to believe that if only Bush had another
chief of staff or if only Bush would involve himself more directly in environmental policy making, administration policy with respect to climate change
or wetlands preservation or clean air would look very different. 111 Sununu
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was well cast as an environmental bogeyman for not only did he exercise
considerable power but he also harbored a well-advertised distrust of the scientific evidence that provided the basis for many environmental proposals. 118
Ultimately, though, Sununu's role as an environmental lightning rod
broke down, and environmentalists increasingly aimed their pointed barbs
directly at the president. Environmentalists became less and less willing to
view Bush's intentions in a charitable light. As the attacks became more vehement and more personal, administration officials publicly expressed "a
growing frustration here that we never get credit for anything." 119 In the
spring of 1990, press reports emerged that Bush "privately has seethed at the
criticism from [environmental] activists, angry that they keep demanding
more when he believes he has offered them much. " 120 The simmering feud
erupted in public in the summer of 1990, with headlines proclaiming,
"Bush, Environmentalists End Relationship in a Huff. " 121 Environmentalists criticized Bush for bad faith , broken promises, and empty rhetoric.
Many in the Bush administration, meanwhile, wrote environmentalists off
as implacable critics who could not be pleased. As one Bush aide expressed
it, "If we are going to get beat up, why bother?" 122
Why did the environmental community give Bush so little credit and so
much blame? Why were they so hypercritical of an administration that had
done so much better than its predecessor? Robert Grady of the 0MB offers
an organizational explanation. In order to maintain and expand their memberships, Grady argues, environmental groups must continually press for
more. 123 If the groups praise the administration, members may feel that there
is a less pressing need to contribute to the group. If things are going well on
the environmental front, contributors may decide that perhaps scarce resources would be better spent in some other area. To combat this threat to
organizational maintenance, these organizations keep up a steady drumbeat
of criticism and demands. There is truth to this analysis, but there must be
more to the story. After all, many voluntary groups share this same basic incentive structure yet not all are as harshly critical of existing policies and authority or as apocalyptic about the future as are environmentalists.
An additional part of the story is provided by focusing on the egalitarian,
antiauthority ethos of many environmental advocates. 12• Many such advocates are openly hostile to the political and economic system and are not
particularly interested in letting the president, or any other established leaders, off the hook. 125 Lightning rods presuppose followers who want to believe
in leaders. In the absence of such a belief, blame avoidance is not a viable
strategy. But this explanation by itself is also insufficient. Many environmentalists are Republicans. The leaders of organizations like the National
Wildlife Federation and even the Sierra Club are very much part of the establishment and regularly engage in the necessary bargains and compromises of politics. 126
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Bush's failure to continue to deflect blame in the area of environmental
policy is more deeply rooted still. It is a failure that is grounded in a growing
ideological divide between political elites on environmental questions that
made it virtually impossible for Bush to chart a middle course. 121 The gap
between movement conservatives and business interests on the one hand and
environmentalists on the other was simply too great. Passage of the Clean
Air Act seemed to belie this divide but the division quickly reasserted itself
in the intense debate over how to enforce the law. One senior administration
official confided, "At the heart of this debate [are] really . . . different
world view[s] inside this administration." The opposing sides tried to iron
out their differences in a series of contentious sessions, but "the conclusion
was the sides were so far apart that Bush would have to make the choice." 128
Similarly, Bush found it virtually impossible to adopt and hold a middle
ground in the controversies swirling around the Earth Summit. Bush's
"split-the-difference" or "find-a-balance" pattern of decision making ultimately proved ill suited to a political environment in which the competing
sides were so far apart that compromise was seen as unacceptable to both
sides. 129
But ideological polarization among followers is not the whole story either.
For Bush's own rhetoric was also critically important in undermining the
president's desire to deflect blame onto subordinates. When Bush promised
to be the "environmental president," he invited voters to judge him on the
basis of his administration's actions in this policy area. Yet the environment
was, as Kraft and Vig point out, in fact "a low salience issue for the president." 130 Bush was thus asking voters to hold him personally accountable for
an area of public policy in which he would play little role and in which policy direction was hotly contested within his party. Rhetoric is never mere
rhetoric. Those who favored environmentalist positions used Bush's own
words to hold the president's feet to the fire. A New York Times editorial,
for instance, argued that "Mr. Bush takes pride in his innovative clean air
bill and his decision to join an international agreement to abolish ozonethreatening chemicals. Those are fine achievements, but they do not unhook
him from a campaign promise he made on Aug. 31, 1988. 'Those who think
we are powerless to do anything about the 'greenhouse effect' are forgetting
about the 'White House effect,' he said. 'As President, I intend to do something about it.' Do what?" 131 Such widely publicized campaign commitments may have given the president a popular issue on which to run but by
lifting his profile on the issue those same promises made it more difficult for
him later to deflect blame onto subordinates.
Yet why did Bush find it so difficult to slip the harness of his rhetoric?
Why didn't the rhetoric serve as a signal of the president's good intentions,
and why weren't the deeds understood as the work of overly zealous aides or
the product of unfortunate but necessary compromises with his conservative
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electoral base? Why was the rhetoric instead seen as largely hollow and the
deeds viewed as a sign of Bush's hypocrisy and opportunism? After all,
Eisenhower made visible campaign commitments to retain price supports
for farmers, and yet farmers did not accuse Eisenhower of hypocrisy so
much as they charged Secretary Benson with betrayal. 132 Eisenhower's
pledges were widely seen as genuine expressions of his desire to help farmers,
while the administration's policies that backed away from price supports
were widely interpreted in terms of Benson's zealousness or knavery. 133 Why
was Bush unable to emulate Eisenhower's success?
Part of the answer is relatively straightforward. Farmers in the 1950s were
overwhelmingly Republican and thus had a strong predisposition to support
Eisenhower. Many environmentalists, on the other hand, were strongly predisposed to distrust Republicans, especially after eight years of the Reagan
administration. As Russell E. Train, a Bush friend and ex-EPA boss and
president of the World Wildlife Fund, says, "Most environmentalists are not
predisposed to support a Republican president." 134
Another part of the answer is that Eisenhower never promised to be the
"agriculture president" and was thus able to keep a greater personal distance
from the issue of price supports, despite the specific pledges he made during
the campaign. In 1952, Eisenhower campaigned largely on the themes of
"Communism, Korea, and Corruption"; agriculture was relatively peripheral. Bush's pledge to be "the environmental president," on the other hand,
played a central role in defining the Bush candidacy. Only Bush's "no new
taxes" pledge had greater visibility in the campaign.
Moreover, Sununu's proximity to the president made him a more risky
lightning rod than Benson, who was lodged some distance away from the
president in a second-tier department. People can believe that a president
may not know or understand or particularly care what his secretary of agriculture is up to; it is much harder to persuade people that a president doesn't
approve of, doesn't know about, or doesn't understand what his chief of
staff is doing.
Sununu's extensive involvement with environmental issues, however, reflected a larger problem for Bush, namely the deep disagreements within the
administration in this policy area. The Eisenhower administration included
diverse views on agriculture, but most of these differences were small enough
that they could be compromised and settled well below the presidential level.
Reagan's initial top environmental appointments to a large degree shared a
common ideological orientation, which often muted the scope of conflicts
within (though not outside) the administration. Bush's strategy of including
people with large philosophical differences meant, as Kraft and Vig point
out, that decisions were inevitably thrust into the upper reaches of the Bush
White House. 135
Bush's experience, then, teaches us some of the difficulties of avoiding
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blame in a deeply polarized policy environment. Part of what made Eisenhower's strategy of blame avoidance viable was that the differences between
opposing sides were small enough that it was possible to carve out a middle
ground where both sides could believe the president was still with them.
Where the differences become too large, a president finds it difficult to keep
his commitments ambiguous and to persuade opposing sides of his good intentions. The greater the ideological divisions, the greater the pressure on the
president to choose sides and to become involved in the disputes. Ideological
polarization thus undermines the two factors-detachment from decision
making and ambiguity about intentions-that enable a president to deflect
blame onto subordinates.

4
The Vice President as
Lightning Rod: Richard Nixon
and Hubert Humphrey

Long dismissed as an insignificant political office, the vice-presidency has
undergone a marked rehabilitation in recent decades. As the vice president's
advisory role has been upgraded, so too has the study of that institution. 1
This increase in scholarly attention to the vice-presidency is consistent with
the dominant tendency within presidential studies to examine members of
the executive branch in terms of their contribution to the formulation of
public policy. Viewed as a policy adviser, the vice-presidency did not become
important until Walter Mondale, or perhaps Nelson Rockefeller, occupied
the office. Viewed as a presidential spokesman and lightning rod, however,
the vice-presidency came into its own with the tenure of Richard Nixon.
Nixon was the first vice president to become a highly visible political
spokesman. During Nixon's first four years in office he received as many entries in the New York Times Index as his four predecessors-Alben Barkley,
Henry Wallace, John Nance Garner, and Charles Curtis-had received in a
combined twenty years in office. Moreover, Nixon's model of a visible vice
president has been emulated by most of his successors. Whereas from 1933
to 1952, the vice president received an average of 109 entries a year, in the
twenty years following Nixon's tenure, the vice president averaged 482 entries a year (see Table 4.1 ).
The transformation in the public visibility of the vice president thus preceded the development of the vice president as policy adviser. 2 This chapter
examines two vice presidents, Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, both of whom
assumed highly visible roles as promoters of administration policies even
though neither were important policy advisers within the administration.
Both were used by their presidents as lightning rods and salesmen for policies they didn't shape. How did this vice-presidential role affect their ability
to act as presidential lightning rods, and how can their success or lack
55
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TABLE 4.1. Average annual number of entries in the New York Times Index.•

1921-1922
1925-1928
1929-1932
1933-1940
1941-1944
1949-1952
1953-1959
1961-1962
1965-1967
1969-1972
1975-1976
1977-1980
1981-1987

Calvin Coolidge
Charles Dawes
Charles Curtis
John Nance Garner
Henry Wallace
Alben Barkley
Richard Nixon
Lyndon Johnson
Hubert Humphrey
Spiro Agnew
Nelson Rockefeller
Walter Mondale
George Bush

69
141
56
73
139
152
528
295
514
708
582
276
180

•Excluded are those years (1960, 1968, and 1988) when the vice president was a presidential candidate, when there was no vice president (1924, 1946-1948, 1964), and when there
was a presidential or vice-presidential death or resignation (1923, 1945, 1963, 1973, 1974).

thereof in deflecting blame contribute to our understanding of lightning
rods generally?

JOHNSON AND HUMPHREY: COSTS OF A
CREDIT-CLAIMING STRATEGY

Vice President Humphrey was a leading spokesman for the Johnson administration's war effort in Vietnam. President Johnson hoped to use Humphrey not only to persuade audiences about the rightness of the administration's course, but also to have someone other than the president carry what
was a highly unpopular message in many parts of the nation. Did Humphrey's outspoken defense of the administration's handling of the Vietnam
War help to deflect blame for the war away from President Lyndon Johnson? The short answer is no.
Humphrey failed to deflect blame away from Johnson in large part because Humphrey was viewed by many people as little more than an extension
of Johnson, a sentiment summed up in a cover picture of Esquire magazine
portraying a wooden Humphrey puppet being manipulated from behind by
President Johnson. 3 As one scholar has put it, "For millions of Americans-protesters and non-protesters alike-Hubert Humphrey appeared to
be a stand-in for Lyndon Johnson."• Humphrey's "basic problem," comments another scholar, "was that too many Americans regarded him as a
Lyndon Johnson without the Texas accent. " 5 To more caustic critics, Humphrey was "all too unhappily known as the parrot in Lyndon Johnson's blue
room ." 6
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Public opinion surveys show that a great majority of the mass public did
not distinguish much between Humphrey and Johnson . Asked by Gallup at
the end of 1966 to rate Humphrey and Johnson on a ten-point scale, 40 percent of respondents gave Humphrey and Johnson identical scores. Sixtyeight percent placed them within one point or less of each other, and 81 percent placed them within two points or less.7 Some critics have suggested that
"one cannot expect in the nature of the arrangement that the image of a vice
president will be too different from that of the president. " 8 But this interpretation is belied by a poll conducted at the outset of 1956 showing that only
11 percent of respondents gave Nixon and Eisenhower the same rating, only
28 percent placed them within a point of each other, and only 44 percent
· placed them within two points. 9
Even after Johnson had withdrawn from the 1968 race and Humphrey
had begun his own campaign for the Democratic nomination, the public
perception of Humphrey and Johnson continued to remain strongly joined.
In a poll conducted in May 1968, about one month after Johnson had announced his decision not to seek reelection, 30 percent placed Humphrey
and Johnson at the same position on the ten-point scale, 60 percent put
them within a point, and 76 percent put them within two points. Another
survey taken several weeks before the 1968 election arrived at almost identical results: 31 percent gave the two men the same rating, 62 percent placed
them within a point of each other, and 80 percent put them within two
points. 10
Why did so many citizens lump Johnson and Humphrey together? People
thought they heard Johnson's voice when Humphrey spoke in large part because of the president's close (and well-advertised) control over his vice president's activities. "From the moment he [Humphrey] took office," reports
Humphrey's biographer Carl Solberg, "the text of all his prepared speeches
had to be sent to the White House in advance, and practically all suffered excisions. " 11 A former Humphrey aide confirms that they "had to get every
syllable cleared with the White House. " 12 Johnson's close supervision of
Humphrey's behavior did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. As early as
February 1965, Time reported that "Johnson keeps him on a close leash,
wants to know at all times where he is, what he is doing and, most important, what he is saying or planning to say." 13 The Reporter informed its readers that all of "Hubert Humphrey's public statements have to be cleared by
the White House." 14
Johnson's control over Humphrey's behavior descended to trivial, even ridiculous, depths. Johnson insisted, for instance, that Humphrey get presidential clearance before taking out a presidential yacht. The same restrictions applied to Humphrey's use of official planes. A Humphrey aide
recalls: "If he had three out-of-town speaking engagements that week, three
memos would go from his military aide to Johnson's military aide to Marvin
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Watson to Lyndon Baines Johnson's overnight reading file, and he would
mark them yes or no. That kept up for three and a half years and there were
many cases where the memos came back marked 'no.' "' 5
The president made few, if any, efforts to conceal Humphrey's lack of autonomy. Indeed Johnson occasionally went out of his way publicly to put
Humphrey in his place. Shortly after the election, for instance, Humphrey
gave a speech in New York calling for a "massive investment" to improve
American education. Such an investment, Humphrey declared, would be
"the single most important step toward building the Great Society." 16 Johnson, David Halberstam recounts, "was furious; this was his terrain and
Humphrey was told this in no uncertain terms. Just so there would be no
mistake about it, Johnson called in the White House reporters who were
with him on the Ranch and told them, 'Boys, I've just reminded Hubert that
I've got his balls in my pocket.' " 11
This incident reveals, among other things, Johnson's obsessive desire to
show those in the political stratum who was in charge and his reluctance to
let other members of the administration share in the credit for the Great Society. Johnson was particularly fearful that liberals, with whom he had never
had particularly close relations, might credit the impetus for the administration's landmark social legislation to Humphrey, a cofounder of Americans
for Democratic Action (ADA) and longtime champion of liberal causes. 18
According to Solberg, Johnson "begrudged any shaft of public light that
fell on his ... vice president. He often chided Humphrey when he felt the
vice president was getting too much newspaper space. And to make sure that
Humphrey did not, Johnson forbade him to take any member of the national press with him on his out-of-town trips. " 19 Humphrey himself later
complained that "the President not only frustrated ordinary human desire
for praise or recognition, he openly clamped down." 20
A Gallup poll conducted in November of 1965 showed that Johnson's policy of keeping Humphrey out of the limelight was having an impact. The
mass public knew little about Humphrey, and what little they did know was
not particularly positive. Only 23 percent said they would like to see Humphrey become president sometime in the future. Although this news alarmed
Humphrey and his staff, Johnson was undisturbed. "Wrapping a big arm
around Humphrey's shoulder," Johnson told Humphrey "that he had never
had a press secretary as vice president and Humphrey didn't need one either." The president advised Humphrey "to concentrate on being a good,
loyal vice president and not pay attention to his image." Humphrey dutifully fired his press secretary. 21
Johnson's efforts to deny Humphrey positive publicity in the opening
years of the administration retarded Humphrey's effectiveness as a lightning
rod when he was later called upon to defend the war in Vietnam. Because
Johnson had been unwilling to build Humphrey up and because he had
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taken special pains to demonstrate to others how little autonomy the vice
president had, it is hardly surprising that Humphrey was unable to provide
Johnson with much in the way of political cover.
After spending the opening years of his administration persuading those
inside and outside of the Washington community that he was responsible for
all the good things that happened, Johnson now found it difficult to duck
responsibility for the increasingly negative outcomes. Johnson's creditclaiming style helped his public prestige while things were going well, but
when events turned sour there was nothing to insulate him from calamity. By
the time the war began to go badly, too many people had already been
schooled to believe that, as one White House aide had confidently boasted
in earlier, less troublesome days, "there is only one leader of this orchestra. " 22

DEFENDING VIETNAM

Although Humphrey was to become one of the administration's most vocal
and enthusiastic defenders of the administration's war effort, he did not begin his tenure that way. In a meeting in early February 1965, Humphrey had
argued, along with George Ball and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson,
against bombing North Vietnam. A week later, in a lengthy memorandum
to the president on "the politics of Vietnam," Humphrey argued that if the
war was escalated, "political opposition will mount steadily," particularly
among the party's core constituency of "liberals, independents, labor." He
warned Johnson that a protracted war would undermine the administration's other cherished policies. "It is always hard to cut losses," Humphrey
conceded, "but the Johnson administration is in a stronger position to do so
now than any Administration in this century. 1965 is the year of minimum
political risk for the Johnson Administration. Indeed it is the first year when
we can face the Vietnam problem without being preoccupied with the political repercussions from the Republican right. " 23
For his pains, the vice president was frozen out of foreign policy deliberations. Johnson had been upset that Humphrey had expressed his dissent in
front of other members of the administration, and the president's anger was
compounded when Humphrey committed his opposition to paper. 2• If the
contents of the memo were leaked, Johnson had reason to fear that Humphrey would be made into an apostle of peace, leaving Johnson cast as the
warmonger. 25
Johnson's freeze-out of Humphrey had the desired effect of modifying
Humphrey's behavior. Humphrey worried aloud to his aides about the need
to "find a way to convince this man of my loyalty. " 26 The quickest way to regain the president's confidence was to bring his public statements and pri-
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vate convictions about Vietnam into closer accord with the president's.
Humphrey slowly climbed back into Johnson's good graces by flattering the
president,2' criticizing opponents of the war, 28 and sounding an increasingly
optimistic note about the prospects for success in Vietnam.
Abandoning his previous reservations, Humphrey now became among the
administration's most outspoken defenders of the war. Humphrey's change
of heart about the wisdom of the war can be dated from his trip to Southeast
Asia in February 1965. Upon his return, Humphrey announced to the press,
"The tide of battle has turned in Vietnam in our favor. " 29 From this point
on, the vice president was seen (in the words of Newsweek) as "the scrappiest warrior in the White House phalanx. " 30
Humphrey was widely portrayed in the media as a "salesman" for Johnson's policies. 31 Those who wanted to place a more derogatory spin on Humphrey's role labeled him a "cheerleader. " 32 Few people, however, are inclined
to blame a salesman or cheerleader for the poor performance of a product
or team. Rather, their wrath is likely to be reserved for those who are believed to be responsible for creating the product. While liberals might express disgust with Humphrey for selling and applauding a product they believed to be unwise and amoral, this in no way lessened their animosity
toward the one man they held responsible for the war in Vietnam-Lyndon
Johnson.
Indeed, Humphrey's "betrayal" seemed only to heighten liberal distrust
and criticism of Johnson. To the president's many sins liberals now added
the emasculation and intimidation of one of their staunchest allies and
greatest heroes. Many of Humphrey's old liberal allies continued to believe
that the vice president was suppressing his true feelings out of loyalty to the
president. ADA cofounder Joseph Rauh, for instance, was convinced that
"if Hubert were president, his visceral liberalism, which I believe is there,
would get us out of the war. " 33 In a similar vein, The Nation editorialized
that defending the war was "a wretched assignment for any politician-even
one of Hubert's gifts. If he makes one misstep Lyndon will be on his back.
And Hubert is apt to step wrong in his new assignment, precisely because a
residue of liberalism remains in his bosom. " 34 When Humphrey came to deliver the main address at the ADA convention in April 1966, the word went
out to "be kind to Hubert" because he was "locked in" by Johnson. 35 In the
summer of 1967, the Atlantic Monthly reported that "disenchanted liberals
... have already written him off as a prisoner of Johnson. " 36
The overriding reason why Humphrey could not serve as a presidential
lightning rod was that he had no hand in making the war he was called on to
defend. From the early days of the administration, he had been banished
from the decision-making process. Even after he assumed a highly visible
public profile on Vietnam, Humphrey was still excluded from the Tuesday
luncheon sessions where Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy (and later Ros-
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tow) discussed high-level Vietnam strategy.3' People might be persuaded or
angered by Humphrey, but they were unlikely to hold him responsible for decisions over which they knew he had no influence. As long as Humphrey was
seen only as a "mouthpiece" for Johnson, 38 the vice president could not deflect blame away from the president.
The Johnson/ Humphrey relationship illustrates in an extreme form the
importance of an adviser being at least perceived as responsible for a policy
if he is to function as a lightning rod. Humphrey's limited utility as a lightning rod stemmed from both his role as vice president and Johnson's leadership style. Johnson's domineering style of leadership created a presumption
among many people within the political stratum that if a member of the administration (whether staff, cabinet member, or vice president) took some
action he must be carrying out the president's wishes.39 Minimizing both the
appearance and reality of subordinates' discretion makes it difficult for a
leader to avoid blame when things go wrong. For if a subordinate is only following presidential orders, then it is the president and not the subordinate
who deserves blame.
Humphrey's ineffectiveness as a lightning rod was also compounded by
the limitations of the vice-presidential role, particularly as it existed at that
time. Because the vice-presidency is often caricatured as a do-nothing role,
vice presidents find it more difficult to deflect blame than do cabinet members or top presidential staff. In contrast to a chief of staff, who is placed at
the vortex of the decision-making process, or to a department secretary, who
is expected to have significant discretion in making public policy, vice presidents are always at risk of being presumed to be simply carrying out a president's orders, defending a policy they had no part in making.
One must be careful, however, not to overstate the inherent limitations of
the vice-presidential role, even as that role existed in the 1960s. After all, the
Gallup surveys cited earlier suggest that in contrast to the Humphrey/ Johnson relationship, people did tend to distinguish sharply between Nixon and
Eisenhower. Despite the widespread expectation that the first duty of a vice
president is to be loyal to the president, Nixon was not seen as Eisenhower's
tool, as simply an extension of the president. How did Eisenhower counteract the weakness of the vice-presidential role and build his vice president
into a plausible lightning rod?

NIXON AS A POLITICAL LIGHTNING ROD

Presidential scholars have long recognized that all presidents must wrestle
with the conflict between their roles as chief of state and chief of party. The
expectation that a president assumes the leadership of his party becomes
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particularly problematic in a context in which the president's party is in the
minority.
Eisenhower's behavior as president was constrained by the fact that he was
a Republican president in a preponderantly Democratic nation. An Andrew
Jackson or a Harry Truman could hope to get elected and even govern by
rallying the party faithful, but Eisenhower required the support of a significant number of the opposition party in order to succeed. Eisenhower was
well aware of this, acknowledging in his memoirs that "I have never enjoyed
the luxury of being head of a majority party. Perhaps the leader of such a
party can be uniformly partisan. But the leader of a minority party has a
different set of references. To win, he ... must merit the support of hundreds of thousands of independents and members of the opposition party.
Attitudes, speeches, programs, and techniques cannot be inflexibly partisan. " 40
Avoiding the appearance of inflexible partisanship helped Eisenhower run
almost six million votes (or 10 percent) ahead of his party in 1952 and again
in 1956. 41 Eisenhower's success in projecting a nonpartisan image is evident
from a Gallup survey conducted in July 1955 which found that 57 percent of
the people felt Eisenhower was "at heart" somewhere in between the Republican and Democratic parties. •2
In part, of course, Eisenhower's nonpartisan image was a result of his
nonpartisan past. 43 Before assenting to be a candidate in 1952, he had refrained from professing an allegiance to either political party. But it is not
enough to suggest, as one former administration official does, that the
people thought: "Here is a man who's above partisan politics. He's the kind
of man I like in the White House. " 44 For this leaves unanswered the question
of how Eisenhower managed to sustain a nonpartisan hero image throughout his eight years as president of the United States. Public images are not
set in stone. They can change with incredible speed, as Nancy Reagan's turnaround from frivolous clotheshorse to respected first lady" or George Bush's
transformation from wimp to winner during the 1988 presidential campaign
attest.
Eisenhower sustained his nonpartisan public image by delegating partisan
responsibilities to other administration officials, the most prominent of
whom was his vice president, Richard Nixon. Since Eisenhower could not
afford (nor was he particularly comfortable with) public expressions of partisanship, Nixon was assigned the task of slugging it out with the Democrats, particularly during election years. As a result, the vice president became a target for Democratic attacks. 46
Eisenhower's intention to use Nixon as a partisan lightning rod was conveyed to Nixon immediately after he was selected as the vice-presidential
nominee. After being informed of Eisenhower's choice by Brownell, Nixon
was immediately rushed over to talk to the general. From this meeting,
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Nixon concluded that "it was clear that he [Eisenhower] envisaged taking an
above-the-battle position, and that whatever hard partisan campaigning was
required would be pretty much left to me." Eisenhower instructed Nixon
that he "should be able not only to flail the Democrats on the corruption issue but also to personify the remedy for it. " 47 As the campaign was set to begin in earnest in mid-September, Nixon went to see Eisenhower at his Denver headquarters to review campaign strategy. The plan, Nixon recalled, was
"for General Eisenhower to stress the positive aspects of his 'Crusade to
Clean Up the Mess in Washington' . . . [while] I was to hammer away at our
opponents on the record of the Truman administration, with particular emphasis on Communist subversion. " 48
Nixon did not disappoint. He kept up a steady barrage of hard-hitting attacks on the Democrats and their presidential nominee, Adlai Stevenson.
Nixon characterized Stevenson as "a weakling, a waster, and a small-caliber
Truman." "Adlai the appeaser," he told a partisan audience in southern
California shortly before the election, "got a Ph.D. from Dean Acheson's
College of Cowardly Communist Containment." On another occasion,
Nixon accused Stevenson, Acheson, and Truman of all being "traitors to the
high principles in which many of the nation's Democrats believe. " 49 Meanwhile Eisenhower, who rarely met up with Nixon on the campaign trail,
carefully cultivated an apolitical image.
Subsequent campaigns followed a roughly similar script. While the president would tell audiences that "no party has a monopoly on brains or idealism or statesmanship," Nixon would accuse Democrats of secretly wanting
to "socialize basic American institutions" and harboring "diseased ideas
. . . from the Marxist virus. " 50 Nixon was assigned the role of answering
Democratic criticisms of the administration, enabling Eisenhower to avoid
replying to the Democrats. While the vice president repeatedly criticized
Stevenson, Eisenhower rarely if ever mentioned his opponent.
While out on the campaign trail, Nixon had a large degree of discretion
about what attacks to answer and how to answer them. On occasion, however, Eisenhower would give Nixon specific instructions on what needed saying. At the formal kickoff for the 1956 campaign at Eisenhower's farm in
Gettysburg, for instance, the president enlisted Nixon to rebut Stevenson's
charges of administration corruption and heartlessness. On the morning of
the picnic, Eisenhower called Nixon with instructions:
Everybody is now noting that you are taking the new high level. However, I think today you ought to take notice of some of these attacks
that have been made on the administration and on me .... I think that
when Stevenson calls this administration racketeers and rascals, when
they say we are heartless in dealing with the problems of the people and
the problems of the farmers, when they say we have no peace and no
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prosperity, I want them to be called on it. I would like for you to do so,
and if you have to praise me that will be okay.... I suggest something
along the lines: Do you want to go back to war in order to have prosperity under the Democrats.... Of course, it isn't necessary to attack
[Stevenson] personally but we should point out that he is wrong. 5 1
Just in case Nixon had missed the message, Brownell got on the phone and
advised Nixon: "I don't think we could win with a so-called high level campaign. It has to be fair but you have to take the opposition on. It has to be
hard-hitting. " 52
Nixon's speech closely followed Eisenhower's outline. One by one, Nixon
refuted the Democratic charges enumerated by Eisenhower. The vice president also went on the offensive, charging that for Stevenson "to suggest one
day that 'we're losing the cold war' and the next day that we might get rid of
the draft ... is the height of political fakery and irresponsibility." While
vowing that communism at home should not be an issue in the upcoming
campaign, Nixon nevertheless called on Stevenson to repudiate Truman's
comment that Alger Hiss was not a Communist. After Nixon had finished
answering Democratic charges as well as making a few of his own, Eisenhower then gave a talk that completely ignored the Democratic campaign.
The president gave an informal pep talk on the virtues of increasing voter
registration ("If you find it necessary to vote against us, all right, we would
rather have you do that than not vote at all"), the nature of leadership, and
the defining principles of the Republican party. 53
Stevenson followed a similar script when he launched the 1954 campaign
by criticizing Eisenhower in a nationally televised speech for his handling of
McCarthy and the "New Look" defense policy that downgraded conventional forces in favor of deterrence through the threat of massive atomic retaliation. The president immediately turned to Nixon to make the formal reply. At a strategy meeting with Republican leaders, Eisenhower suggested
that "we probably ought to use Dick more than we have been ... . He can
sometimes take positions which are more political than it would be expected
that I take." 54
The day before Nixon was to deliver the televised speech, Eisenhower
summoned his vice president to the White House. The president prefaced his
remarks by allowing that Nixon did not need advice on "a political speech"
but then went on to give him detailed advice anyway. Eisenhower laid particular stress on the need to get across to people that he had "a progressive, dynamic program which benefited all the people." Evidently worried that
Nixon might come across as mean-spirited, Eisenhower suggested that he
"might work [in] a smile with regard to ... comments on Stevenson."
Nixon told Eisenhower that he "planned to stick a few barbs into him
[Stevenson]." The president was "perfectly content" that Nixon do so but
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"thought it was best to laugh at him rather than to hit him meanly." He also
advised his vice president to remind the audience that he had commanded
five million troops in Europe. "What qualification," the president demanded, "does Stevenson have on this subject? Who is he?" 55
Nixon took the hint. In his speech, he built his defense of the administration's "New Look" policy upon President Eisenhower's position as "one of
the greatest military leaders in the world today." In contrast, the vice president pointed out, Stevenson, like a great many of the rest of us, was no military strategist. Because Eisenhower was a military expert, Nixon believed
that "we can and ... should have confidence in his ... policy, particularly
when the nonexpert who criticizes it offers nothing but a return to a policy
which failed and ... was rejected overwhelmingly by the American people
in the election of November 1952. " 56 Immediately afterward, Eisenhower
called to congratulate Nixon on a "magnificent" speech,S' but many in the
press were considerably less laudatory. The liberal Catholic weekly, Commonweal, characterized Nixon's reply to Stevenson as "low-key demagoguery." The editors were particularly critical of Nixon's "condescending" suggestion that Eisenhower's military experience was reason enough for the
citizenry to place confidence in the president's policy. Were it possible to locate Eisenhower "behind the phalanx of advertising men and merchandising
experts," the editors were certain that the general "would agree with us. " 58
In actual fact, however, as Eisenhower's chat with Nixon the day before the
speech indicates, the "condescension" (if that is what it is to suggest that the
opinion of experts deserves greater weight than that of nonexperts) was
Eisenhower's, not Nixon's.
That Nixon was sometimes explicitly instructed by Eisenhower to go after
Stevenson and the Democrats should not obscure Nixon's relish for the role
of partisan hit man. When Dulles was being criticized by congressional
Democrats for his Middle East policies in 1956, for instance, the vice president called Dulles and told him to "let me know if you want anyone attacked. " 59 Nixon the partisan, as he himself admitted, enjoyed "sticking a
few barbs" into the likes of Stevenson, Acheson, and Truman.
Hard-hitting partisanship came naturally to Nixon, and he found these instincts difficult to repress. In his memoirs, Nixon recalls Eisenhower coming
out to the Washington National Airport to see him off on the first campaign
swing of 1956 and warning the vice president against indulging in "the exaggerations of partisan political talk." The president's parting admonition was
"Give 'em heaven." Nixon followed Eisenhower's advice for the first few
days but found it difficult to inspire his partisan audiences without exaggerated partisan rhetoric. After adding some "hard-hitting additions" to his
basic speech, Nixon recounts feeling that "suddenly I felt as if a great weight
had been lifted from me . I had not realized how frustrating it had been to
suppress the normal partisan instincts. " 60
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Nixon's attacks on the Democrats sometimes went beyond what Eisenhower regarded as proper or wise. Early in the summer of 1954, for instance,
in McCarthy's home state of Wisconsin, Nixon accused "the Acheson policy" of being "directly responsible for the loss of China." Worried that such
attacks would jeopardize Democratic support for administration policies,
Eisenhower promptly instructed Nixon to cease such inflammatory attacks.
Such accusations, Ike told Nixon, not only threatened to undermine his foreign policy but were inaccurate. "The reason we lost China," Eisenhower
explained, "was because the U.S. insisted upon Chiang Kai-shek taking
Communists into his government." And it was George Marshall, he pointed
out, not Acheson, who had recommended this policy.6 1
Another presidential reprimand came during the 1958 campaign after
Nixon attacked the Democratic party's "sorry record of retreat and appeasement, " and the "defensive, defeatist fuzzy-headed thinking which contributed to the loss of China and led to the Korean war." This time Eisenhower
made public his displeasure with Nixon's rhetorical excesses. At his weekly
press conference, Eisenhower stated his belief that "foreign policy ought to
be kept out of a partisan debate .. . . America's best interests in the world
will be served if we do not indulge in this kind of thing. " 62
The occasional reprimand notwithstanding, Nixon's attacks on the Democrats largely met with Eisenhower's approval, for they satisfied the president's and the Republican party's need for effective counterpunching
against the opposition. When Democratic leaders in Congress protested that
Nixon's attacks during the 1954 campaign had reflected on their patriotism,
Eisenhower's private response, as reported by Samuel Lubell, was that
"Nixon must have done a good job if the Democrats complain so much ." 63
Sherman Adams confirmed that Eisenhower did not, "as some Republicans
seemed to think, . .. [want] his spokesmen to be kind to Democrats in their
campaign oratory. He told Nixon and others, including myself, that he was
well aware that somebody had to do the hard-hitting infighting, and he had
no objections to it as long as no one expected him to do it. " 64
Nixon's hard-hitting attacks upon the opposition earned him praise from
the president and Republican politicians but also secured him the undying
enmity of Democrats. The Democratic party, declared one Democratic representative, has announced "open season on the Vice President." Nixon was
denounced by another Democrat as an " inept, naive, Piltdown statesman,
... a broken-down, maladjusted, purblind Throttlebottom." "So far as
we're concerned," Speaker Sam Rayburn concluded, "his name is mud." 65
According to one interpretation, Democratic attacks upon Nixon were
purely strategic. Nixon himself advances this thesis in Six Crises, in which he
argues that as vice president he had " been the whipping boy for those who
chose not to direct their political attacks against Dwight D. Eisenhower, the
most popular president in recent history. " 66 Others concurred that "Nixon is
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being shot at now because he appears the obvious candidate and the attacks
are directed at him instead of a popular Eisenhower. Were Nixon to step out
and another appear . .. he'd get the same treatment. " 67 Time magazine
echoed this view, arguing that "Nixon was a favorite target of Democrats
who felt it unprofitable to criticize Dwight Eisenhower. " 68
There is substantial truth in this view, but it underestimates the genuine
antipathy that Nixon aroused among many Democrats. Truman, who never
forgave Nixon for his "traitor" remark, later told Merle Miller that Nixon
was "a shifty-eyed goddamn liar. ... All the time I've been in politics,
there's only two people I hate, and he's one. " 69 Stevenson, too, is reported to
have said that Nixon was the only man in public life he ever "really
loathed. mo Nixon was attacked not only for strategic reasons, but because
his role (and the way he played that role) of answering and making partisan
charges generated a deep-seated dislike for the vice president.
At the level of the mass public, Nixon-haters often liked Ike. Public opinion surveys show that citizens commonly combined an intense dislike for
Nixon with great admiration for President Eisenhower. A poll conducted in
February 1956, for instance, found that of those who gave Nixon the lowest
possible rating of minus five (about one in seven of those who had formed
an opinion of Nixon), only 7 percent gave that same low rating to Eisenhower. Better than three in ten of the people who felt most negatively toward
the vice president actually gave Eisenhower the highest possible rating of
plus five, and eight in ten evaluated Eisenhower positively (i.e., gave him a
rating of between plus one and plus five). 71
This divorce between the public perception of Nixon and Eisenhower is all
the more remarkable when contrasted with the Johnson/ Humphrey pattern.
A Gallup poll conducted in December 1966 shows that extreme dislike (i.e.,
a minus five rating) of Humphrey was about as common as that uncovered
for Nixon in the February 1956 survey. The difference is that while only 7
percent of those who gave Nixon a rating of minus five also gave President
Eisenhower the lowest rating, 61 percent of those who gave Humphrey the
lowest possible score also gave Johnson a minus five rating . Moreover, less
than 3 percent of those who felt highly negative toward Vice President Humphrey gave Johnson the highest possible rating of plus five, and only one in
ten even gave Johnson a positive rating. 72
People had little difficulty reconciling a deep dislike for Nixon with a high
regard for Eisenhower, because they did not view Eisenhower as in any way
responsible for Nixon's partisanship. Most people did not see a vice president fulfilling a role assigned by the president, but simply Nixon being
Nixon. Nixon, not Eisenhower, appeared to be the political mastermind behind Republican campaigns. Writing during the fall of 1954 in the New York
Times, Cabell Phillips described Nixon as "the chief strategist" of the
GOP.73 In January 1955, U.S. News & World Report informed its readers
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that Richard Nixon is "the man at the helm of the Republican Party, busily
shaping policy and strategy for the 1956 presidential contest." The vice president, the magazine concluded, "has become the President's political mentor. " 1•
Eisenhower did little to discourage such notions, however inaccurate. In
private, he would occasionally acknowledge that he considered himself "a
better politician than most so-called professionals, "' 5 but in public he took
any number of occasions to build up the perception of himself as a political
neophyte needing the guidance of more sophisticated professional politicians. Asked how he felt about politics in a news conference during the
spring of 1955, Eisenhower confessed to "having no great liking for . . . politics ... in the general derogatory sense. " 16 And at the outset of his second
year in office, he announced to the assembled press that he was "not very
much of a partisan. " 11 Eisenhower sensed that the perception of him as a political innocent served him well with an electorate that regarded politicians
and politics as dirty words 78 and understood that his nonpartisan stance
helped him to win the support of Democrats and Independents.
Part of what made Eisenhower's nonpolitical, nonpartisan image believable, however, is that it was grounded in reality. It was not all dissembling.
Eisenhower did distrust party professionals, whom he viewed as too shortsighted to serve the national interest. 79 Patronage, he confided in his diary,
"is almost a wicked word-by itself it could well-nigh defeat democracy. " 80
In private "thinking-aloud sessions," Eisenhower occasionally discussed the
possibility of forming a new party that would better reflect his views. 8'
But the nonpolitical, nonpartisan Eisenhower was only part of the story.
If Ike did not share the fervent commitment to the Republican party qua
party that animated Nixon, he disliked Stevenson, Truman, and Kefauver as
intensely as the most partisan of Republicans. 82 If patronage-seekers were
distasteful to Eisenhower, he had few qualms about throwing out New Deal
and Fair Deal Democrats, 83 and he always encouraged cabinet members to
cooperate with the party chair on appointments. 84 If Eisenhower showed disdain for party professionals who talked only about how an issue would play
in the next election, it was he, Eisenhower, who had advised his cabinet on
the need to promote the administration's accomplishments as if they were
selling a product. 85
Eisenhower's ambivalence toward politicians was mirrored in his ambivalence toward Nixon. 86 On the one hand, he recognized that Nixon played a
valuable role by answering Democratic charges and rallying the party faithful. Moreover, he agreed with much of what Nixon said about Stevenson
and the liberal wing of the Democratic party. On the other hand, Eisenhower's conception of a good president was one who lifts himself above the
partisan fray, thereby becoming a leader of the whole people rather than of
only a part. (His dislike for Truman stemmed in large part from what he saw
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as his predecessor's unseemly partisanship.) Eisenhower felt that Nixon was
perhaps "too political" to be president. 87 In the spring of 1956, he acknowledged to Emmet Hughes that "I've watched Dick a long time, and he just
hasn't grown. So I just haven't honestly been able to believe that he is presidential timber. " 88 Those whom Eisenhower regarded as "presidential timber" tended to be men, like himself, who were relatively nonpartisan in orientation, such as Robert Anderson, a Democrat from Texas, or his own
brother Milton Eisenhower. 89 Nixon was thus caught in a double bind, for
Eisenhower (as well as local and national party officials) asked him to play a
role that required behaving in ways that seemed to disqualify him, at least in
Eisenhower's eyes, from the office of the presidency.

THE ART OF CASTING
Historian Stephen Ambrose, who has written definitive biographies of both
Nixon and Eisenhower, has argued that President Eisenhower "used Nixon
in the most cynical fashion." In this respect, Eisenhower is little different
from any other president, because, as Ambrose also notes, "to be used is
what a Vice-President is for. " 90 But the comparison with the Johnson/ Humphrey relationship suggests that it is potentially misleading to place undue
stress upon Eisenhower's manipulation of his vice president. For President
Eisenhower's use of Nixon pales in comparison to Johnson's ruthless manipulation of Humphrey.
The key to Eisenhower's success was not just that he used Nixon but that
he cast Nixon in a role in which he needed minimal prodding or monitoring.
Partisan attack and counterattack came naturally to Nixon. Indeed, so
suited was Nixon to the role of partisan hit man that it was difficult even to
tell that he was playing a role. In contrast, it was painfully obvious that
Humphrey (who was defending a policy he had had no part in making and
had initially opposed, and was criticizing longtime friends and allies) was
playing a part that had been foisted upon him by the president. Not surprisingly, people who disapproved of the performance blamed the director in the
case of Johnson and Humphrey and the actor in the case of Nixon and
Eisenhower.
The Humphrey/ Johnson relationship alerts us to a crucial point that is
sometimes lost sight of in Eisenhower revisionism, at least in its popularized
forms. It is true, as revisionists claim, that Eisenhower tried to conceal the
strings by which he controlled his vice president while Johnson advertised
his control. But it is also true (to continue the metaphor) that Eisenhower
used many fewer and much thinner strings than did Johnson . Not only was
Humphrey more tightly controlled than Nixon, it was much easier for outsiders to witness that control. Eisenhower's aim as a political leader was
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both to conceal the ways in which he controlled others and to select performers who could act with a minimum of presidential control.

THE CHANGING VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ROLE

Since Nixon and Humphrey's time, the vice president's advisory role has become substantially upgraded and even institutionalized. Where Nixon occupied an office on Capitol Hill and was strictly a visitor at the White House,
every vice president since Walter Mondale has occupied an office in the West
Wing of the White House. Where Nixon and Humphrey had only infrequent access to the president, Mondale, Bush, Quayle, and Gore have all had
a regular, weekly slot in the president's schedule. Starting with Mondale,
moreover, the vice president has received the president's daily briefing on
foreign policy. Nixon's office budget was not to exceed that of a senator
from a one-district state, and his staff numbered only a handful of people;
today the vice president has a budget well over two million dollars and employs about a hundred people. 91 Indeed, as Paul Light observes, "the VicePresident's office is now a replica of the President's office, with a national
security adviser, press secretary, domestic issues staff, scheduling team, advance, appointments, administration, chief of staff, and counsel's office. " 92
What does this transformation in the institutional capacity and advisory
role of the vice-presidency mean for the job's availability as presidential
lightning rod? With increased policy-making power one might expect that
vice presidents would be better positioned to provide presidents with political cover. But Light suggests that there may actually be a trade-off for vice
presidents between "external visibility" and "internal impact. " 93 Mondale's
influence on policy, Light suggests, rested on his "hidden-hand" approach.
He "kept his advice to Carter private. He was reluctant to speak at cabinet
meetings and did not want his staff taking highly visible stands. " 94 Bush followed much the same low-profile strategy in gaining the trust of President
Reagan and those around him.
Neither Mondale nor Bush could be described as lightning rods on any
policy issue. Mondale avoided the role of policy advocate in public and did
not allow himself to become identified with any one policy area, preferring
instead to remain a generalist. As one Carter official remarked: "He
couldn't be hit because he never made a clean target. He was moving in and
out of issue areas, and didn't stay long enough to get hurt. He was a genius
at staying out of the line of fire. " 95 George Bush emulated the Mondale
model only more so, publicly downplaying his influence in policy making,
staying out of the public eye, avoiding controversial assignments, and shunning long-term duties that might make him a target for critics. 96
Of the post-Mondale vice presidents only Dan Quayle, in his capacity as
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chair of the President's Council on Competitiveness, has translated the institutional changes in the vice president's policy-making role into something
resembling lightning rod status. By the third year into the Bush administration, Quayle began to be portrayed by the environmentalists as an influential administration advocate of loosening environmental regulations. In the
summer of 1991, for instance, The Nation could describe Quayle's "preemptive power [as] so considerable that he can overrule heads of agencies
like E.P.A. Administrator William Reilly. " 97 California Democrat Henry
Waxman described Quayle's Competitiveness Council as a sinister "shadow
government" 98 and said that on clean air, "Quayle seems to have made the
transition from irrelevant to dangerous. " 99 As head of the Competitiveness
Council, Quayle has shown that by sticking to an issue a vice president can
assume the role of policy lightning rod. Yet, as Waxman's comment also indicates, before this point few Washingtonians had seen Quayle as an important player in White House policy making.
Indeed, for all the changes in the office that political scientists have documented, the media and public image of the office seem to remain little
changed. Recent news stories have dismissed the vice-presidency as a "high
office without power," as "the least exciting job in national politics," as a
job in which "traditionally, the role . . . is to do essentially nothing." "The
vice president," we are told, "is in charge of very little"; the job amounts to
little more than being "the president's understudy and [showing] as little independence as possible." '00 With these popular stereotypes of the office still
firmly engrained, a stereotype that the "hidden-hand" vice-presidencies of
Mondale and Bush have done little to dispel, it remains difficult for vice
presidents to act as policy lightning rods. 101
Moreover, the emergence of what Light calls "the policy vice presidency"
in the mid-1970s may have made vice presidents more reluctant to be used as
political lightning rods in quite the same way that Eisenhower used Nixon or
Nixon used Agnew. When a vice president's choice was largely between the
ceremonial vice-presidency (attending funerals, symbolic participation in
task forces and councils, and the like) and the political vice-presidency
(presidential spokesman, promoter, hit man, and campaigner), the ambitious vice president would prefer the controversial role of partisan hit man to
the demeaning role of professional mourner. 102 Taking the partisan low road
while the president takes the presidential high road not only gained the vice
president presidential gratitude but also earned the vice president the loyalty
of local party officials and fund-raisers . Now that vice presidents have access to the administration's innermost policy-making circles, however, they
may be less inclined to play the divisive role of partisan hit man-a role that,
as Nixon found out in 1960 and Humphrey discovered in 1968, is a reliable
route to the nomination but can create a less than presidential image that
may be a liability in the general election. The policy vice president will never
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displace the political vice president-vice presidents as well as presidents
need the political/partisan function performed-but future vice presidents
will be reluctant to act in ways that might jeopardize their new-found role as
trusted adviser to the president. As a result, future vice presidents will most
likely be reluctant to emulate the Nixonian model of vice president as slashing partisan. What future presidents would do well to emulate, though, is
Eisenhower's skill at casting subordinates-vice presidents included-in
roles that they can play convincingly with a minimum of presidential direction.

5
The Secretary of State as
Lightning Rod: John Foster Dulles,
Dean Acheson, and Henry Kissinger

Of all the members of a president's cabinet, the secretary of state is invariably the most prominent. No other member of the administration outside of
the president himself so readily commands the attention of the media. During the first year of the Reagan presidency, when the administration's focus
was overwhelmingly on the economy, Secretary of State Al Haig was still by
far the most visible Reagan administration official. His 646 references in the
Vanderbilt Televisions News Abstract and Index dwarf the next most prominent administration officials, who had less than half that number (Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger, 272; 0MB director David Stockman, 226;
Vice President George Bush, 200). The most prominent officials in Congress, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and House Speaker Tip
O'Neill received only about one-third of Haig's coverage (220 and 182, respectively). And Haig received roughly ten times the coverage of even reasonably prominent figures such as CIA director William Casey (66), Press
Secretary Larry Speakes (77), Interior Secretary James Watt (63), Senator
Bob Dole (75), and House Ways and Means chair Dan Rostenkowski (57).
Lest it be thought that this greater visibility reflects Haig's peculiarly colorful personality, one need only look at the coverage of the more understated Jim Baker in the first year of the Bush presidency. Secretary of State
Baker's 322 references were still well over twice those of his nearest administration rival, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney (148), and three times those of
Vice President Dan Quayle (119). Even Speaker of the House Jim Wright,
despite being engulfed in a prolonged and public scandal, was only half as
visible as Baker. And Baker had six times the prominence of Chief of Staff
John Sununu (53) and four times that of Drug Czar William Bennett (88),
neither of whom could be described as shy of the public spotlight. Baker's
visibility was more than ten times as great as that of 0MB director Dick
Darman (32), Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady (24), Federal Reserve chair
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Alan Greenspan (23), Chief Justice William Rehnquist (29), and Senate Finance chair and 1988 Democratic vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen
(30). 1

The abundant attention the press gives to the secretary of state would
seem to make this cabinet post a prime candidate for the role of presidential
lightning rod. Three postwar secretaries of state stand out as particularly
visible and controversial occupants of this office: John Foster Dulles, Dean
Acheson, and Henry Kissinger. Surveys show that about 90 percent of the
American public claimed to recognize each of these men. More significantly,
close to 80 percent of the public could correctly identify Kissinger's job after
four years in the Nixon administration;2 upward of two-thirds of the public
could correctly identify Dean Acheson's job as President Truman's secretary
of state,3 and close to 60 percent could "recall offhand" the name of the secretary of state by the end of Dulles's tenure in the Eisenhower administration.• That these individuals were well known even to the general public
seems beyond question. That they were controversial and much criticized is
well established. Less obvious and more interesting is the question of
whether these individuals, prominent and controversial though they were,
served as presidential lightning rods. In examining these three individual
cases, we find a pattern that suggests some general lessons about the suitability of the secretary of state as a lightning rod.

DULLES AS LIGHTNING ROD

An oft-repeated corollary of Eisenhower revisionism is that President Eisenhower slyly used his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, as a lightning rod.
"The truth," according to one of the earliest revisionists, Peter Lyon, is not
only "that Dulles did Eisenhower's bidding in matters of high policy" but
that Dulles "also served as the convenient butt for any criticism of that policy so that Eisenhower's avuncular image might be preserved." Historian
Robert Divine echoes this view: "Dulles could serve as the lightning rod, absorbing domestic criticism and warding off attacks from the right wing with
his moralistic fervor." And Fred Greenstein writes that the secretary of state
was an "object of animosity that in another presidency would have been directed toward the chief executive." Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose agrees that having "Dulles available to serve as a lightning rod served
Eisenhower's purposes and helped maintain Eisenhower's popularity. " 5
This view of Dulles as lightning rod is not without validity. An implicit division of labor does seem to have evolved, as Greenstein says, in which
Dulles "issued the bulk of the 'get tough' foreign policy statements," while
Eisenhower made the "gestures toward international humanitarianism and
detente-for example, Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, goodwill trips, and
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summitry. " 6 One can certainly point to individuals who blamed Dulles
rather than Eisenhower for particular decisions or even for the overall course
of the administration's foreign policy. The lightning rod hypothesis well describes the way certain liberal journalists conceived of the Dulles/ Eisenhower relationship. New Yorker columnist Richard Rovere, to take one of
the more extreme examples, believed that Eisenhower "more or less subcontracted the whole thing out [to Dulles].'" According to Rovere, Eisenhower
was a man of peaceful, moderate instincts who was always having to resist
his bellicose secretary of state. In contrast to Eisenhower's "restraint and
circumspection," Dulles was a "righteous, godly man, ... repelled by the
thought of striking bargains with men as steeped in sin as the Russian leaders are." As Rovere saw it:
The periods in which our foreign policy .. . appears to reach the maximum of flexibility and sobriety are those periods when Mr. Dulles is
out of the country and making the rounds of the chancelleries. Then it
is the President who speaks and who gives a powerful sense of being
profoundly aware not only of the danger of Communist expansion but
of the danger of war. After these interludes, Mr. Dulles flies in for a few
days, delivers a couple of dour Calvinist forecasts of doom and retribution, then heads back out to Bangkok or Rio or wherever. It is believed
in Washington that the President . . . winces each time he is notified
that Mr. Dulles is about to touch down at National Airport.
Rovere even went so far as to speculate that Eisenhower had recruited
Harold Stassen for the job of the president's special adviser on disarmament
in hopes that "Mr. Stassen should embarrass Mr. Dulles. " 8
For certain events, too, a good case can be made that Eisenhower consciously used Dulles to shield himself from criticism. The controversy over
the Bricker amendment, which would have limited the president's power to
make international agreements as well as limiting the impact of international agreements on domestic laws, provides an early instance of Eisenhower's blame-avoidance technique and Dulles's willingness, in his own
words, to be the "whipping boy. " 9 Asked at a press conference in March
1953 what he thought of the proposed Bricker amendment, which was heavily favored by congressional Republicans, Eisenhower at first artfully evaded
the question. When asked again the following week, he spoke against the
amendment but placed the responsibility for his decision on Dulles: "As analyzed for me by the Secretary of State," Eisenhower explained, the amendment "would, as I understand it, in certain ways, restrict the authority that
the President must have, if he is to conduct the foreign affairs of this Nation
effectively.'' 10 In the ensuing months, Eisenhower met with Senator John
Bricker on several occasions and gave the Ohio senator what Sherman Ad-
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ams described as a "warm and sympathetic" hearing. 11 Indeed, Eisenhower
had seemed so sympathetic that Bricker emerged from one such conference
telling reporters that he and the president had the same objectives and a few
weeks later praised Eisenhower for "supporting the principle" of safeguarding constitutional rights. 12
Eisenhower's private expressions of sympathy for Bricker's position combined with his public deflection of responsibility onto Dulles fostered the
view that it was the secretary of state who was "largely responsible" for the
administration's opposition to the amendment. 13 A number of supporters of
the amendment doubted that the president fully understood the issue or that
the president had firm views on the subject. Chief among those who held
Dulles responsible for the president's opposition was Bricker himself. 1•
Dulles, Bricker told an interviewer many years later, represented the New
York bankers and lawyers who "wanted to run government through treaties
. . . to protect themselves and the international trade." Bricker believed that
Dulles "dominated the administration's position and finally converted" the
president and others in the administration to oppose the amendment. 15
The truth, as Duane Tananbaum's recent account shows, was that Eisenhower privately had little sympathy for Bricker or his amendment. Indeed "behind the scenes, Eisenhower played a much more active part in opposing the
amendment than Bricker ever realized." 16 The president tried to play down his
personal opposition because he wanted to avoid a public confrontation during
the first months of his presidency with people whom he would need to work
with on other issues; he particularly wanted to avoid picking a fight on an issue
that had broad support among congressional Republicans-virtually all the
Republicans in the Senate had cosponsored Bricker's resolution. Republican
leaders in Congress warned Eisenhower that a firm White House stand on the
issue might cause "a serious split" in the Republican party. 11 Even had Dulles
not strongly opposed the measure, moreover, there were plenty of others in the
administration-including Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Secretary of
Defense Charles Wilson, and Mutual Security Director Harold Stassen, not to
mention every high State Department official-who urged Eisenhower to oppose the amendment. In any event, Eisenhower needed little persuasion that
the amendment compromised the ability of the United States to cooperate economically and militarily with its allies. On this basic question, there was no disagreement between the president and Dulles (or indeed any of the president's
foreign and defense policy advisers). 18
If conservative Republicans faulted Dulles for the administration's opposition to the Bricker amendment, liberal Democrats blamed Dulles for the
administration's Middle East policies. In particular, they held Dulles responsible for the administration's abrupt decision to withdraw promised funding
for the Aswan Dam, a decision that Dulles's critics believed provoked Egyptian President Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal and thus set off the entire
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Suez crisis of 1956. That the decision was made while Eisenhower was still
recovering from an operation helped bolster the view that it was Dulles who
was alone responsible for the decision. 19 But as Donald Neff's account of the
decision-making process makes clear, Eisenhower was intimately involved in
the decision-making process throughout and the final call to withdraw the
American offer of financial help was the president's. 20
In the administration's relations with foreign governments there seems a
particularly compelling case for describing Dulles as a lightning rod. Foreign
leaders frequently expressed admiration for Eisenhower, while simultaneously condemning the policies pursued by the secretary of state. Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev, for instance, professed "the deepest respect" for
Eisenhower but characterized Dulles as an "imperialist" and "war-like. "2 l
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, upon receiving a letter from Eisenhower warning Eden that the United States would not support the use of
military force against Nasser, immediately attributed the letter to Dulles.
"The only thing that's true to Ike in that [letter] is his signature and that's illegible." The truth, however, was that Eisenhower himself had written the
letter. 22 European powers, particularly the British, found in Dulles a convenient scapegoat for their frustrations with their postwar role as followers of
the United States. Dulles was crude, undiplomatic, moralistic-indeed, from
their point of view, quintessentially American. 23 Blaming Dulles allowed Europeans to avoid having to complicate their rosy view of Eisenhower as the
supreme commander of the Allied forces and liberator of Europe.
What allowed Dulles to serve as a lightning rod was a widespread perception, even among some who should have known better, that the president
"let Foster Dulles do about what Foster Dulles wanted to do. " 2• This view
was often repeated by contemporaries and even by scholars. lypical was
Herman Finer's judgment that Eisenhower picked Dulles to be secretary of
state "so that he could leave in [Dulles's] hands almost all of the direct and
daily responsibilities for guiding this nation in her multitudinous and complex dealings with the other nations of the world. Dulles alone was in the
driver's seat. " 25 Revisionist research has persuasively demonstrated that this
conventional view of Eisenhower is widely off the mark. 26 Dulles and Eisenhower in fact worked together extraordinarily closely, 27 and Dulles invariably
consulted the president before making public statements or sending diplomatic messages of any importance. 28 Moreover, it was Eisenhower, not
Dulles, who made the final decisions. 29

DULLES AND THE MASS PUBLIC
The finding that Eisenhower controlled foreign policy is necessary but not
sufficient, however, to support the claim made by Ambrose and others that
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having "Dulles available to serve as a lightning rod ... helped to maintain
Eisenhower's popularity. "3o To validate this hypothesis we need evidence
about how the general public felt about Dulles. Was Secretary Dulles as unpopular as this thesis implies, indeed requires? A number of secondary accounts assert that Dulles was unpopular. Political scientist Stephen Hess, for
instance, reports that Dulles "was as unpopular as the President was popular." Diplomatic historian Gordon Craig agrees that "it would be difficult to
think of an American Secretary of State who was less beloved during his
term of office than Dulles. " 31 In The Devil and John Foster Dulles, Townsend Hoopes contrasts "the popular President" with "the unpopular Secretary of State. " 32 But in none of these cases is systematic evidence marshaled
to support the claim.
This oversight is surprising because, unlike with most administration officials, there is no shortage of public opinion data relating to the public's attitude toward Dulles. In Eisenhower's first term, the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) asked the public to evaluate Dulles's job performance on no less than twenty-one occasions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these public opinion polls indicate that Secretary of State Dulles was
well liked by the American public. In the first term, Dulles's popularity
among those expressing an opinion averaged 87 percent, slightly above the
80 percent of those with an opinion who approved of Eisenhower. 33 These
results suggest an alternative to the lightning rod hypothesis: the mass public
viewed Dulles and Eisenhower as a package, holding them jointly responsible for foreign policy setbacks, while crediting them both with foreign policy
triumphs.
Consider, for example, the 1955 Geneva Summit, which is often cited as
an instance in which the likable Eisenhower played "the warm champion of
peace" to Dulles's "austere cold warrior. " 34 This view is offered by, among
others, Herbert Parmet, who explains that "once again the impression created was of a President seeking peace with open sincerity while his Secretary
of State, more consistent with the party's right wing, held out for the hard
line. " 35 A contemporary version of this thesis is presented in a Her block cartoon featuring a dour Dulles, laden with "Dulles doubts," and an eager
Eisenhower, bubbling with "Eisenhower optimism," reassuring the listener
at the other end of the phone that "we'll be there [at the summit], rain or
shine. " 36
Public opinion polls taken before and after the July summit validate part
of this hypothesis: Eisenhower's popularity did increase slightly after the
summit. During the months before the summit, the president's approval rating, among those expressing an opinion, hovered around 80 percent. A special Gallup survey conducted immediately after the summit showed the president's approval rating had been pushed up to 86 percent. What Parmet's
thesis neglects, however, is that Dulles's popularity was also boosted by the
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summit. Before the summit, 84 percent of those with an opinion approved
of Dulles's performance; afterward, approval of the secretary rose to 92 percent. 37 President Eisenhower's allegedly "personal triumph" 38 was thus
shared, at least in the mind of the general public, by the secretary of state.
Proponents of the "Dulles as lightning rod" thesis often point to the furor
over the Suez crisis as evidence of their contention. They stress that it was
Dulles, on July 19, 1956, who issued the public "slap in the face" to Egyptian President Nasser by withdrawing the American offer to help finance the
building of the Aswan Dam. Although the Egyptians and congressional
Democrats may have blamed Dulles, there is no indication that the American public faulted the secretary. Dulles's approval rating after the incident
(61 percent approval, 16 percent disapproval, and 23 percent no opinion) remained unchanged from before (63-15-22). 39 As the Suez drama unfoldedin response to Nasser's nationalization of the canal, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt at the end of October-the American public, far from
blaming Dulles, rallied around the foreign policy team of Dulles and Eisenhower. After Eisenhower's landslide victory in November 1956, approval of
Eisenhower among those with an opinion increased to 83 percent (75-1510), as did approval of Dulles, which rose to 84 percent (70-13-17). 40
The public evidently did not share the bitter antipathy felt toward Dulles
in foreign capitals and, to a more uneven extent, in Congress. Dulles's "frequent references to God and the flag" may have been "tiresome" for intellectuals, but the general public, if they noticed at all, seemed to be little
bothered by his moralizing. 4 ' Perhaps, as Newsweek speculated at the time,
"the very [moralism] that has irritated Europeans and Asians is the very
thing that many Americans admire most about him. " 42 For at least some in
the general public, foreign antagonism toward Dulles was probably a sign
that the secretary was standing up for America. 43 Whatever the reasons, the
evidence cannot sustain the view that Dulles was unpopular with the American public, at least not during the first term. 44
Data concerning public attitudes toward Dulles's performance during
Eisenhower's second term, unfortunately, are much more scanty than those
that exist for the first term. The few polls taken, however, do not lend much
support to the lightning rod hypothesis. During 1957, only one national survey asked respondents to evaluate the secretary of state's performance.
Taken in the spring, as the "get Dulles" campaign in Washington intensified, 45 the poll found that of those with an opinion (83 percent of the sample), 76 percent approved of Dulles's performance. A Gallup survey conducted at roughly the same time showed President Eisenhower with an
identical approval rating of 76 percent among those with an opinion (88 percent of the sample). 46 Up to this point, at least, there is still no evidence that
Dulles helped to maintain Eisenhower's popularity in the general public by
serving as a lightning rod.
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Anti-Dulles sentiment in Congress and the media reached its peak at the
outset of 1958. Gallup conducted two surveys during January that asked the
public to evaluate the performance of both Secretary Dulles and President
Eisenhower. The first poll, taken at the beginning of the month, found that
among those with an opinion Dulles's approval rating had fallen to 61 percent. But support for Eisenhower had also declined; only two-thirds of those
with an opinion now expressed approval of Eisenhower's performance. The
drop in support for Dulles, however, is sharper than these statistics indicate.
Thirty-six percent-more than double the number from the previous
spring-were now undecided about how to evaluate the secretary's performance. Dulles met with the approval of only 39 percent of the sample-a
dramatic decline from the 63 percent who had approved of his performance
the preceding spring. In contrast, only one in ten respondents reserved judgment on Eisenhower's performance, and six in ten still approved of the president's performance. 47
This poll suggests that the pervasive criticism of Dulles in Congress and in
the press did have a significant impact on public attitudes toward Dulles.
The primary impact of this criticism, however, was not to increase disapproval of Dulles-only 25 percent now disapproved compared with 20 percent the previous spring-but rather to move those people who had previously approved of Dulles into the undecided column. While this might be
construed as evidence of a lightning rod effect, one must keep in mind that
(1) more people (30 percent) still disapproved of Eisenhower than disapproved of Dulles (25 percent), and (2) Eisenhower's popularity had been declining steadily since his reelection and continued to erode until the spring of
1958 when it reached the low point of his administration. Mounting criticism of Dulles, in other words, corresponded closely with Eisenhower's own
decline in popularity.
Bivariate analysis of the January 1958 survey provides further evidence of
the high degree of linkage between public attitudes toward Eisenhower and
Dulles. Only 14 percent of those who expressed an opinion about both men
(62 percent of the sample) combined disapproval of Dulles with approval of
Eisenhower. That figure is only marginally larger than the 11 percent who
disapproved of Ike but approved of his secretary of state. More than half
liked both Dulles and Eisenhower, and slightly less than one-fourth disapproved of both men. In short, three-fourths of those respondents with an
opinion about both men answered the same way about the president and the
secretary of state. In contrast, the same survey shows that only about half of
the farmers gave Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson the same approval rating as they gave to the president.
Another Gallup poll taken in late January strengthens the linkage thesis
while throwing further doubt upon the lightning rod hypothesis. Unfortunately, this survey uses an unnecessarily stringent filter question, asking
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whether the respondent could "recall offhand the name of the U.S. Secretary of State. " 48 Among the 58 percent who passed this hurdle, Dulles had
the support of 69 percent of those who expressed an opinion about Dulles's
performance. This level of support was no different from the 68 percent of
those with an opinion who approved of Eisenhower. 49 Again one is struck by
the trend toward consistency in public attitudes toward the president and
secretary of state.
Two state polls taken near the end of 1958 point to the same conclusion
that there was not a great discrepancy between the public's evaluation of
Eisenhower and Dulles. A Des Moines Register poll of 753 Iowa residents
taken in September 1958 found that among those with an opinion Dulles's
performance was approved by 63 percent, while Eisenhower's performance
met with the approval of 67 percent. (Benson, in contrast, met with the approval of only 47 percent.) In October 1958, the Minneapolis Herald Tribune polled 999 Minnesotans and found that among those with an opinion,
70 percent approved of Eisenhower and 69 percent approved of Dulles (and
only 47 percent approved of Benson). 50
The dominant impression that emerges from the available survey research
is of a public that has difficulty separating evaluations of the president from
judgments about the secretary of state. This contrasts markedly with public
attitudes in the sphere of agriculture, where many in the public, particularly
among farmers, simultaneously held a positive view of the president and a
negative view of Secretary Benson. Agricultural policy was deemed by the
public to be largely the responsibility of Secretary Benson; foreign policy, in
contrast, seems to have been judged the joint responsibility of the president
and the secretary of state.

DULLES AND CONGRESS

In contrast to the mass public, which normally pays little or no attention to
foreign affairs,5 1 elites closely scrutinize an administration's actions. Much
of what exercises elites (the battle over the Bricker amendment is a conspicuous instance)52 leaves the great bulk of the mass public cold. While elites debate nuances in the doctrines of massive retaliation, containment, or liberation, the general public tends to evaluate an administration's performance in
foreign affairs at the more "simple and global level of getting into war or
staying out of it. " 53 If foreign policy "has to shout loudly to be heard even a
little" by the mass public, even the faintest whisper is usually detected by political elites. 54
Because elites pay closer attention than the mass public to questions of
foreign policy, they are more likely to perceive differences in the personas
and positions of the president and secretary of state. We would therefore ex-
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pect the lightning rod thesis to carry greater validity at the elite than at the
mass level, and indeed we have already presented evidence that this is the
case for Dulles. Even at the elite level, however, the evidence that Dulles was
a presidential lightning rod is much less compelling than is commonly assumed. Although elites were more attentive to the differing emphases Eisenhower and Dulles assigned to policies, the dominant tendency among the political stratum no less than the mass public seems to have been to link their
evaluations of the president and Secretary Dulles.
In a heroic effort, James Rosenau has coded every comment made on the
Senate floor regarding Dulles between 1953 and 1956. 55 Among those senators who engaged in "recurrent behavior," ten were consistently hostile toward the secretary of state. 56 Four were extreme right-wing isolationists: William Jenner (R-Ind.), George Malone (R-Nev.), Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.),
and Patrick McCarran (D-Nev.); the other six were liberal, " peace-minded"
internationalists: 57 Paul Douglas (D-III.), William Fulbright (D-Ark.), Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), Herbert Lehman (D-N.Y.), Joseph O'Mahoney
(D-Wyo .), and Wayne Morse (I-Oreg.) . Contrary to the lightning rod hypothesis, none of these senators were favorably disposed toward Eisenhower.
Most were scornful of the president.
Like many other liberal senators, Hubert Humphrey often drew attention
to apparent differences between Dulles and Eisenhower on such issues as
disarmament or summit meetings with the Soviets. But this did not mean
that he absolved Eisenhower from responsibility for what he regarded as the
administration's incoherent and contradictory foreign policy. Far from it.
Indeed the president's willingness to permit such differences was itself
grounds for condemnation. Humphrey pledged that he could not "support
an administration that constantly reveals such an abysmal lack of executive
leadership." In another unmistakable swipe at Eisenhower he lamented that
"the great tragedy of this administration is that it seeks popularity at the expense of principle and leadership. " 58 President Eisenhower no less than Secretary Dulles was responsible for what he considered to be "the deterioration of American foreign policy. " 59
From 1956 on, William Fulbright was Dulles's severest congressional
critic, but by 1958 the Arkansas senator had also become one of Eisenhower's most persistent and uncompromising critics. Fulbright, like many
other Democrats, did single out Dulles for deciding on his own to withdraw
the offer of financial assistance to Nasser. 60 And in an interview in 1970,
Fulbright attributed what he regarded as the improper handling of treaties
during the Eisenhower years to Dulles rather than to Eisenhower. 6 1 But in
criticizing Dulles for seeming "at times to be exercising those 'delicate, plenary, and exclusive powers' which are supposed to be vested in the President, " 62 Fulbright also implicitly criticized Eisenhower for abdicating his
constitutional responsibilities as president of the United States. Increasingly,
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rather than isolating Dulles as the source of the administration's missteps,
Fulbright directly criticized Eisenhower. The most extreme instance was a
1958 speech on the floor of the Senate in which he ridiculed the entire Eisenhower era as one of "luxurious torpor" in which people "were at liberty to
stop thinking any more . .. [when] they could bask in the artificial sunlight
of a government which did not bother them with serious things." He decried
the "weakness for the easy way" and, in an unmistakable jab at Eisenhower,
declared that "the age of the amateur is over. " 63 Fulbright was contemptuous of what he regarded as Eisenhower's "aimless and feeble" leadership
that was distinguished by its "lack of taste for the hard work of the intellect
that must precede meaningful action. " 64
Another of Dulles's most vocal antagonists was Oregon Senator Wayne
Morse. But Morse, who had bolted the Republican party shortly after the
nomination of Eisenhower to become an Independent, had been a strident
critic of Eisenhower from the outset. In 1952, he had supported Stevenson,
whom he considered "a brilliant statesman," over Eisenhower, who he believed wasn't "big enough ... for the job, [and] ... hasn't the mind for it."
During the campaign, Morse accused Eisenhower of "demagoguery, double-talk and dangerous desertion ... of his once-professed political principles" and labeled Eisenhower's "I will go to Korea" pledge "a cheap, grandstand political ploy." The trouble with Eisenhower, Morse believed, was that
Eisenhower was "a man of compromise rather than a man of determined
principle." Nothing Ike did during the next eight years prompted Morse to
change his opinion, and their personal relations remained frosty. 65
Neither Herbert Lehman nor Paul Douglas, both ardent liberals, had
many kind words for Eisenhower. Ten days after Eisenhower had been nominated, Douglas criticized Eisenhower on the floor of the Democratic convention for his role, as army chief of staff, in recommending the withdrawal
of American troops from South Korea. Eisenhower, Douglas told the Democratic delegates, must therefore carry a large part of the blame for the
North Korean invasion of South Korea. 66 Like Morse, both Lehman and
Douglas regarded themselves as men of principle rather than of compromise. 67 In Lyndon Johnson's view, they were "crazies ... bomb-thrower
types. " 68 Both Lehman and Douglas sought leadership "which inspires and
awakens . . . people to great ends and to great sacrifices" and found Eisenhower sorely lacking. Douglas condemned Eisenhower's "rush toward the
middle of the road" and ridiculed a situation in which the "bland [were]
leading the bland." Similarly, Lehman longed for "an administration seeking ideas instead of nostrums." Much as Ronald Reagan's detractors talked
of a Teflon presidency, so Douglas referred disparagingly to "the Eisenhower spell. " 69
Among the right-wing isolationists who were critical of Dulles, none
could be counted as supportive of Eisenhower. Although initially reluctant
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to tangle with the popular president, their private comments were suffused
with disdain for the general-turned-president. In the case of McCarthy, the
private contempt bubbled up to the surface at the end of 1954, when he publicly accused Eisenhower of "weakness and supineness" in ferreting out
Communists and felt it necessary to "apologize to the American people" for
supporting Eisenhower in 1952.70 The attitude toward Eisenhower among
this stripe of Republican was, "He's our meal ticket now. Once we' re in, the
hell with him .. .. I won't give a damn about Ike the day after the election. " 11 From the perspective of the extreme right wing, it was not Secretary
Dulles but Eisenhower, a "Fifth-Column Democrat, 72 who was largely responsible for the administration's failure to depart from the disastrous foreign policy of his predecessors.
Early on, Eisenhower had given up trying to work with what he termed
"the McCarthy-Malone axis," which "hates and despises everything for
which I stand." Instead he opted for a strategy of isolating, and thereby rendering impotent, the " reactionary fringe" of the party by wooing those less
rigid among the Old Guard, such as Robert Taft, Everett Dirksen, Homer
Capehart, Styles Bridges, and William Know land. 73 With the exception of
the "unappeasables," 74 the Old Guard consistently defended Dulles (as well
as Eisenhower). By Rosenau's count, five such senators (Capehart, Dirksen,
Homer Ferguson, Bourke Hickenlooper, and Knowland) made a total of 233
references to Dulles between 1953 and 1956, and only four of those references were coded as unfavorable toward Dulles. 75
Suspicions the Taft wing of the party originally harbored about Dulles on
account of his past associations with the Truman administration and
Thomas Dewey were dispelled by Dulles's strident anti-Communist rhetoric
and by the enemies he was making, particularly in Britain. 76 One notable
convert was Senator William Langer (R-N.D.), a fervent isolationist who in
a debate over foreign aid in 1953 had scored Dulles for having "brought over
with him to the halls and meeting chambers of the State Department the entire Truman-Acheson foreign concept almost without variation. " 11 Before
long, however, Langer was praising Dulles as a tireless and courageous
champion of American interests. "With John Foster Dulles as his Secretary
of State," Langer observed, "Dwight Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have taken
charge of the foreign relations of the United States Government, and, although cooperating with other countries, have not allowed England, France,
or any other country to dictate to the United States of America. " 18
If even in Congress Dulles proved to be less of a lightning rod than is often
presumed, this is in part due to his assiduous efforts to gain the support and
confidence of members of Congress, particularly those (like Langer) who sat
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee . "His correspondence files and
telephone memoranda," according to one scholar, "tell the story of perpetual courtship. " 19 He breakfasted with the Foreign Relations chair Walter
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George at the influential Democrat's apartment at least every other week
and frequently stopped by for conversations in the late afternoon or early
evening. Dulles kept up a "continuous dialogue" with William Knowland,
who was minority (and, briefly, majority) leader as well as a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee. 80 Anxious to avoid the acrimonious congressional relations that had plagued the tenure of his predecessor, Dean Acheson, Dulles made extraordinary efforts to consult congressional committees.
During his six-year tenure, he testified forty-eight times before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and always consulted the committee before
and after major international conferences. He established a reputation with
Congress that Senator Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.) characterized as one of
"complete frankness and honesty. " 81 Republicans in particular regarded
Dulles's attitude as a welcome departure from the "deceit and contempt"
that they believed Acheson had displayed during his appearances before congressional committees. 82
Those senators not persuaded by Dulles's appeals usually did not exempt
the president from their criticisms of the administration's foreign policy. In
part this was because, in contrast to a policy area like agriculture where
Eisenhower had no pretense to expertise, the president knew a great deal
about national security policy and foreign affairs. The former leader of the
Allied armed forces could hardly claim to be following the advice of subordinates in formulating the nation's national defense posture. Indeed playing
upon Eisenhower's military experience and wisdom was a common tactic
used by proponents of the administration's foreign and defense policies. In
defending the policy of massive retaliation, for instance, William Knowland
told his fellow senators he doubted "that any member of this body has had
the experience of President Eisenhower, who led our armies in World War II
and won the great victory in Europe. " 83 Such arguments, which were repeated again and again, meant that Eisenhower's prestige was closely tied to
his foreign and defense policies in a way that was never true in domestic policy.
Criticisms of Dulles's handling of foreign and defense policies, however,
spilled over into indictments of the president for reasons that go beyond the
circumstances peculiar to the Eisenhower presidency. To criticize the country's "foreign policy [as) inadequate, outmoded, and misdirected" 84 necessarily implied a critique of the president, an implication that was absent or
muted when critics attacked agricultural, labor, or land policies. The Acheson/Truman relationship, which exhibits an even more pronounced tendency on the part of elites and masses to merge their evaluations of the president and secretary of state, lends support to the hypothesis that this
coupling phenomenon is embedded in the peculiar nature of a president's
roles and responsibilities in conducting foreign policy.
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ACHESON AND TRUMAN

If ever a president was in need of a lightning rod in foreign affairs it was
Harry Truman during his second term . In contrast to the perceived foreign
policy successes of his initial term-the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine,
Berlin Air Lift-1949 was, as the historian Eric Goldman phrased it, "a year
of shocks. " 85 First came the fall of the Nationalist Chinese government, followed by the announcement that the Soviets had acquired the atomic bomb.
Within another year, the United States was embroiled in a war in Korea.
Public opinion surveys reflected the administration's changing fortunes .
Whereas during Truman's first term more people had approved than disapproved of " the way the officials in Washington are handling our foreign affairs," during the second term a majority consistently expressed disapproval
(except for a brief "rally around the flag" immediately after North Korea invaded South Korea). 86
Dean Acheson was sworn in as secretary of state on January 21 , 1949, arriving, as Acheson later noted, "just in time to have [Chiang Kai-shek] collapse on me. " 87 In many ways, Acheson was an ideal foil for conservative Republicans looking for a culprit for the "loss of China." With "his
smart-aleck manner and his British clothes and that New Dealism," Acheson, in the eyes of many Republicans, stood "for everything that has been
wrong with the United States for years. " 88 The Republican right piled abuse
upon the head of "the great Red Dean. " 89 By one scholar's count, isolationist Republican senators made 7 cordial and 1,268 hostile remarks regarding
Acheson on the floor of the Senate. 90 It is understandable that Acheson believed he had been singled out as "chief villain by the Republican right. " 9 '
If there is no doubting the level of abuse directed toward Acheson by Republican congressmen, there are grounds for questioning whether these assaults upon the secretary of state diverted criticism away from President
Truman. An alternative hypothesis is that criticism of Acheson went handin-hand with criticism of Truman. The Congressional Record shows the latter hypothesis to be in closer accord with the evidence. The predominant
tendency among Acheson's severest congressional critics was to condemn
both the secretary of state and the president.
A glimpse of the depths of Republican hostility toward Truman was revealed when Republican congressmen heckled the president during delivery
of his 1950 State of the Union message. 92 The following day, California Senator William Knowland launched an extended attack upon the administration's "defeatist attitude" and "bankrupt policy" in China. Although
Knowland singled out "a small group of willful men in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department" as particularly culpable for "the debacle
which has taken place in China," this did not, in his view, absolve those
higher up in the chain of command, for the subordinates "had the backing
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of their superiors." "No group," Know land stressed, "could so operate in
the Far Eastern Division without the approval of the Secretary of State and
no Secretary of State could follow such a policy without the approval of the
President of the United States. The ultimate responsibility is there." The
Chinese, Knowland concluded, had been "sold down the river into slavery
by the President of the United States and the State Department. " 93
Perhaps the most persistent critic of the secretary of state was Styles
Bridges, whom Acheson later characterized as "my faithful enemy. " 94 But
while Bridges may have saved his most colorful barbs for Acheson and the
State Department, 9s his speeches on the floor of the Senate reveal that he
considered Truman and Acheson jointly responsible for the disappointing
course of events in the Far East. It was "the policy of Truman and Acheson," not that of Acheson alone, that Bridges blamed for "turning over
China" to the Communists. 96 In explaining why he believed no top military
expert would contradict Acheson's contention that Formosa was of little
strategic value to the United States, Bridges declared that under this administration "if a top-ranking policy maker is to retain his position, he must unhesitatingly follow the line laid down by the President. " 91
Criticism of the secretary of state intensified after Acheson responded to
news of Alger Hiss's perjury conviction by announcing at a press conference
that "I do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss." But the same Republicans who now called for the secretary's removal believed Truman too was
guilty of "coddling" Communists. As they were quick to remind the opposition, it was President Truman who had dismissed charges of subversion
made by congressional investigating committees as "red herrings. " 98 Many
Republican congressmen shared Indiana Senator Homer Capehart's belief
that there would continue to be spies "as long as we have a president who refers to such matters as 'red herrings' and a secretary of state who refuses to
turn his back on Alger Hisses. " 99
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 only strengthened the perceived ties between Truman and Acheson. Although the immediate effect of
the North Korean invasion of South Korea was to mute criticism of Truman
(but not of the secretary of state) as the country "rallied around the flag,"
once the war began to go badly-as it did after the entry of the Chinese in
the winter of 1950-1951-there was even less scope for Truman to avoid responsibility than before. President Truman could not avoid blame because,
as Senate Minority Leader Robert Taft expressed it, "the Korean War is a
Truman War." 100
The dismissal of General MacArthur in the spring of 1951 provided a
fresh occasion for Republicans to air their grievances with the Truman administration. As before, criticism was aimed at the team of Truman and
Acheson. North Dakota Senator Milton Young, for instance, believed the
firing of MacArthur to be "in line with President Truman's and Secretary
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Dean Acheson's program of everlasting appeasement to Communists." Senator Richard Nixon agreed that "the policy of the State Department-and
that means the policy of the administration" was one of "bare-faced appeasement." The disastrous war in Korea, Senator Capehart argued, "was
due to the foreign policy team of Truman, Marshall, and Acheson." Bridges
blamed the "Truman-Acheson clique." 101
That abuse of Acheson in no way precluded blaming (or even abusing)
Truman is evident from the behavior of Senator Joseph McCarthy, whose
vitriolic criticisms of Acheson are well known. In his now famous Wheeling
address, for instance, McCarthy had pummeled Acheson as a "pompous
diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent. " 102 Although he obviously relished attacking the vulnerable State Department, he reserved
plenty of invective for the president. Truman's dismissal of MacArthur
prompted McCarthy to declare that "the son of a bitch should be impeached. "101 He intimated, moreover, that Truman had been drunk when he
issued the order to recall MacArthur. 104 McCarthy was unequivocal that "we
should put the blame [for tying MacArthur's hands] on our Chief Executive. " 105
Another of Acheson's most abusive critics was the newly elected senator
from Idaho, Herman Welker-indeed Welker attributed his election in 1950
to his denunciations of Acheson during the campaign. While MacArthur's
dismissal proved to Welker that Acheson "is riding in the saddle today," he
also told his Senate colleagues that on account of the "continuous blundering on the part of the President of the United States, I have lost any confidence I ever had in Harry Truman'~although he allowed that "I never had
very much in the beginning." Both Truman and Acheson, Welker intimated,
were in league with the Communist paper the Daily Worker. In addition to
repeating his call for Acheson to be "fired and replaced," he also asked for
Truman's resignation-90 percent of his telegrams, he reported, asked for
impeachment proceedings to begin immediately. 106 Another longtime Acheson foe, Senator William Jenner, also believed that Acheson's resignation
was no longer sufficient: "It is too late now for such minor remedies. We
must cut this whole cancerous conspiracy out of our Government at once.
Our only choice is to impeach President Truman. " 107
Public opinion polls, though scanty, strongly suggest that the general public also perceived Acheson and Truman as an inseparable package. In the
public mind, Secretary Acheson was the president's accomplice, Truman's
partner in crime. After the Chinese crushed the United Nations armies in
late November, public support for the war shrank dramatically, 108 as did support for President Truman and Secretary Acheson. A Gallup poll conducted
early in December of 1950, immediately before the Republican caucus' vote
of no-confidence in Acheson, found that six in ten of those venturing an
opinion held an unfavorable impression of Acheson. Roughly the same per-
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centage believed Acheson should be replaced. A Gallup poll taken shortly
thereafter showed that 58 percent of those expressing an opinion disapproved of Truman's performance as president. 109 The percentage of people
who wanted Acheson replaced was thus virtually identical with the proportion who disapproved of Truman.
In May of 1951, a month after Truman's recall of MacArthur, Gallup
found that slightly more than two-thirds of those with an opinion believed
that Acheson should be replaced. The same poll also showed that Truman's
disapproval rating among those with an opinion had reached a new high of
72 percent. Bivariate analysis confirms that those who disapproved of Truman overwhelmingly wanted to get rid of Acheson and that those who approved of Truman were content to stick with Acheson. 110
Four months later, the storm over Acheson had subsided somewhat. Reflecting the relative absence of elite voices now calling for Acheson's dismissal, Gallup found that the percentage of those with an opinion who believed Acheson should be replaced had dropped to just under half. The same
poll, however, showed that 63 percent of those expressing an opinion disapproved of President Truman's performance. One-sixth of those who wanted
Acheson to stay on, moreover, did so out of a fear that Truman might appoint someone worse. 111 No matter how unpopular a secretary of state becomes, this survey suggests, he cannot protect a president from bearing the
responsibility for an unpopular war. It was Truman's war, not Acheson's.
If there had been a decline in the number of people clamoring for Acheson's dismissal, it did not mean that the public now approved of his performance as secretary of state. Far from it. A NORC survey taken in October
1951 found that although 60 percent of those with an opinion now wanted
Acheson to stay on, only 42 percent of those with an opinion evaluated his
handling of foreign affairs positively. Another NORC poll, taken a year
later, found Acheson's approval rating roughly unchanged at about 39 percent. 112 During this last year of Truman's presidency, the president's Gallup
approval rating among those with an opinion hovered in the mid-30s, somewhat below Acheson's rating.
It is tempting to attribute the widespread perception of Truman and Acheson as a package to peculiar features of Truman's leadership. Because, as
Robert Donovan observes, "Truman angrily regarded attacks on any of his
subordinates as attacks upon himself, " 11 3 the president vigorously defended
Acheson when he was under attack . As any number of commentators have
noted, President Truman placed a high premium on loyalty. Richard Fenno,
for instance, remarks that Truman "required a close loyalty, and he reciprocated in full measure when any of his subordinates (like Dean Acheson) were
under fire from the outside." 114
The most obvious example of Truman coming to Acheson's defense occurred at the close of 1950. On December 15, the Republican caucuses in
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both the House and Senate requested Acheson be removed on the grounds
that he had "lost the confidence of the country." At a subsequent press conference, Truman promptly "blasted back" at critics of the secretary of
state. 115 To dismiss Acheson, Truman responded, would be to "weaken the
firm and vigorous position this country has taken against communist aggression." In addition to reiterating his great faith in the secretary of state,
Truman made it clear that such attacks upon Acheson were attacks upon the
president's foreign policy. As Truman later explained in his memoirs, "They
wanted Acheson's scalp because he stood for my policy.... The men who
struck out against Acheson were thus in reality striking out at me." 116
Perhaps Truman's style of never shrinking from a fight, much in evidence
in his sharp, unflinching defense of Acheson, encouraged opponents to criticize the president directly. Certainly Truman's insistence on reminding the
public that responsibility for a decision was the president's alone ("The
Buck Stops Here") made it more difficult for opponents to criticize Acheson
without also criticizing Truman. But it was not only Truman who drew attention to the fact that attacks on Acheson were necessarily attacks on the
president. Democrat William Fulbright, for instance, reminded his Senate
colleagues that "this attack upon Mr. Acheson is, of course, not just a personal matter between him and the Republicans. It is, in fact, an attack upon
the President and his foreign policy. . . . Everyone knows that Mr. Acheson
is not an independent agent, but, on the contrary, that he is but the instrumentality of the President in carrying into effect the foreign policy which
the President determines." 111 Republican Senator Eugene Millikin admitted
as much when he explained that at issue was something much broader than
the issue of Mr. Acheson himself, and that was the "whole question of this
Administration's foreign policy." 11 8
An examination of how President Eisenhower acted when faced with congressional criticism of Secretary Dulles's handling of the Suez affair casts
doubt upon an explanation that centers exclusively on Truman's style of
leadership. Rather than allow Dulles to stand alone and absorb the fire,
Eisenhower went out of his way to identify himself with his secretary of
state. At a January 30, 1957, news conference, Eisenhower was asked
whether Dulles's actions had "contributed to our present international difficulties." Eisenhower replied that Dulles "has never taken any action which I
have not in advance approved." The policies pursued by the secretary of
state, the president continued, "have my approval from top to bottom. " 11 9
Moreover, just as Truman praised Acheson as "among the greatest of our
Secretaries of State," 120 so Eisenhower credited his secretary of state with
possessing "a wisdom and experience and knowledge that I think is possessed by no other man in the world." 121
An additional difficulty with focusing on Truman's leadership style as the
critical variable in explaining the intense criticism directed at Truman is that
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Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both delegated extensive authority to
their secretaries of state. 122 Unlike FDR, Truman had no desire to be his own
secretary of state. 123 Although Truman was hardly averse to placing himself
on the firing line-indeed his motto "If you can't stand the heat, stay out of
the kitchen" implied that the ultimate test of presidential mettle was how
well one stood up under fire-it was Acheson who, more often than not, was
the administration's spokesman in foreign affairs.
In particular, Truman largely left to Acheson the role of "educating" the
public about the fall of China. For instance, Acheson used a speech, delivered on January 12, 1950, before the National Press Club-with characteristic causticity, Acheson characterized the speech as "another effort to get the
self-styled formulators of public opinion to think before they wrote" 124-to
explain that Chiang's government had fallen not because of American bungling but because of the Chinese government's internal weakness. Throughout the first half of 1950, Acheson continued to make numerous speeches
explaining and defending administration policy. These speeches amounted
to what one scholar has called an "experiment in foreign-policy education." 125
Even with Acheson "out front," however, the president could not avoid
blame. As one Republican critic of Truman reminded his fellow members of
the House, "Under the Constitution, the President of the United States has
full control in shaping our country's foreign policy." 126 Even decisions announced by Acheson were blamed on Truman. Although it was Acheson, for
instance, in the Press Club speech of January 12, 1950, who excluded South
Korea from the American "defensive perimeter" (thus allegedly inviting a
North Korean invasion of South Korea), Republican Senator Bourke Hickenlooper recalled it as a presidential announcement: " A little more than a
year ago . . . the State Department and the President, or the President
through the State Department, made the famous announcement that Korea
was not within our perimeter of defense. " 121 Equally striking was Senator
Knowland's reference to the much-maligned White Paper issued by the State
Department-a 1,000 plus page document recounting why the administration could not have done anything to stop China from going Communistas "the white paper statement of the President of the United States." 128 Foreign policy, these comments suggest, was viewed as primarily Truman's
responsibility or at best as the joint responsibility of the president and secretary of state.
Both Truman and Eisenhower chose strong-willed secretaries of state, delegated to them substantial authority, and encouraged them to assume a
prominent public profile, yet in neither case did the general public distinguish much between their evaluation of the president and their judgment of
the secretary of state. In both cases the president and secretary were judged
as a team, with the major difference between the two cases being that the
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majority approved of the results-peace-achieved by the Eisenhower/
Dulles foreign policy and disapproved of the outcomes-war-associated
with the Truman/Acheson foreign policy. The story is more complex and nuanced at the elite level, particularly in the Eisenhower case, but here too the
dominant tendency is to view the secretary of state as a presidential accomplice. Is there something distinctive about the domain of foreign policy that
would explain why an adviser is less likely to act as a lightning rod than to be
seen as an accomplice?

WHY PRESIDENTS CAN'T OR DON'T HIDE IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Why might presidents be less able to deflect blame in the realm of foreign
policy? Part of the answer surely lies in the nature of public expectations regarding presidential control of foreign policy. The public expects the president to be responsible for, and intimately involved in, the conduct of foreign
affairs, a presumption that is absent or significantly weaker in domestic affairs. A Gallup poll conducted in 1979, for instance, found that 49 percent
of those surveyed thought the president "should have the major responsibility for setting foreign policy" while only 27 percent said the same about
Congress. In contrast, when asked about energy policy or economic policy,
40 percent said Congress should have the major responsibility for setting
policy, and only 34 percent named the president. 129
Nor is this expectation of presidential control limited to the general public. It is shared by party activists and elected officials. 130 Hubert Humphrey,
speaking while Richard Nixon was ensconced in the presidency and opposition to the Vietnam War was near its peak, admitted that "ultimately
though the President must be in charge [of foreign policy]. You cannot run
foreign policy by committees.... It is [the] President [who] has the responsibility for really defining the ... national security [interests] of this country. "131 The same view is expressed in the findings of the 1987 Tower Commission Report: "The President is responsible for the national security
policy of the United States. In the development and execution of that policy,
the President is the decision-maker. He is not obliged to consult with or seek
approval from anyone in the Executive Branch. . . . As Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief, and with broad authority in the area of foreign affairs, it is the President who is empowered to act for the nation and protect
its interests." 132 More systematic evidence comes from a study of 1976 national party convention delegates that found delegates from both parties
showed substantially greater trust in the president's judgment in foreign
than in domestic policy, while trusting Congress more than the president in
domestic policy. 133
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But there is more to the puzzle than the widespread predisposition to hold
the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. 134 The presumption that presidents are uniquely responsible for foreign policy makes it difficult for presidents to hide, but equally important is that presidents often
don't even try to hide on the foreign policy stage. If secretaries of state often
make poor lightning rods it is because presidents seem more inclined to
thrust themselves into the public limelight in the foreign policy domain than
they are in domestic policy.
In part, this is because presidents are inclined to regard foreign policy as
uniquely their own responsibility. The Constitution may be, as Edward Corwin famously put it, "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing
American foreign policy, " 135 but few presidents, especially in the twentieth
century, have seen it this way. As Harry Truman bluntly informed a gathering of Jewish war veterans, "I make American foreign policy. " 136 Or, as
Richard Nixon expressed the point: "I've always thought this country could
run itself domestically without a President; all you need is a competent Cabinet to run the country at home. You need a President for foreign policy; no
Secretary of State is really important; the President makes foreign policy. " 137
Presidents don't hide, in short, because they believe foreign and national security policy is their unique constitutional and statutory responsibility.
Even presidents less inclined to define the president's role in quite the way
that Nixon did invariably find themselves spending large and increasing
amounts of their time on foreign policy. Those presidents who come to office focused on a largely domestic agenda, as in the case of Ronald Reagan,
soon find themselves "surprised at how much a part of the job, that is how
much .. . percentage of your time and effort and thinking is devoted to the
international situation." 138 In the most systematic study of presidential attention, John Kessel showed that not only do presidents devote more space
in their State of the Union addresses to international affairs than to any
other topic, but that attention to this policy area increases substantially during the course of a president's term in office. 139 Why do presidents invariably
catch what a Clinton aide recently characterized as the "foreign policy
bug"?1'°
A number of incentives lure the president onto the foreign policy stage.
First is the prospect of being able to accomplish more. Studies have shown
that presidents are more successful in getting their way with Congress in foreign policy than in domestic policy-although how much more is a matter of
some dispute. 141 What is beyond dispute is that presidents are substantially
less dependent on legislative enactments in foreign affairs than in the domestic area. President Carter, as Thomas Cronin notes, freely "confessed he
liked foreign policy because his capacity to act unilaterally seemed much
greater in the foreign than in the domestic realm." 142
A second incentive is the promise of a more presidential image. "As for-
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eign policy leaders," George Edwards and Stephen Wayne explain, "[presidents] can act as unifying figures, [and] overcome perceptions of partisanship. " 143 To the extent that "going international" plays up the president's
nonpolitical, head-of-state image, there is less need for lightning rods in the
foreign policy domain. 144 For the aim of lightning rods is precisely to distance the president from the controversial political side of the presidential
role. 1• 5
A number of studies have shown that popularity is significantly more
likely to accompany presidential action in the realm of international affairs,
where the president claims to speak for the entire nation, than in domestic
affairs, where he appears to represent only a part. 146 Gary Smith, for instance, finds that during Kennedy's presidency, "presidential popularity
jumps when foreign conflict occurs and it slumps at times of domestic conflict." 147 Examining presidential popularity from 1963 to 1980, Michael
MacKuen finds that "the average net impact of all foreign actions ... is
positive (2.42 points), but ... for domestic events (excluding Watergate) is
slightly negative (- .84)." 148 And Philip Stone and Richard Brody demonstrate that even in the case of Lyndon Johnson, "approval of Johnson goes
up when announcements are made regarding foreign policy other than Vietnam . .. [and] it goes down when announcements are made regarding ...
domestic issues. " 149 Even foreign policy blunders, as when an American U-2
spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, have often resulted
in increases, at least in the short term, in presidential popularity. 150
To the extent that presidential actions in foreign affairs accent a president's unifying image as head of state and tend to be rewarded with increases
in public support, presidents have an incentive to push themselves onto the
foreign policy stage. This incentive structure teaches presidents to seek a
lower profile on the domestic scene, where even skillful handling of a policy
may cost a president political support, and to raise their profile in foreign
affairs, where even mistakes may be rewarded.
If presidents are lured onto the foreign policy stage by the prospect of
greater rewards, they are also pushed onto it by the fear that letting others
take the blame will leave the impression of a president not in control. A president can admit ignorance or detachment in the realm of agricultural or
land-use policy without drawing into question his fitness for the presidency,
but a similar admission in foreign affairs is much more hazardous to a president's public prestige. In the aftermath of revelations about the Iran-contra
affair, for example, Gallup found that more people thought it was worse if
the National Security Council (NSC) ran the operation without President
Reagan's knowledge than if President Reagan had known and approved of
the Iran-contra connection. 151 The public expectation of presidential involvement in national security matters helps explain why both Truman and Eisenhower were so reluctant to let their secretaries of state take the blame for
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policies that were drawing criticism. And their vigorous defenses of Acheson
and Dulles suggest that part of the reason the public so closely linked their
assessments of the president and the secretary of state is that both presidents
worked to forestall the perception that the secretary of state alone shaped
the policies affecting the nation's security.
Eisenhower's willingness to accept responsibility for, and admit complete
knowledge of, the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union-at the price of the collapse of the 1960 Paris Summit-reflected his recognition that a president
cannot escape blame on a national security issue without seeming to abrogate his responsibility as conductor of foreign relations. Despite CIA Director Allen Dulles's offer to take full responsibility and resign, and Khrushchev's statement that he was "quite willing to grant that the President knew
nothing" about the reconnaissance flights, Eisenhower evidently felt, as
Stephen Hess writes, that to do so "would have been an unconscionable admission that he did not control the country's national security apparatus. " 152
The reaction in the press to the government's denials helped to persuade
Eisenhower that admitting involvement would be better than feigning detachment. In the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Lippmann pointed out
that "in denying that it authorized the flight, the Administration has entered
a plea of incompetence." James Reston, columnist for the New York Times,
believed that "the heart of the problem here is that the Presidency has been
parcelled out, first to Sherman Adams, then to John Foster Dulles, and in
this case to somebody else-probably to Allen Dulles." Eisenhower's style
had removed him from the key decisions and left "the nation, the world and
sometimes even the President himself in a state of uncertainty about who is
doing what." Harry Truman wrote to Dean Acheson with the opinion that
" the President of the United States ought not to admit that he doesn't know
what is going on." In the wake of such talk, Eisenhower convened the NSC
and announced that "we're just going to have to take a lot of beating on
this-and I'm the one, rightly, who's going to have to take it." 153
In subsequent interviews a number of former officials have suggested that
Eisenhower shouldered the responsibility for the fiasco because it was not in
the general's nature or training to avoid blame. Douglas Dillon, for one, has
suggested that "he didn't like to blame other people. . . . He felt more
strongly than a civilian leader might have. He had this thing about honesty
and that was the military tradition." Similarly, Andrew Goodpaster has
claimed that Eisenhower wasn't "in the business of using scapegoats . . ..
That's the last thing the President would want." 15•
Although there is some validity to this view, 155 the question remains as to
why Eisenhower was unwilling to deflect blame in this episode but was perfectly happy to shift blame to subordinates on any number of other occasions. The answer seems to be that he recognized that an admission of detachment on such a question would do more harm than good. What
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bothered Eisenhower was not only that this would be a "glaring and permanent injustice" to the subordinate, but that it would have been an intolerable
admission that the president did not "control important matters in our government. " 156 To mute criticism that "the country has been humiliated by absentmindedness in the highest quarters of government," '5' Eisenhower
found it best to take the blame. The costs of being seen as a president not in
command of foreign affairs can be further illustrated by examining the public perception of the relationship between Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger.

UPSTAGING THE PRESIDENT: KISSINGER AND
FORD
From the moment Gerald Ford became president, the White House staff,
and to a lesser extent Ford himself, worried that Kissinger, who had become
a genuine celebrity in the last years of the Nixon administration, would upstage the new president. Believing that the public perception that Kissinger,
not Ford, directed foreign policy hurt the president, 158 some staff members
attempted to downgrade Kissinger's importance, most visibly by stripping
Kissinger of his second hat as national security assistant. 159
Polling data suggest that White House concerns that Kissinger was stealing Ford's thunder were justified. The Harris polling organization conducted eleven surveys between September 1974 and November 1976 asking
respondents to evaluate the job performances of Kissinger and Ford. In the
initial survey, Ford and Kissinger both received high marks, with only about
20 percent of the sample disapproving of either man's performance. Ford's
pardon of Richard Nixon, however, sent the president's approval plummeting below 50 percent, while having no impact on the public's evaluation of
the secretary of state. In the ten polls subsequent to the pardon, Kissinger's
approval rating ranged from a low of 55 percent to a high of 75 percent;
Ford's fluctuated from a low of 30 percent to a high of 50 percent. The president's average approval rating of 43 percent was a full 20 points below Kissinger's average approval rating of 62 percent, and at no point did Ford have
a higher approval rating than his secretary of state.
Follow-up questions asking respondents to evaluate the performance of
the president and secretary of state in specific foreign policy areas show that
the difference between Ford and Kissinger was due to more than the fact that
Kissinger was not being evaluated on the basis of a faltering economy. They
show that the public was much more likely to approve of Kissinger's handling of foreign policy than of Ford's. More than 60 percent of those with an
opinion approved of Kissinger's performance in handling U .S.-Chinese relations, for instance, while only 45 percent of those with an opinion approved
of President Ford's performance in this area. Ford fared little better with
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U.S.-Soviet relations: 62 percent of those with an opinion expressed approval of Kissinger's handling of relations with the Soviet Union, while only
46 percent approved of Ford's handling of the Soviets. While 71 percent of
those expressing an opinion believed Kissinger had done a good job in
"working for peace in the world," only 56 percent were willing to say the
same for the president. 160
There is some evidence that Kissinger did help President Ford by taking
much of the public heat for the fall of Cambodia and the North Vietnamese
takeover of Vietnam. In a May 1975 poll, taken in the aftermath of the fall
of Cambodia and the North Vietnamese takeover, only 38 percent approved
of Kissinger's "handling of the Vietnam and Cambodian crises." Despite
Ford's significantly lower overall job rating at the time (40 percent approval
compared to 56 percent for Kissinger), 46 percent expressed approval of the
president's handling of the Indochina situation. 161 Given that Kissinger had
been linked in the public mind with Vietnam since early 1973, before Ford
had become vice president let alone president, it is not surprising that Kissinger rather than Ford was held responsible. But these are rare circumstances indeed.
On balance, these polls suggest that Kissinger's accomplishments were of
little help in boosting public approval of Ford. This pattern is well illustrated
by the public reaction to the preliminary agreement Kissinger helped negotiate between Egypt and Israel. Kissinger's job approval rating, which in early
August had been around 56 percent, jumped to 63 percent after signing the
accord in September. Sixty-one percent (in contrast to 48 percent in May,
and 50 percent in August) now expressed approval of Kissinger's efforts in
"working to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East." In contrast, Ford's
job rating remained mired around 40 percent, unaffected by what was perceived as Kissinger's personal accomplishment. Only 44 percent approved of
Ford's efforts in handling the Mideast crisis-only slightly higher than the
40 percent who had approved in May and July. A poll conducted the following spring, which found that Kissinger's efforts in the Middle East were approved by 56 percent of the sample while approval of Ford's efforts in this
area had dropped to 31 percent, showed the persistence of this pattern in
which the public withheld credit to Ford for Kissinger's peacemaking efforts.
The Kissinger case highlights both the costs to a president of not being
perceived as in control of foreign policy and the credit that is foregone by
abdicating the public perception of being responsible for foreign policy. Kissinger's "upstaging" relationship with Ford (and Nixon in his later years)
was, however, exceptional. It is unlikely that a president will long endure a
situation in which his secretary is credited for favorable developments while
the president is blamed for the unpopular. This upstaging type of relationship inevitably creates friction between the departmental head and the presi-
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dent and his aides 162 and cannot help but generate pressures for the secretary's removal.

THE TWO PRESIDENCIES
Kissinger, Acheson, and Dulles all seemed ideally suited for the role of presidential lightning rod; they were prominent, powerful , and controversial secretaries of state. Their public personas-particularly Dulles the self-righteous, Presbyterian moralist and Acheson the haughty, pompous
aristocrat-made them inviting targets for opponents. That none of them
were particularly effective as lightning rods, at least at the level of the mass
public, suggests that foreign affairs may be in important ways a distinctive
policy domain. As Wildavsky formulated the point close to thirty years ago,
"The United States has one president, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with defense and
foreign policy."
For Wildavsky, presidential power in foreign policy was substantially different than in domestic policy in large part because the president's potential
opponents-the citizenry, special interest groups, Congress, the bureaucracy-were substantially weaker or less assertive in foreign policy than in domestic policy. '63 Whatever the reasons, presidents do in fact do better in foreign policy. They do better in terms of public approval, and they do better in
terms of congressional support. In foreign policy, moreover, presidents are
more able to act unilaterally and thus are better able to convey to the public
an image of strength as well as a unifying image of national leadership. In
foreign policy, as a result, presidents have less to gain from lightning rods
than they have to lose from being upstaged, a danger that is well illustrated
by Kissinger's relationship with Ford.
The two-presidencies phenomenon is also structured by public expectations about presidential roles and responsibilities. Vietnam may have modified, at least at the elite level, the willingness to defer to the president in foreign affairs, but a widespread presumption remains that foreign policy is
largely a presidential responsibility or, at least, that a president's responsibilities are relatively greater in foreign than in domestic policy. The public's
predisposition to hold the president responsible for the conduct of national
security (in a way the public does not hold the president responsible for education policy or agricultural policy, for example) makes it difficult for a
president to avoid blame in foreign policy. The president who maintains his
distance from a dispute over agricultural price supports can keep himself out
of trouble, but the president who seems uninvolved with a decision vital to
the country's national security risks drawing into question his fitness for
governing.
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Certainly there is no hiding for a president when it comes to war. The
Constitution's designation of the president as commander-in-chief makes it
virtually impossible for a president to hide from the wrath unleashed by an
unpopular war. Although Truman delegated a great deal of authority to
Acheson, and although Acheson was ideally cast as a villain for conservative
Republicans, it did not prevent public anger over the Korean War from being
directed at the president. Neither Truman nor Acheson could have done anything short of ending the war that would have helped Truman regain public
favor.
Elites, because of their greater attentiveness to foreign policy matters, are
better able to discriminate between their appraisal of the president and their
evaluation of the secretary of state. There are myriad foreign policy battles
that never penetrate the public consciousness-the Bricker amendment controversy is a paradigmatic example-in which secretaries of state can serve
as viable lightning rods at the elite level. Yet even among sophisticated political elites, the presumption that the president is responsible for the conduct
of foreign relations acts as a retardant upon a president's ability to use the
secretary of state as a lightning rod, particularly in major international crises such as the U-2 affair or the Bay of Pigs. Modern presidents have often
found it easier, as we see in the next chapter, to deflect elite attention and
blame onto the chief of staff, a post where the norm of anonymity has repeatedly clashed with the realities of the job description.

6
The Chief of Staff as
Lightning Rod: From Sherman Adams
to John Sununu

Presidential staff "should be possessed of high competence, great physical
vigor, and a passion for anonymity."' So concluded the famous 1937
Brownlow report in what has become its most infamous passage. When this
passage was read to President Roosevelt, he is reported to have "burst out
chuckling and laughing and read the phrase out loud a second time." Presenting the report at a press conference, Roosevelt forewarned the assembled
press "to sharpen your pencils and take this down. This is a purple patch,
one you will never forget." More than one journalist must have thought
what one said, "There ain't no such animal." The bemused reporters even
ran a contest among themselves to select the best poem lampooning the proposal. 2
The cynic's view that "there ain't no such animal" has coexisted uneasily
with the reformist's earnest plea for a presidency populated with more such
creatures. In the half century since the Brownlow report, political observers
have frequently lamented that presidential aides have forsaken Louis
Brownlow's guidance. The chorus of protest became particularly vociferous
in the wake of Watergate as presidential staff were roundly criticized for
supplanting cabinet members as spokesmen and formulators of administration policies.
It is not only outside observers, however, who believe presidential staff
should adhere to Brownlow's precept. Presidential staff, including chiefs of
staff, also profess a belief in the value of staff anonymity. Nixon's controversial chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, admits to being "very strongly ...
[in favor of] the passion for anonymity viewpoint." "I tried," Haldeman explains, "to work behind the scenes where I felt I could be most effective."
"As soon as you become the issue," Haldeman continues, "you've lost an
enormous amount of your value to the president ... as a staff person. " 3
Richard Cheney, chief of staff to Gerald Ford, subscribed to much the same
100
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professional code, albeit with greater success. His function as chief of staff,
he says, was to explain policy but "never to be quoted, never to be out front
as a public official."• A similar vision of the staff role is evident in Sherman
Adams's comment that "I wasn't there to accomplish things, I was there to
help the President. Good staff people have to be measured by their dedication, by their hard work, by their sense of proportion. But not by their accomplishments. All the accomplishments belong to the President. " 5 And
Donald Regan, anything but anonymous, explained his role in the Reagan
White House as "a sort of producer, making certain that the star had what
he needed to do his best; the staff was like the crew, invisible behind the
lights, watching the performance their behind-the-scenes efforts had made
possible. " 6
Why do senior staff and especially chiefs of staff so often fail to achieve
the anonymity that outside observers urge upon them and that they themselves profess to prefer? Why the discrepancy between professional creed
and reality? 1 Part of the answer can be found in the media's (and the attentive public's) fascination with the powers behind the throne. FDR's skepticism about Brownlow's "passion for anonymity" idea had more to do with
his jaundiced view of the press than with worries about the self-aggrandizing
instincts of presidential aides. As Roosevelt told Brownlow when the latter
first presented the idea to the president, "Tell your British friend [who
coined the phrase] that he doesn't know his American press. " 8 Foremost in
Roosevelt's mind was aide Tommy Corcoran, who despite (or because of) his
"instinct for anonymity" had become the target of intense press scrutiny. 9
Avoiding "Meet the Press" is no guarantee of anonymity. Indeed staying out
of the public eye may only fuel anxiety about unaccountable power behind
the scenes.
Another answer to this puzzle lies in a conflict within the professional
creed of chiefs of staff. Chiefs of staff must reconcile a passion for anonymity with their responsibilities as gatekeeper, determining who and what gets
access to the president, coordinator of policy making, determining what is
and is not in accord with the president's position, and spokesman for the
president and his policies. 10 Each of these roles conflicts with the precept of
anonymity. By including some people and information and excluding others, staff inevitably create ill-feeling on the part of those who feel their message has been unfairly excluded. Coordination, in the absence of consensus,
is another word for coercion, 11 and coercion may induce fear but rarely loyalty or lasting support. Finally, seeing that the president and his policies are
viewed in a positive light entails explaining the president's policies in private
and public forums. Protecting the president, in sum, is thus likely to earn
the chief of staff a notoriety and enmity that override any passion for anonymity.
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"THE SMALL END OF THE FUNNEL'' 12

Presidents, like the rest of us, cannot possibly pay attention to everything at
once. No president can afford to listen to, let alone grant, even a fraction of
the requests made of him. Selectivity is essential. The staff's function is thus
to filter out those communications that are not essential to a president's
ability to make informed decisions. 13 Staff are positioned between the president and other governmental officials and given the job of screening which
communications get through to the president. Such a function is indispensable. That selectivity is inevitable, however, is slight consolation to those
whose messages have been excluded.
Those who have served as chief of staff are virtually unanimous in defining their role as an "honest broker" who presents all sides of an issue. At a
recent conference that brought together a number of former chiefs of staff,
Haldeman, Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Jack Watson all eagerly endorsed the honest-broker ideaJ. 1• Each of Reagan's chiefs of staff have also
publicly described their role in these terms, as has Bush's chief of staff John
Sununu. '5 A chief of staff, explains Cheney, will not "survive very long if he,
in effect, warps the flow of information to suit his own bias with respect to
policy." 16 If others in the administration do not have confidence that their
views are being communicated in an even-handed manner they will bypass
the chief of staff and establish alternative channels to the president. 11
No doubt it is true that a chief of staff who insisted on expressing unsolicited personal policy preferences would not last long in the job. But the notion of chiefs of staff as nothing more than "honest brokers," like the
media's claim to being an "electronic mirror" of society, severely underestimates the biases that necessarily intrude in making decisions about what is
more important and what is less important. Discretion is unavoidable.
When Haldeman says that the chief of staff "functions as an honest broker
in the sense of eliminating or bringing together repetitious material .. . and
organizing the material in an orderly manner so that the president can proceed through it," he disguises the substantial power involved in deciding
what is repetitious and what is not, what should be organized in and what
should be organized out. Of course "the president shouldn't have ten piles
of irrelevant or unrelated paper that he's got to wade through, sort out, and
figure out what to do with," but the power to decide what is and is not relevant or related is critically important in framing and reaching a decision. 18
Even a chief of staff committed to ensuring that the president hears all sides
of an issue has the discretion to decide which advice needs to be "counterbalanced" and by whom . 19
If chiefs of staff see themselves as honest brokers, those who believe their
message is not getting through to the president invariably portray that power
in more sinister terms. As Michael Medved points out, "No one likes to be-
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lieve that he has been denied an audience with the chief executive because his
opinion is insignificant or irrelevant; it is much easier to blame a conspiratorial aide for cutting off advice 'the President needs.' " 20 Haldeman was "the
keystone of a Berlin Wall around Mr. Nixon," the "Iron Chancellor" with
"a gaze that could freeze Medusa"; 21 Regan was portrayed as the "Iron Major" with "a look that would stop a locomotive in its tracks"; 22 Adams was
referred to as "the great stone face," the "abominable no-man" with "the
disposition of a grizzly with a barked shin"; 23 and Rumsfeld was dubbed the
"Praetorian. " 2•
The role of chief of staff may be a twentieth-century response to the tremendous growth in the size of " the presidential branch," but the belief that
top aides close to the president are preventing presidents from hearing valuable advice is as old as the republic. Typical was the lament of a former congressman, who complained to Lincoln's friend and campaign manager
David Davis that an opinion was "quite prevalent" that John Hay and John
Nicolay deliberately prevented letters from reaching the president. A sympathetic Davis forwarded the congressman's letter to "the impassable Mr. Nicolay," prompting an unapologetic response from Nicolay: "Literally considered this is true .... A moment's reflection will convince you that the
President has not time to read all the letters he receives, and also that
[among any] hundred miscellaneous letters there will be a large proportion
which are obviously of no interest or importance. These the President would
not read if he could. " 25 The need for aides to exclude "unimportant" or "irrelevant" communications has become increasingly critical in a political environment where more and more groups look to the president for answers to
their problems.
Complaints about a chief of staff isolating the president frequently come
from what political scientist Thomas Cronin calls the "outer cabinet," departments such as Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), transportation, agriculture, interior, commerce, and labor. 26
In the Nixon White House, for instance, the earliest and most vocal critics of
the "Berlin Wall" allegedly isolating the president were Interior Secretary
Walter Hickel,2' Transportation Secretary John Volpe, 28 HUD Secretary
George Romney, 29 and top health administrators within Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW). 3° Cabinet heads from these peripheral departments
want to enlist presidential support for what they deem to be a worthy cause;
the president, on the other hand, often prefers to maintain his distance from
the outer cabinet, thereby preserving political capital for those central issues
on which he holds the most intense preferences. Chiefs of staff protect the
president by guarding against a run on the bank , thereby avoiding the dissipation of precious political capital.
If such complaints more commonly arise from the periphery of the administration, they are by no means limited to the periphery. In almost every
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administration, officials from the " inner cabinet" (state, defense, justice,
and treasury) can also be found lamenting their inability to gain adequate
access to the president. During Reagan's first term, for instance, Secretary of
State Alexander Haig complained bitterly about the White House staff's unwillingness to let him see the president alone, and National Security Assistant Richard Allen found that even his supposed ally, Ed Meese, was a "400pound obstacle. " 31 Eisenhower's defense secretary, Charles Wilson, felt that
Adams was blocking his access to the president, although the truth was that
Eisenhower found Wilson tedious.32
The role of gatekeeper places a chief of staff in the unenviable position of
saying "no" to powerful people. Some, like Cheney or Jim Baker, have tried
to deliver the negative in a relatively diplomatic manner. Others, like Adams,
Haldeman, Regan, and Sununu, seem to have relished, and embellished, the
image of the gruff, even autocratic no-man. Chiefs of staff have frequently
blended personal characteristics with the strategic demands of the no-man
role in such a way as to make it nearly impossible to tell where personality
ends and role commences. Eisenhower aide William Bragg Ewald considered
Sherman Adams's abrupt gruffness "artfully ingenious rudeness. " 33 But
Richard Strout was perhaps closer to the truth when he wrote: "Perhaps
[Adams] realizes that a reputation for gruffness is a buckler against bores.
But it must be said that , for Adams, the switch between make-believe and
real has the gliding ease of automatic transmission. " 34 More recently, John
Sununu has insisted " that contrary to the legend, any strong statements on
my part are .. . controlled, deliberate and designed to achieve an effect.
There is no random outburst. It all is designed for a purpose. " 35 But even
granting Sununu his strategic outbursts, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that Sununu's combative personality seems well suited to the gatekeeper
role.
All chiefs of staff, no matter what their personalities, have been highly
self-conscious of their role as presidential buffers. They have acted on the
assumption that "every President needs a Darth Vader in the White House
to thwart special pleaders and scrutinize even apple-pie issues. " 36 Adams understood the division of labor perfectly: "Never make the mistake of giving
me credit for everything. I just take the blame around here. " 37 " If there's a
dirty deed to be done," echoes Cheney, "it's the chief of staff who's got to
do it. The president gets credit for what works, and you get the blame for
what doesn't work . That's the nature of the beast. " 38 Although some chiefs
of staff have in fact reaped substantial credit for positive outcomes, as in the
case of Jim Baker, 39 more often they have left office with sullied or at least
diminished reputations; the list includes Sherman Adams, H. R. Haldeman,
Hamilton Jordan , Don Regan, and John Sununu.
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"A HEADKNOCKER"

The president can personally settle only a fraction of interdepartmental disputes. Thus on many issues, a senior staffer is given the responsibility for
settling interagency disputes. This staff person, as Richard Rose puts it, is
designated "to knock together the heads of the disputants in order to arrive
at an outcome."'° But not just any outcome will do. Senior staff are responsible not only for seeing that disputants reach an arrangement that both
sides can live with but also for seeing that the negotiated outcome is consistent with presidential preferences. Coordination entails not just umpiring
disputes but transmitting presidential preferences.
The headknocker function has figured prominently in the job descriptions of most chiefs of staff. Sherman Adams described his "routine" work
as including "the settlement of occasional conflicts between Cabinet Secretaries and among agency heads." "I always tried," Adams explained, "to resolve specific differences on a variety of problems before the issue had to be
submitted to the President. Sometimes several meetings were necessary before an agreement was reached. But with a few exceptions I was successful. " 4 1 Cheney recalls "repeatedly" being called upon to settle "a major conflict between two willful cabinet members. " 42 Jim Baker, tagged the "velvet
hammer" by admiring aides, regularly called disputatious department heads
into his office to "settle [disputes] on the spot. " 43
Placed in the position of determining what is and is not consistent with
the basic objectives of the administration, a chief of staff is always vulnerable to criticism from others within the administration who believe the president's real preferences are (or should be) different from those laid down by
staff. In the Ford White House, for instance, Rumsfeld and Cheney were frequently the target of Nelson Rockefeller's wrath because the vice president
felt that senior staffers were scuttling his policy proposals. Rockefeller's proposals were invariably found to be "totally inconsistent with the basic policy
of the Ford administration," and it was left to the chief of staff to confront
the vice president with this awkward fact. By serving as "that cushion, that
rubber . . . between the president and vice-president," Cheney points out,
the staff enabled the president to continue to have an excellent working relationship with Rockefeller. 44
Even presidents who have eschewed a chief of staff have had somebody
fill the function of coordinating policy and ensuring that the outcome is
consistent with presidential objectives. Joseph Califano, for instance, filled
such a role under President Lyndon Johnson. Califano's office, remembers
one Bureau of the Budget official, became a "command post for directing
the Great Society campaigns, an operational center within the White House
itself, the locus for marathon coffee-consuming sessions dedicated to
knocking heads together and untangling jurisdictional and philosophical
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squabbles." 45 Knocking heads together antagonized many within the administration who saw Califano as an aggressive "empire builder. " 46
In the Nixon White House, John Ehrlichman performed much the same
function that Califano had in the Johnson White House. 47 When Attorney
General John Mitchell and HEW Secretary Robert Finch squared off over
school desegregation guidelines, when Arthur Burns complained that Pat
Moynihan was issuing unauthorized policy statements to the press, or when
Mitchell and Treasury Secretary David Kennedy clashed over jurisdiction of
foreign drug busts, it was Ehrlichman who was called in to settle the dispute
and to ensure that the settlement conformed to presidential objectives. 48 Like
Califano, Ehrlichman quickly made some powerful enemies within the
White House. Within months of the new administration, reports surfaced in
the New York Times that "complaints are coming in from senior officials
who find themselves negotiating with Ehrlichman instead of Nixon." 49
Complaints about Ehrlichman's intrusiveness became increasingly bitter
over time.
Serving as a "headknocker" makes it difficult for a top staffer to remain
anonymous because the role places the staff person at the vortex of intergovernmental conflicts. Such conflict is likely to attract public attention, especially because losers in intra-White House power struggles often have an incentive, in E. E. Schattschneider's language, "to enlarge the scope of
conflict," to alter the balance of political forces by introducing new actors
into the equation. 50 An antagonist who chooses to go public in this manner
can catapult even the most self-effacing and discreet aide into the public eye.
As a consequence it is difficult for a senior staffer to follow Brownlow's twin
precepts of coordinating administration policy and remaining anonymous. 51

THE ROLE OF SPOKESMAN

Those who cannot speak to the president seek out those who can speak for
the president. Absent direct access to the president, reporters or congressmen or department heads ferret out those senior aides who confer with the
president throughout the day, travel with the president, and know the president's mind on a broad range of issues. Such people are few and not difficult
to identify. President Eisenhower told the nation that his chief of staff
"knows exactly what I believe, what are my convictions, my policy. " 52 During the Nixon administration, attentive elites understood that Haldeman's
power rested on the fact that he "knew at all times exactly what the President was doing, what his current priorities were, what he was expecting others to accomplish." 53 "I meet with the president dozens of times during the
day," John Sununu told reporters. "[As a result] I know enough about the
president to do exactly what he wants done. " 54 Carter instructed his cabinet
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members to "speak with Stu [Eizenstat] if you want to know my position, " 55
and Johnson told his cabinet, "When Joe [Califano] speaks, that's my voice
you hear. " 56 The same intimate knowledge of the president's mind that enables a top aide faithfully to transmit presidential preferences to other actors
within the political system also makes anonymity an unattainable ideal because an intimate knowledge of presidential intentions, preferences, and priorities unavoidably thrusts the aide into the role of presidential spokesman.
Some chiefs of staff have tried to preserve their anonymity by speaking to
the press only on background. This was the practice followed by Cheney
who, although he "talked to the press frequently," made it a rule to do so
"always on background, always to explain policy, never to be out front as a
public official." 57 But if a low profile was Cheney's aim ,5 8 he was only partially successful in achieving his objective.59 Especially as the fight for the
Republican nomination heated up, Cheney's name surfaced increasingly frequently as the spokesman for the president on the subject of the Reagan
candidacy. 60 Who else could speak authoritatively for the president?
Even when a chief of staff avoids public statements, it is often difficult to
avoid the limelight. In the spring of 1982, for instance, a New York Times
reporter observed that "while Mr. Baker eschews public pronouncements,
his name has replaced Mr. Stockman's in the headlines. " 61 Because Baker
spoke for the president in budget negotiations with Congress, Baker was
news whether he spoke directly to the press or not. A picture of Baker going
into the meeting made the front page as did his private, behind-closed-doors
comments that were leaked by other participants to the press. Because the
president is news, those vested with the authority to act for and speak for the
president also become news. 62
It is often said that the "big shift [toward a staff member serving as policy
spokesman] has really been with the Reagan administration. " 63 In part this is
accurate. Appearances by top presidential aides on television news shows
seem to have greatly and irreversibly increased during the Reagan years. But
the chief of staff's role as presidential spokesman does not emerge fully
formed from the Reagan administration. In fact , here as elsewhere, the
Eisenhower administration established a pattern that was developed during
subsequent presidencies. 64
Sherman Adams, according to the conventional view, was the administration's "anonymous man" who "carried on his monstrous toil in a secrecy
that was as zealously guarded as an atomic bomb stockpile. " 65 But Adams
was much Jess shy of the limelight than people often remember or than Adams wanted people to remember.66 Adams was not only among the most
publicly visible members of the Eisenhower administration,61 but he is also
among the most visible chiefs of staff in modern presidential history. 68 Adams may not have held press conferences, as some of his critics suggested he
should, but on many occasions he spoke to groups of reporters or repre-
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sented the administration point of view in public forums. A careful study of
the record cannot support the claim made by Eisenhower's staff secretary
Andrew Goodpaster that the Eisenhower administration "really had only
two spokesmen in the White House. One was the press secretary, Jim Hagerty, and the other was none other than Dwight D. Eisenhower. " 69 Besides
ignoring the important role Vice President Nixon played in presenting administration views, Goodpaster overlooks Adams's substantial role in publicizing the administration's views. Adams gave a large number of public
speeches, 10 most of which promoted administration policies, and some of
which vigorously assailed Democratic leaders and policies. 11
Even when Adams did not make public pronouncements, letters and telegrams that he sent to congressmen, governors, mayors, and interest-group
leaders explaining the administration position were often made public and
reported in the press. 72 What Adams told officials in private meetings also
frequently made its way into print as, for instance, when Colorado Governor
Dan Thornton publicly quoted Adams as having assured him that the president was not committed to continuation of the grant-in-aid system. 73 However much Adams might have preferred anonymity, his role as presidential
surrogate thrust him unavoidably into the public eye.

"MY LORD HIGH EXECUTIONER"74

Few human beings enjoy having to personally fire other people. Certainly no
president in recent memory has relished the task. One biographer after another tells how each president disliked such confrontations. Ronald Reagan,
Lou Cannon finds, "detested confrontations, particularly over personnel. " 15
For all their differences, President Carter fully shared Reagan's aversion to
face-to-face confrontations. Gerald Ford, too, as Hedley Donovan reports,
"simply hated to lay down the law," preferring to leave unpleasant tasks to
others. 76 It is well known that President Nixon, as William Safire tells us,
"never has enjoyed telling anybody bad news, firing anybody, or running
down associates to their faces." 77 Likewise, President Eisenhower "always
had to be the nice guy.... [He] always had to have someone else who could
do the firing, or the reprimanding, or give any orders which he knew people
would find unpleasant to carry out. ms
Has chance ensconced in the presidency a peculiar bunch of conflictavoiders? Perhaps. More likely, there is significantly more than personality
at work here. President after president avoid such confrontations less out of
psychic need than out of organizational necessity. Delegating unpopular
tasks to those who are expendable helps a president maintain a positive image and thereby maintain political support. Presidents may indeed dislike
personal confrontations, but so do most presidential aides. Mike Deaver,
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who frequently wielded the ax for President Reagan, explains, "I would find
it as hard as anyone to fire somebody who worked for me. But I could do it
for someone else, if doing so served Ronald Reagan. " 19 Senior staff are not
necessarily less sensitive people than presidents, but they are expendable in a
way that presidents are not.
Deaver's case illustrates the extreme enmity that can accrue to the person
assigned to be "the bearer of bad news" and explains why presidents have
farmed out this job to top subordinates. In his memoirs, Deaver observes
that because of "the President's distaste for an unpleasant scene" and because "both Baker and Meese were reluctant to ... tell someone his or her
services were no longer required, I was the guy who wielded the ax." As
Deaver emphasizes, "That is a guaranteed way to develop a flock of ill-wishers. " 80 A White House aide agreed that Deaver "was the heavy all the time.
He had to dump on the old friends. He was the bearer of the bad news," and
the result was that people "thought he was power-crazy" and "one royal
pain in the ass. " 81 The depth of resentment and bitterness against Deaver
bubbled to the surface shortly after the 1984 election when a White House
aide commented to a New York Times reporter: "Wait till he's on the outside. A lot of people he worked over will want to settle scores when he tries
to call back. " 82
If the senior staffer is perceived to be doing nothing more than carrying
out the president's bidding, the bearer of bad news saves the president an
awkward scene but little else. Dismissal of administration officials, however,
is frequently accompanied by great uncertainty about what role the president has played. Even scholars looking at the facts years later may have a
difficult time reconstructing exactly what role the president played in a personnel decision. Many are the officials who have been dismissed by a senior
staffer and who have left Washington thinking the president was uninformed or at least misled about the facts. And more often than not, such
perceptions have a solid basis in reality. For a chief of staff is not just the
"executioner," not just the one who breaks the bad news. The chief of staff
can also often be the prosecutor, the principal architect of a campaign to discredit a person who is felt not to be acting in accordance with the president's
best interests.

SEEING THROUGH THE RUSE
During his years as chief of staff, Haldeman is said to have boasted: "Every
President needs a son of a bitch, and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer and I'm his
bastard. I get done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him. " 83
Interviewed some years later, Haldeman gave a somewhat different, more reflective view of his role: "If I told someone to do something, he knew it
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wasn't me-he knew exactly what it was; it was an order from the President.
They knew an appeal wouldn't get anywhere. " 84 These two statements raise a
puzzling question. If Haldeman's effectiveness as chief of staff rested on
others believing that his wishes reflected the president's preferences then
how could he serve as a lightning rod? If others clearly perceived that Haldeman was only carrying out Nixon's orders then why should they blame the
chief of staff rather than the president?
One answer is supplied by Gerald Warren, former press aide under Nixon,
who explains: "I hope ... the American press understands that when Bob
Hartmann leaks to Evans and Novak that Haig is keeping all those Nixon
folks in the White House, he's doing that because he doesn't want to attack
Jerry Ford. It's Jerry Ford who's doing it, not Al Haig. " 85 Warren's answer
suggests that political elites are not fooled by the lightning rod ruse. They
see through it, realizing that aides are only an extension of the president
himself, but fabricate feelings of hostility toward the underling in order to
avoid directly criticizing the president.
The further removed one is from the inner circle the more difficult it becomes to determine whether or to what extent a directive from a top aide reflects the president's views. Even the most attentive political elites have few
opportunities to directly check for themselves whether an aide is carrying
out explicit presidential instructions or is creatively interpreting positions
near the outer limits of the zone of presidential indifference. Even the detached scholar who has access to the voluminous records of a presidential library will often have a difficult time determining where presidential will
leaves off and subordinate discretion begins.
The difficulty that others have in determining whether an aide is speaking
for the president will also depend on the president's leadership style. A president who barks out directives to subordinates and keeps a close eye on the
implementation of those orders will create a presumption within the administration that the aide is carrying out the president's will. A president who
shuns direct instructions and detaches himself from the day-to-day operations of the White House will generate much greater uncertainty about
whether and when an aide speaks for the president.
The Reagan presidency provides a vivid illustration of the latter phenomenon. Martin Anderson, who served as a senior aide in both the Nixon and
Reagan White Houses, was struck by the fact that Reagan "made no demands, and gave almost no instructions. " 86 Reagan's passive, detached style
meant that many officials within the administration suspected (sometimes
correctly) that top aides were not so much carrying out presidential directives as making presidential policy. Education Secretary Terrel Bell was convinced that Ed Meese ("the keeper of the radical right dogma") and his aides
were carrying out their own agenda rather than the president's. 87 Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, believed that Jim
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Baker was doing far more than just carrying out the president's wishes in
blocking her appointment to the National Security Council. 88 Secretary of
State Alexander Haig professed to be at a loss to ascertain which staff directives represented presidential wishes. "Did a demand for action by a Cabinet
council come from the President himself?" asks a puzzled Haig. "It was impossible to know." When Meese and Baker appeared on talk shows to speak
on foreign policy questions, Haig notes that "no one knew if what they were
saying was the President's policy." Indeed, Haig confesses, "I myself was
never altogether certain on this point. " 89
President Nixon's directive style of leadership provides a stark contrast to
Reagan's approach. Where Reagan rarely issued instructions except at the
most general level, Nixon showed no hesitation in issuing detailed directives
on even the most trivial of matters. Nixon would instruct Haldeman, for instance, to "tell Haig that when Henry [Kissinger] has his picture taken with
Le Due Tho, he's not to smile. " 90 Those familiar with Nixon's operating style
had little reason to doubt (as those in the Reagan White House certainly
would) that a directive from the chief of staff originated with the president.
Kissinger, who understood that Nixon systematically used Haldeman to do
his dirty work, was under no illusions that Nixon was behind the messages
he received from Haldeman, even petty directives advising him to "present a
sterner appearance" in pictures with Le Due Tho. 91 Haldeman seems justified in claiming that "every White House insider knew that I was [acting] at
the President's direct order." He may even be correct when he adds, "so did
most of the outsiders. " 92
Certainly when Haldeman appeared on national television in early 1972
and charged Nixon's critics with "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy
of the United States," Washington elites had little difficulty seeing through
the ruse. 93 Haldeman was too close and too loyal to Nixon, they believed, for
him to have made such comments on his own initiative. Moreover, such a
statement seemed perfectly consistent with what many believed to be the
"real" Nixon. In reporting Haldeman's comments, the Times stressed that
"the Administration's critics quickly assumed today that Mr. Haldeman was
reflecting the President's view in saying that those who attacked the latest
Nixon plan to end the Vietnam war were 'consciously aiding and abetting
the enemy of the United States.' " 94 As Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) put
it, Haldeman's attack only showed that "the old Nixon is emerging again. " 95
A Times editorial on "The Haldeman Smear" pointed out that "the President cannot so easily isolate himself . .. from the public comments of a
man who has been a close personal associate for many years who currently
serves as coordinator of White House affairs. " 96 For the Times, both Haldeman's position and his past made it implausible to assume he did.not express
the president's views. Haldeman, as James Reston pointed out, "is a loyal
Nixon man" who was simply "being shoved into the act. " 9' Because Halde-
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man lacked independent stature and was positioned at the president's right
hand, the White House efforts to disavow his comments as "his own personal point of view," and not necessarily those of Nixon, only fueled a
"credibility gap. " 98
Even after Nixon, in a televised speech two days later, adopted a more
conciliatory position than the one taken by Haldeman, most elites still
seemed unwilling to let Nixon evade responsibility for Haldeman's statement. "The Nixon technique," Mayor John Lindsey said, "is all too familiar.... [It is] McCarthyism pure and simple. " 99 "Nixon's softer tone," reported the Times, "had not removed McGovern's suspicion that Haldeman's
comments had been programmed by the President himself." 100 And many
months later, columnist William V. Shannon recounted the incident to his
readers by noting that "Nixon sent Haldeman . .. on a television interview
show to say that Muskie and others were 'consciously aiding and abetting
the enemy.' " 101
Haldeman's spectacular failure as a lightning rod was due to several factors. First, because he was a top staff person with extremely close ties to
Nixon, it strained credibility that Haldeman was acting on his own. When
Nixon was asked about Haldeman's statement at a press conference, the reporter prefaced his question by saying, "Do you think that Mr. Haldeman's
statement, since he is so close to you, and a lot of people interpret his thinking as very close to yours." '°2 Second, Haldeman's behavior seemed to conform to what many people perceived to be a Nixonian pattern. This sentiment was reflected in a letter to the editor, which pointed out that
Haldeman's statement "strikingly recalls the similarly irresponsible cries of
the dark days of Richard M. Nixon, who is alive and well and now living in
the White House. Let's not forget Helen Gahagan Douglas and all the others. " 103 Nixon's reputation for deviousness and dissembling made it difficult
to sustain Haldeman as a plausible lightning rod.
Using chiefs of staff as lightning rods, as this episode illustrates, is risky
business. Because chiefs of staff are so close to the president, for them to engage an issue is to bring controversy only a step away from the president's
door. The advantage of using cabinet members as lightning rods is that they
are further removed from the president. This is particularly true for departments in the outer cabinet. Their distance from the president, as Richard
Rose explains, means they are particularly well suited to acting as "buffers
that keep subgovernment problems from becoming White House problems. " 104 For instance, when Carter's transportation secretary, Brock Adams,
suggested to a congressional committee that some of the revenue from a proposed gas-guzzler tax be used for mass transit, Press Secretary Jody Powell
could plausibly reject the idea (even though Carter had personally cleared
Adams's testimony), insisting that "Secretary Adams was speaking for himself." '°5 As an issue becomes engaged by those aides closest to the president,
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however, it becomes much more difficult for the president to disown knowledge or involvement without seeming at best disengaged and at worst disingenuous or even dishonest.

AN INTERNAL LIGHTNING ROD

A chief of staff's critics typically look significantly different from a cabinet
member's critics. The bitterest critics of a cabinet member are most often
partisan critics on the outside. Criticism of Secretaries Benson, Watt,
Dulles, Acheson, Kissinger, and Brownell emanated largely from members
of the opposition party or from groups with weak ties to the administration.
The severest critics of a powerful White House aide, in contrast, are frequently found within the president's own party and especially within the
president's own administration. As Cheney points out, the chief of staff's
function "is to be the cushion that takes the pain and the heat, oftentimes
not only externally but also internally." 106 Adams, Haldeman, Regan, and
Sununu were hardly beloved by Democrats, but it was Republicans in each
case who clamored the loudest for their scalps. The explanation for this pattern is not hard to find: it is members of the president's own party and especially members of the president's own administration who are most likely to
feel they have a need or a right to see the president. In carrying out their
gatekeeper function it is thus largely to members of their own party that
chiefs of staff must say no.
This is not to say that strong chiefs of staff do not have vigorous critics on
the other side of the aisle. Indeed, their role as promoter of administration
policy means that they inevitably expose themselves to criticism from opponents of administration policy. Moreover, many chiefs of staff have been aggressive critics of the opposition, especially around election time. In 1954,
for instance, Sherman Adams lashed out at the Democrats as "political sadists" who were trying to talk the country into a depression, substituting the
"Fear Deal" for the "Fair Deal." Unless a Republican Congress were
elected, Adams declared, the nation would be "turned back once more to
the spending sprees and political orgies to which the American people called
a halt in 1952." 107 And in 1958, Adams climbed back onto the political
stump to blame the Democrats for Pearl Harbor, "the tragic loss of China,"
and "the scientific catastrophe of losing our atomic secrets." The "befuddled" Democratic party, he railed, was "a political monstrosity" with
"two heads, two hearts, and two souls," united only by "lust for privileges
of public office." 108 On national television, as we have already seen, Haldeman accused Democratic critics of the president's peace plan of "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States." 109 So, too, did
Sununu plant his share of partisan barbs into the opposition's hide.
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These public attacks on the opposition make it all the more remarkable
that a chief of staff's bitterest enemies so often come from within the administration and from congressmen of the same party. Democratic dislike for
Adams, for instance, could not compare with the hostility felt by leading Republicans. Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall told Adams,
"Some of my people think you've got horns that are halfway between a
Washington snowslide and a bundle of icicles. The fact is they think that in
you where the milk of human kindness ought to be, there is only ice-water. " 110 Republican antipathy toward Adams went beyond that felt by Old
Guard Taft Republicans, who believed Adams was moving administration
policy in a liberal, New Deal direction. Republicans of every ideological
stripe, historian Stephen Ambrose has observed, "were furious with Sherman Adams for not handing out enough jobs fast enough for their deserving
constituents." 111 Adams angered every supplicant who expected or wanted a
"yes" and received a "no." The disappointed, not surprisingly, came largely
from Republican ranks: from cabinet members wanting a presidential
speech in support of a department initiative, from Republican congressmen
seeking administration support for a pet project, 112 from local party leaders
wanting the president to campaign for Republican candidates, and from various Eisenhower supporters wanting some small favor.
Hamilton Jordan would not have won any popularity contests among Republicans, but his severest critics were Democrats, not Republicans. So intense was House Speaker Tip O'Neill's hostility toward Jordan that he took
to calling him "Hannibal Jerkin," thus capturing what O'Neill perceived to
be both Jordan's autocratic style and political ineptitude. 11 3 Democratic
Congressmen and members of the cabinet continually groused that Jordan
"never returns a phone call." 114
Even someone like Dick Cheney, who generally strove to be accommodating rather than confrontational in interpersonal relations, 115 was the target of
a considerable amount of internal carping, especially after a string of primary losses in May 1976. 116 Many within the Ford White House, the most
prominent of whom were presidential counselor Robert Hartmann and Vice
President Nelson Rockefeller, complained that Rumsfeld and Cheney came
between them and the president. According to John Osborne, prominent
cabinet members such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Treasury Secretary William Simon, and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger also thoroughly "detested the White House staff under Rumsfeld and his successor,
Richard Cheney."' " Their relationship with Rumsfeld and Cheney, Osborne
wrote, was surrounded by a "welter of suspicion and hatred [and] the word
hatred is justified." 118 As an aide to Cheney explained, "Cheney ran the one
'pipeline' for political communications in and out of the White House and
. .. many of the President's other advisers felt shut out of the political process." 11 9
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Rumsfeld relates a trivial but telling example of the way in which he
functioned as an internal lightning rod for Ford. A cabinet member came to
Rumsfeld to complain about being left off the invitation list for a state dinner. Rumsfeld told the disgruntled cabinet member he would take the question to the president, which he did. Ford instructed Rumsfeld to leave the
cabinet member off the list. Several days later the cabinet officer saw the
president and mentioned that he was not on the list. Ford feigned surprise
and told the cabinet officer he would see what he could do. That evening
Rumsfeld received a note from the president, "Let's put that fellow back
on." The result is the president gets to play the nice guy, while the chief of
staff is seen as the bad guy who schemed to bump the cabinet member off
the list. 120
John Sununu delivered and took his share of partisan hits, yet the most
vitriolic attacks aimed at Sununu came from inside his own party. Senate
Minority Whip Alan Simpson denounced Sununu as a "beadyeyed guy out
there figuring out how to use" the budget talks "for political advantage." 121
Robert Dole, the Senate minority leader, labeled Sununu "the chief of
chaff." 122 After Sununu dismissed Senator Trent Lott as "insignificant" to
the process, an incensed Lott told reporters that Sununu "is going to have to
crawl over here and BEG for [forgiveness] .... He just stuck the wrong
pig." 123 Newt Gingrich, meanwhile, was described as barely on speaking
terms with Sununu. 124 House Minority Leader Robert Michel was more measured in his public comments, but an aide to Michel acknowledged that "our
relationship with Sununu has been no bed of roses." 125 As the relationship
hit bottom at the end of 1990, the Washington Post reported that "angry Republicans want [Sununu's] head." 126 And by early 1991, Sununu's "lagging
relations" with key cabinet members close to Bush had become a prominent
item in the national press. 121
Given that hostility to chiefs of staff so often arises from within the president's own party and administration, it is little wonder that when chiefs of
staff fall from grace they are often hurled into a political abyss. Fulfilling the
role of internal lightning rod leaves a chief of staff with few allies and many
intense enemies within his party and the administration. In contrast to cabinet secretaries, who typically spend large amounts of time and energy nurturing support from key constituencies within their party, chiefs of staff are
aware that they have "a constituency of one." 128
Sherman Adams's precipitous fall from power was typical of the experience of many powerful chiefs of staff. When Adams got in trouble for accepting gifts from industrialist Bernard Goldfine, the opposition was the
first to jump on the issue, but it was pressure from Republican ranks that ultimately produced Adams's resignation. 129 As one administration member
confided, "Mr. Adams is a difficult man to sympathize with. " 130 Adams's
dismissal, Robert Keith Gray points out, came less from the charges them-
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selves than from "not building himself a cadre of support to lean on when
trouble came. " '31 What Gray does not say is that building such support is
difficult for a person cast in the role of buffer between the president and
those within the president's own administration and party. However much
Eisenhower might feel Adams was a valuable assistant, he also knew that no
important political constituencies would be offended by dumping Adams, in
marked contrast to the high costs among key political constituencies that
would be incurred by jettisoning a Nixon or even a Benson. 132
Similarly, pressure for Don Regan's removal in the wake of the Iran-contra
revelations came more from Republicans than from Democrats. ' 33 Republican Senator Larry Pressler demanded Regan's immediate resignation, saying
Regan " epitomizes the arrogance of power. " 13• Republicans Richard Lugar
and Robert Michel echoed Pressler's call for Regan's resignation. 135 Regan
had no constituency to which he could turn, having made many enemies and
few friends during his two years as chief of staff. But Regan faced still another problem, one that plagues all chiefs of staff to a greater or lesser degree: an inflated reputation for power.

THE DOUBLE BIND OF EXAGGERATED POWER

In his memoirs, Don Regan complains bitterly that "somehow the press had
got the idea that Poindexter, and MacFarlane before him, had reported to
me and I was therefore responsible for their performance. I explained that
neither man had ever worked for me, but there was no dispelling this mistaken idea." Why was there no dispelling this "mistaken idea?" Why were
reporters not prepared to accept Regan's version that he had no knowledge
of the Iran-contra connection? Regan's answer: "They had heard that I was
an autocrat who knew ... when every sparrow fell on the White House
lawn." Although true, this begs the question of where reporters and other
political elites got this mistaken impression. Regan's effort to pin the blame
for his image as "an ex officio prime minister" on "a press campaign" ignores his own role in fostering this myth. 136
No public official, of course, can be held entirely responsible for his public image. Some get tagged with an undeserved image that, try as they might,
they cannot shake. One thinks, for instance, of Gerald Ford's undeserved
reputation as a klutz. The mass media, no doubt, by favoring instant analysis over cautious reflection, are not always good at separating fact from fiction. But more than media malice or miscue is responsible for the inflated
estimates of Don Regan's power. Regan's reputation for power was exaggerated for many of the same reasons that the reputations of Sherman Adams, ' 37 H. R. Haldeman, and John Sununu' 38 were inflated in contemporary
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press accounts: many political actors, including the chief of staff and the
president, have an interest in exaggerating that power.
In order to be effective, senior staffers must persuade other officials that
they have the authority to speak for the president. To function successfully
as a "headknocker," for instance, a staffer must have sufficient prestige
within the White House that the disputants will accept the staffer's decision
rather than appeal to the president. 139 Because the effectiveness of a senior
staffer depends on others within the administration respecting that staffer's
power, an incentive exists for staffers to exaggerate (or to permit others to
exaggerate) their reputation for power. The dilemma for the senior staff person is that an inflated reputation for power also means, as Don Regan found
out, being held accountable for things outside one's control.
Presidents, too, have an incentive to acquiesce in having their chiefs of
staff portrayed as more powerful and autonomous than in fact they are. Not
only does it mean fewer appeals to the president but, as political scientist
Bruce Buchanan points out, it means that the president can "use his own
power without paying the price for doing so." 140 If others believe the chief of
staff exercises considerable discretion, they will be more inclined to blame
the staffer and absolve the president for policies they disagree with or that
have gone awry. If a congressman gets turned away at the president's door, it
is in the president's interest that the congressmen "go away thinking that
that S.O.B. at the door kept him out instead of that that S.O.B. on the other
side of the door didn't want to see him." 1• 1
Other public officials within and outside the administration have a strong
incentive to exaggerate a chief of staff's power because it allows them to criticize presidential policy without directly criticizing the president. Exaggerating the power of senior staff enables disgruntled elites to express displeasure
with the current direction of the administration without personally affronting the president. Thus critics of administration policy, the president, and
the chief of staff himself all play a role in creating the overestimation of a
chief of staff's power.
Regan's claim that "because I was not in fact a prime minister, but a servant
of the Presidency, I did not think it mattered what the press wrote and said
about me" is not just naive but disingenuous. 1• 2 Regan found that a reputation
for near-total mastery of the White House improved his own strategic position
as well as suited President Reagan's desire to remain aloof from day-to-day
management squabbles and policy conflicts. Opponents undoubtedly did exaggerate Regan's power for their own purposes, but Regan made no effort to
rectify the inflated estimation of his position. On the contrary, many of his
actions seemed calculated to foster such an inflated reputation.
After Bitburg, Regan clearly indicated to other elites that such fiascoes
would not recur because in the future he, Don Regan, would assume control
over the president's schedule. Regan's aides told Bernard Weinraub of the New
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York Times that Regan had decided "to be more careful in watching the schedule, to be in full charge." According to Weinraub, "Mr. Regan plainly seeks to
send a signal across the Administration that he is in total control over Mr.
Reagan's schedule." 143 When Regan found out that President Reagan and King
Hussein were answering reporters' questions, Regan immediately summoned
Speakes to his office and demanded to know: "Why don't I know about this?
.. . Damn it, I'm in charge of scheduling around here, and anybody that's going to do anything like that has to get my approval. ... Don't you ever let this
happen again. " 144 On another occasion, when Regan's driver informed him
there had been a small fire at the White House, Regan exploded at one of his
aides: "Dammit! I'm the chief of staff! I've got to know when these things
happen! ... You guys have got to keep me posted on these things and I don't
want this ever to happen again." 145 Upon Poindexter's appointment as national
security assistant, Regan was quoted as telling Poindexter "that he didn't like
surprises, he wanted to be told what's going on." 146 Regan's insistence on being
seen as the person who knew everything that was going on in the White House
meant, as William Niskanen sagely foresaw, "there's no way for him to avoid
responsibility for every mistake." 147
Regan apparently made no effort to stop friendly White House aides from
talking to the press about his control over White House operations. One Regan
aide boasted, "Don has positioned himself to be an extremely powerful chief of
staff who's in charge of the whole show."' 48 Another aide agreed: "Don is
clearly in charge. He sees the staff as his staff. He's the one the President relies
on. " 149 "Everyone works for Regan," agreed a third aide, who praised Regan
because "he understands that all the power centers need to be subservient to
him." ,so Given the image propagated by his aides, it is little wonder that, as Regan complained at one point, "if someone gets a cold in this town, I get
blamed.'" 51 Little wonder, too, that after the Iran-contra revelations, the press
insisted that Regan "cannot escape responsibility for recent developments by
feigning noninvolvement." 152 Or that 65 percent of the American people believed Regan knew "that money from the Iranian arms sales was going to help
the contras. "m As a former White House aide explained, "Don Regan would
never have got in this trouble if he hadn't gone around telling everyone that he
ran everything and knew everything." 154 For chiefs of staff no less than for presidents, a reputation for knowing everything means being blamed even for those
things one knows little or nothing about.

IS A CHIEF OF STAFF NECESSARY?

Gerald Ford entered the presidential office determined not "to have a powerful chief of staff ... [and instead] be my own chief of staff.'' 155 Along with
many others in Washington, Ford felt that the lesson to be learned from Wa-
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tergate was that a hierarchical White House organized around a chief of
staff dangerously isolates the president from diverse ideas and information.
His experience as a legislator reinforced his preference for a "spokes of the
wheel" system in which he would be the wheel's hub. The president would
thus be assured of multiple sources of information and senior aides would
be guaranteed direct access to the president. 156
Within two months, however, the much ballyhooed "spokes of the wheel"
structure was being phased out. Ford quickly recognized the validity of what
his top aides had been telling him for several months: without some person
acting as a funnel, the president would be overloaded with unwanted information and unwelcome visitors. "Everyone," Ford later explained, "wanted
a portion of my time." Ford's answer was to bring Donald Rumsfeld into
the White House to serve as staff coordinator and gatekeeper. As Ford explained to the assembled staff shortly after Rumsfeld's appointment as assistant to the president, " The responsibility is on you to work through Don
... [and to] make sure that Don is cognizant of what is happening." By the
end of 1974, Dick Cheney (then Rumsfeld's deputy) recalls, "we were really,
without ever formally announcing it, back to a model that was very close to
the Haldeman model. " Disgruntled staff agreed that Rumsfeld was "another Bob Haldeman, only he smiles." 157
Much the same evolution of roles occurred, albeit more slowly, in the
Carter White House. Like Ford, Carter entered office committed to being
his own chief of staff. Ignoring the Ford administration's unsuccessful experiment with the "spokes of the wheel" concept, the people around Carter
fixated instead on the centralized structure of the Nixon White House they
deemed to be partially responsible for Watergate. 158 Fearing, as Press Secretary Jody Powell explained, that "an excessively powerful White House staff
in general and a chief of staff in particular, . . . would tend to choke off the
flow of information to the president, " 159 Carter opted for much the same organizational structure of direct access to the president that Ford had tried
and discarded. Jack Watson, who served briefly as Carter's chief of staff in
1980, explains that Carter "felt very strongly that he didn' t want to set up
any barriers or obstacles between the free and full expression of opinion to
him directly from Stu, Jack, Hamilton, Jody, Frank. And, he didn't want it
to be filtered. " 160 It took Carter two years to reach essentially the same conclusion that Ford had reached in two months: filtered information might be
bad but unfiltered information is worse.
Distress signals emerged among senior White House staffers almost from
the outset. In the fall of 1977, Hamilton Jordan asked for a written opinion
on the advisability of selecting a chief of staff. The answer he got back from
A. D. Frazier, a staff person from the president's reorganization project, was
that "designating someone as chief of staff or better, as staff coordinator,
would be most helpful to the President." Shortly thereafter, Eizenstat wrote
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to the president: "I continue to believe that our most serious structural problem is the lack of internal White House coordination .... No one has been
given the directive to sort out the various priorities of our work, to coordinate our work and make sure it is all going in the same direction, before it all
pours in to you." 161 Finally in July 1979, Carter relented to his advisers'
pleas and appointed Jordan as chief of staff.
Former members of the Carter administration today seem almost unanimous in concluding that not having a chief of staff was a mistake. "Without
question," Eizenstat admits, "one of the most serious errors that was made,
I would say near fatal error, was not having a chief of staff." The White
House, Eizenstat flatly declares, "cannot function properly without a strong
and effective chief of staff." Jack Watson agrees that Carter "should have
designated a chief of staff almost immediately." Even Jody Powell now concedes that "we should have had ... a chief of staff. [It] could have saved
time for everybody, including the president. " 162
Natural experiments are rare in politics, and rarer still in a field like the
presidency that is so open to personal idiosyncrasy and historical contingency. This makes the Carter and Ford experiences that much more noteworthy. For here are two presidents, of vastly different political backgrounds,
personalities, and operating styles who both, for different reasons, came
into office predisposed against the idea of a chief of staff. Ford resisted the
chief of staff concept because his extensive congressional experience had
taught him the value of exposing oneself to diverse sources, and Carter resisted because of his desire "to be on top of everything, to manage everything, to know everything." 163 That both men nevertheless ended up appointing a chief of staff forces one to ask whether the chief of staff is not a
functional necessity in today's presidency.
A number of presidential scholars have reached precisely this conclusion.
Even those like Richard Neustadt, who once vigorously opposed the idea of
a chief of staff, now concede that "in administrative terms [a chief of staff],
or something like it, has become a practical necessity." 164 Michael Medved
concurs that "a central figure on the staff-whether he is called White
House Secretary, Staff Coordinator, Assistant President, or Chief of
Staff-is necessary for the efficient functioning of the White House."
"Chiefs are necessary," echoes Samuel Popkin, "because a president's time
must be rationed, decisions must be paced, and access by the staff and cabinet need to be refereed." 165
The startling rapidity with which "lessons" of the presidency are learned,
unlearned, and relearned leads one to regard any "iron laws" or "functional
requisites" of the presidency with a healthy skepticism. Still it is striking
that a position that so many people have deplored continues to persist in the
modern presidency. Future presidents could with profit follow Reagan's
first-term model and opt not to concentrate power in the hands of a single
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chief of staff, 166 but Carter and Ford's experiences teach us that it would be
unwise for any future president to try, in the manner of Franklin Roosevelt
or John Kennedy, 167 to be his own chief of staff. 168
A president cannot be his own chief of staff for reasons that go beyond
the crushing administrative burdens of running the modern presidency.
Given the ever-increasing number of groups that look to the presidency for
solutions to problems, modern presidents cannot afford to become involved
in, let alone be held responsible for, all the problems that are dumped at the
White House door. The president, as the Brownlow report stated, does need
help. But that help cannot come only in the form of anonymous administrative aides, tirelessly toiling in the president's shadow. For in today's political
environment, presidents also need top aides who can share the glare of the
limelight, speak for the president, say "no" for the president, and take the
blame for the president. A president who tries to do all or much of this himself will become personally embroiled in too many political disputes and will
find himself increasingly unable to sustain political support inside Washington and in the country as a whole.

7
Limits of the Lightning Rod:
Eisenhower, Brownell, Southern
Whites, and Civil Rights

On October 23, 1957, exactly one month after President Eisenhower issued
an executive order sending federal troops into Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce the court-ordered integration of Central High School and only six
weeks after the president had signed the nation's first civil rights legislation
since Reconstruction, Attorney General Herbert Brownell announced his
resignation. Many in the South could hardly contain their glee. "From
Harper's Ferry to the Rio Grande," proclaimed the Richmond Times-Dispatch, "no tears are being shed for the retirement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.
as Attorney General. The frightful mess the South, and the country, are in is
probably as much his responsibility as that of any living man." The TimesDispatch went on to chronicle Brownell's offenses:
It was Brownell who journeyed to California in 1953 to confer with Earl
Warren before that worthy was named Chief Justice of the United
States. It was Brownell who pressed the government's case in the integration suits before Chief Justice Warren, and told the nine justices that
it was their "duty" to rule out segregation in the public schools. It was
Brownell who either drafted or sponsored the unspeakable "civil
rights" bill, as originally introduced in Congress, and who convinced
President Eisenhower that it was a mild and moderate piece of legislation. And finally, it was Brownell who had Eisenhower's ear throughout
the Little Rock affair, and who is generally credited with persuading the
President that Governor Faubus should be put in his place with bayonets.'

Editorial pages across the South echoed this sense of relief at Brownell's departure.2
Southern politicians also rejoiced at the news. Georgia's Governor Marvin
122
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Griffin felt "encouraged and delighted that Mr. Brownell has resigned. " 3 A
local pol could hardly contain his enthusiasm: "That's the greatest news I've
ever heard in a long time .... I don't care who replaces Brownell, nobody
could be worse, we are bound to get an improvement. ... I'm just delighted. " 4 The chair of the Alabama Democratic Executive Committee told
reporters he was "glad [Brownell's] out ... [because] Brownell has been the
moving factor in the integration movement of the present administration, as
well as having advised the use of federal troops in Little Rock." With
Brownell out of the way, there was now hope that "the President will look to
someone else who might show a little more consideration to the South." An
Alabama man who had been the Republican candidate for governor in 1954
declared that he was "delighted to hear [that Brownell] is out of government." While admitting that as "captain of the ship ... President Eisenhower must still bear his part of the blame," he nevertheless believed that
"Brownell has been the agitator, the pusher of the integration plan," and
must therefore "accept the blame for the president's decision to send troops
to Little Rock, the most tragic incident in American history. " 5 Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus was certain that Brownell had been "fired because
of the bad advice or misinformation he gave the President about Little
Rock." 6

ATTORNEY GENERAL BROWNELL AS LIGHTNING
ROD

It is tempting to interpret such reactions as evidence of another triumph for
Eisenhower's blame-avoidance leadership style. Certainly these reactions to
Brownell's resignation suggest that many southern whites held Attorney
General Brownell personally responsible for actions taken by the Eisenhower administration in the area of civil rights for blacks. Moreover, the enmity directed at Brownell was not due to Eisenhower's luck or some magical
"Teflon" but rather was part of a conscious effort on Eisenhower's part to
have Brownell out in front on divisive issues like civil rights.
From the outset, Eisenhower made it clear to Brownell that he expected
his attorney general to exercise decision-making power and to provide the
president with political cover. Among the first tasks Eisenhower delegated to
Brownell was to review and make recommendations on pardon applications.
Brownell diligently prepared a list of recommendations, and in one of his
first official meetings with the president "started to recite the facts of each
case." After about ten minutes Eisenhower cut his new attorney general off.
"What are you doing reciting these details to me? Give me your recommendations and I'll approve them." A chastened Brownell turned to leave, and
Eisenhower added, "But, remember, you and I initiated a policy of making
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these pardon actions open to the public. If anything proves to be misrepresented or incomplete about these cases, it's your responsibility. " 7
Eisenhower, according to Brownell, believed that the president "was most
effective as president if he maintained his tremendous popularity and support with the public and did not get beaten down by the day-to-day political
fights. " 8 Eisenhower's "preferred strategy," Brownell explains, was "delegating authority to his cabinet officers-when he deemed they could be
trusted with it-and having them serve as his political front men and lightning rods, and projecting an image of being above the political fray." "In
my own case," Brownell continues, "it meant I was given responsibility and
authority in a number of controversial areas such as civil rights, antitrust,
and internal security, all of which were likely to be divisive. " 9
In private meetings and correspondence with southern leaders, Eisenhower often conveyed both his detachment from the administration's actions
in the area of civil rights and his sympathy for their predicament. In July of
1953, for instance, with the White House considering how to respond to the
Supreme Court's invitation to file a brief in the pending school desegregation case of Brown v. The Board of Education, South Carolina's Governor
(and former secretary of state under Truman) James F. Byrnes met with
Eisenhower in hopes of persuading the president either to decline the Supreme Court's invitation or take the southern side in submitting arguments
to the Court. The president reassured his "great friend" that he felt "improvement in race relations is one of those things that will be healthy and
sound only if it starts locally." Prejudice, Eisenhower agreed, would not
"succumb to compulsion." 10
Several months later, Byrnes wrote Eisenhower to lobby again for upholding the "separate but equal" doctrine; overturning Plessy v. Ferguson,
Byrnes argued, would be inconsistent with "the position you have consistently taken, that the states should have the right to control matters that are
purely local." 11 In a prompt reply, Eisenhower not only reiterated his appreciation for the South's plight, but carefully distanced himself from the legal
proceedings: "In the study of the case," he explained,
it became clear to me that the questions asked of the Attorney General
by the Supreme Court demanded answers that could be determined
only by lawyers and historians. Consequently, I have been compelled to
turn over to the Attorney General and his associates full responsibility
in the matter. He and I agreed that his brief would reflect the conviction
of the Department of Justice as to the legal aspects of the case .... In
rendering an opinion as to these phases of the case, it is clear that the
Attorney General had to act according to his own conviction and understanding. 12
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"No matter what the legal conclusions might be," he assured Byrnes, "the
principle of local operation and authority would be emphasized to the maximum degree consistent with [the attorney general's] legal opinions. " 13
When questioned at press conferences about the administration's position
on civil rights questions, Eisenhower frequently referred the questioner to
the attorney general. Questioned on March 7, 1957, as to how he felt about
an amendment to the administration's civil rights bill that would provide for
jury trials in cases of contempt, for example, Eisenhower refused to comment because the question "is so legal in its character that you ought to go
to the Attorney General. . . . I don't know anything about ... [these] legal
quirks." 14 Asked again a few months later about southern objections to the
absence of a jury0 trial provision in the civil rights bill, the president responded in much the same fashion: "I am not enough of a lawyer to discuss
that thing one way or the other. . . . You will have to go to the Attorney
General. He knows more about it than I do." 15 By defining the jury-trial issue as a legal matter best handled by the attorney general, Eisenhower hoped
to deflect the anger felt by southern whites onto Brownell.
Perhaps the most conspicuous illustration of Eisenhower's studied aloofness from the wrangling over civil rights came in a press conference during
the summer of 1957, in which he was asked to comment on Senator Richard
Russell's criticism that the administration's civil rights bill was "a cunning
device" designed to enforce integration of public schools. Rather than repudiate Russell's charge, Eisenhower replied only that this was not his objective, which was only to "prevent anybody from illegally interfering with any
individual's right to vote." He added, however, that "naturally, I am not a
lawyer and I don't participate in drawing up the exact language of the proposals'!.__leaving the implication that perhaps this may have been the objective of others in his administration who drafted the bill. Expressing puzzlement that "highly respected men" could think this "a very extreme law,
leading to disorder," Eisenhower allowed that he was "always ready to listen
to anyone's presentation to me of his views on such a thing." Asked if that
meant he would be willing to rewrite the bill so that it dealt only with the
right to vote, Eisenhower declined to answer on the grounds that "I was
reading part of that bill this morning, and there were certain phrases I didn't
completely understand. So, before I made any more remarks on that, I
would want to talk to the Attorney General and see exactly what they do
mean." 16 This was a vintage Eisenhower performance, designed to distance
himself from controversial aspects of the bill by deferring to the expertise of
a trusted cabinet member. 17
That Eisenhower's intent was to distance himself from the divisive issue of
civil rights seems clear enough. How successful, though, was Eisenhower's
strategy of having Brownell absorb the blame for unpopular or controversial
policies? To answer that question requires us to ask at least three different
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questions. First, we need to ask whether Eisenhower actually did maintain
public support in spite of controversial administration policies in the area of
civil rights. Second, we need to know whether or to what extent the pursuit
of presidential popularity came at the expense of achieving Eisenhower's
policy objectives. Finally, we must inquire whether Brownell pursued civil
rights objectives the president shared, or whether delegating to Brownell entailed sacrificing presidential control over the civil rights agenda.

DID THE SOUTH LIKE IKE?

During Eisenhower's first term, the administration was associated with a
number of civil rights positions and actions that were violently opposed by
many southerners. Most important among these were the Justice Department's brief arguing that "separate but equal" was unconstitutional, the appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice (both of which were critical in producing the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education) , and the civil rights bill of 1956. Yet Gallup polls during Eisenhower's first term reveal consistently high public support for Eisenhower in
the South and only relatively minor discrepancies between Eisenhower's approval rating in the South and in the rest of the nation. 18 These approval
scores suggest that at least through his first four years Eisenhower did successfully avoid becoming personally associated with administration policies
in the minds of most southerners.
Eisenhower distanced himself from Brown by refusing publicly to endorse
the decision. 19 When, at a press conference two days after the decision was
handed down, a reporter remarked that the decision had been "brought out
under the Republican Administration," the president promptly, and somewhat testily, retorted that "the Supreme Court, as I understand it, is not under any administration." Asked whether he had any advice for the South
about how to react to the decision, Eisenhower quickly replied, "not in the
slightest" and then took the occasion to praise Governor James Byrnes: " I
thought that Governor Byrnes made a very fine statement when he said,
'Let's be calm, and let's be reasonable, and let's look this thing in the
face.' " 20 Eisenhower later insisted on having the words "Eisenhower administration" stricken from the section of the 1956 Republican platform endorsing the Supreme Court's desegregation decision 21 and publicly repudiated
Vice President Nixon's boast, made during the 1956 campaign, that the desegregation verdict had been issued by a "Republican Chief Justice. " 22
Eisenhower remained almost equally aloof from his administration's 1956
civil rights bill, which consequently never made it out of committee. He kept
the bill at arm's length by having the attorney general recommend the program to Congress rather than having it sent in a presidential message, leav-
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TABLE 7.1. Eisenhower's approval rating among southern whites and the rest
of the population, April 1957-December 1958.
Approval

April 25-30, 1957
June6-11
June 27-July 2
July 18-23
August 8-13
August 29September 4
September 19-24
October 10-15
November 7-12
January 2-7,
1958
January 24-29
April 16-21
December 3-8

South.
Whites

Rest of
Nation

63
60
49
59
52

64

Disapproval
Diff.

South.
Whites

Rest of
Nation

Diff.

65
67
66
65

-1
-5
-18
-7
-13

23
23
27
21
29

23
22
22
23
18

0
-1
-5
+2
-11

50
46
28
41

62
63
65
62

-12
-17
-37
-21

25
33
53
41

22
25
21
24

-3
-8
-32
-17

48
42
40
43

64

-16
-20
-19
-18

42
39
41
44

27
24
28
29

-15
-15
-13
-15

62
59
61

Sources: Gallup polls; data provided by Roper Center. The "rest of the nation" category
includes nonwhite southerners.

ing the two most controversial of the bill's recommendations (those parts
calling for protection of voting rights and protection of civil rights more
generally) off his legislative "must" list and refusing to endorse these provisions until late in his reelection effort.
The president's landslide reelection over Adlai Stevenson in 1956 confirmed what the polls had been saying. In 1956, Eisenhower held every
southern state he had carried in 1952 (Florida, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia), while adding victories in Kentucky, Louisiana, and West Virginia. Moreover, he increased his share of the vote in virtually every southern state. In Virginia, for example, where he had received 56 percent of the
vote in 1952 (becoming the first Republican since Herbert Hoover to carry
the state), he increased his share of the vote to 59 percent. In Alabama, to
take another instance, he improved from 35 percent in 1952 to 41 percent in
1956.
Not until the summer of 1957, as the administration's civil rights bill
made its way through Congress, was there a drop-off in southern support
for Eisenhower (see Table 7 .1). A Gallup survey conducted in late April
showed no difference in support for Eisenhower among southern whites and
citizens in the rest of the nation, and even as late as the first weeks of June,
the difference between the president's popularity among southern whites
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and his support in the rest of the country was still only marginal. But by the
end of June, southern support for Eisenhower had declined significantly, a
decline that would appear to be directly attributable to the House of Representatives having passed the administration's civil rights bill on June 18.
This gap between support for Eisenhower among southern whites and the
rest of the population persisted throughout the summer as the Senate debated and then passed its own, significantly weaker version of the bill on
August 7 and then approved the reconciled version of the bill on August 29.
Three surveys conducted in the two-month span between the House passage
of the bill on June 18 and final Senate approval of the Civil Rights Act on
August 29 show an average gap of almost 13 percent between approval of
Eisenhower among southern whites and the rest of the nation. 23 Another
poll taken immediately after final passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act
showed the persistence of the same 12-13 point gap between southern whites
and the rest of the nation.
The shift in southern attitudes toward Eisenhower during the summer of
1957 is evident, too, in the editorial pages of leading southern newspapers.
Previously inclined to blame Brownell for the administration's course on
civil rights, editors increasingly began to pin responsibility on the president.
The Richmond Times-Dispatch, for instance, ran an editorial on May 19,
1957, laying the blame on Attorney General Brownell for misleading a wellmeaning and honorable president. The commentary began by citing Eisenhower's remarks at a May 15 press conference that the proposed "civil rights
bill is a very moderate thing done in all decency" and that those with questions about the bill's denial of jury trials should ask the attorney general
who "knows more about it than I do." "Herein," the editors informed their
readers,
lies the tragedy of this whole presidential effort to ram the "civil rights"
bill through Congress. Mr. Eisenhower is no lawyer and he has been
told by Mr. Brownell that the civil rights bill is a mild piece of legislation .. . . If anybody could get Mr. Eisenhower to read the minority report of the Senate Subcommittee on Civil Rights ... he might see what
vast and far-reaching evil lies in this legislation.
A month later, the editors were still hopeful that "in time, Mr. Eisenhower
can be brought to see how utterly nonsensical it is for him to describe this
bill as 'moderate.' " 24
By mid summer, however, the paper's tone had shifted dramatically. The
editors ceased to hold out hope that Eisenhower would recognize that he had
been deceived and repudiate the bill and his attorney general. While still
complaining of a "Warren-Brownell coup," they no longer spared Eisenhower, whom they now accused of "surrender to the left." After the presi0
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dent issued a statement on August 2 declaring that the Senate's passage of a
jury-trial amendment had weakened "our whole judicial system," the
Times-Dispatch directly attacked the president for presenting an "absurd"
opinion that "only adherents to the Warren school of thought could hold."
The editors also criticized Eisenhower for "guilelessly" relying on the legal
advice of "that astute politician with both ears to the ground, Attorney General Brownell." A few days later the editors continued the trend of placing
responsibility on the president for following the advice rather than on the
advisers for giving it. As if it only had just dawned on them, they wrote,
"Not only has the President endorsed federal civil rights legislation of the
most extreme character, but he must have approved the action of Attorney
General Brownell in telling the Supreme Court prior to its anti-segregation
decision of 1954 that the court was in duty bound to render the decision, annihilating the rights of the states to operate their own public schools. " 25
A similar pattern of change is evident in the editorial pages of the Mobile
Register. Alienated by the Democratic party of Truman, Harriman, and
Stevenson, the Register, like the Times-Dispatch, had been a consistent supporter of Eisenhower and had endorsed his candidacy in 1952 and 1956. An
April 10 editorial provided the first indication of uneasiness with the discrepancy between Eisenhower's professions of support for states' rights and
the civil rights course being pursued by his administration. A week later, the
editors suggested that the reason for this inconsistency was that the president had been getting bad advice: he had been "sold a bad bill of goods" by
"the loud-mouthed anti-South busy beavers" and "political radicals." If
Eisenhower had "more advisers with a political philosophy that makes horse
sense," he would quickly "recognize the need for correcting the errors of his
administration's ways. " 26
The first hint of personal criticism of Eisenhower for his handling of the
civil rights issue came on June 8. Bemoaning the administration's sponsorship of the civil rights bill, the Register concluded that "the South ... has
deserved better from Mr. Eisenhower than he has given it." The following
day, the editors called attention to the contradiction between the president's
performance and his promises. Eisenhower's address to the annual conference of state governors at Williamsburg, Virginia, (delivered on June 26) advocating a return of power to the states was met with deep suspicion: "It
does not make sense to us for Mr. Eisenhower to talk up states' rights while
his administration batters down states' rights. " 21
Throughout July and August, as the bill made its way through Congress,
the Register continued to criticize in the severest terms the "wretched" civil
rights bill but largely refrained from criticizing Eisenhower directly. 28 Instead
the editors preferred to blast "anti-Southern radicals" in Congress, such as
Paul Douglas and Hubert Humphrey. But after the bill had passed both
houses of Congress, and with Eisenhower set to sign the bill into law, the edi-
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tors publicly expressed, for the first time, the extent of their disillusionment
with Eisenhower's leadership. In a September 6 editorial, they admitted that
the Register "once had great hope that Mr. Eisenhower could ... lead
America away from . . . federal intermeddling and racial anxiety" but now
conceded that they had been mistaken. Instead the Eisenhower administration had "carried the country deeper into the night of racial misfortune than
the Roosevelt and Truman administrations left it." "The disillusionment of
the people with the Republican administration of Mr. Eisenhower," they
concluded, "must be close to complete. " 29
Despite Eisenhower's efforts to have the Justice Department take the lead
on the civil rights bill, he ultimately was unable to avoid political fallout
from this controversial measure. In large part, this was because Eisenhower
had been faced with a choice of placing his prestige behind the civil rights
bill or watching the bill fail. He had largely avoided identifying himself with
the 1956 civil rights bill, and as a result the bill died in committee. In July of
1957, faced with the strong possibility that the Senate would attach a jurytrial amendment to the bill-which he believed would "nullify the purpose
of the legislation" 30-Eisenhower felt compelled to take an unequivocal public stand against the amendment. In a press conference at the end of July, he
emphatically stated his opposition to a trial-by-jury amendment and urged
the Senate to pass the bill "as it now stands. " 3 1 Eisenhower's more visible
public profile became necessary because the lightning rod strategy that he
had hitherto pursued was now playing into the hands of the bill's opponents.
Although southern support for Eisenhower slipped markedly during this
period, one must be careful not to overstate the extent of the decline. If, as
the Richmond Times-Dispatch reported on August 17, "the bloom was off
the I-like-Ike boom," 32 it was also true that a Gallup poll conducted at the
end of August showed that twice as many southern whites approved of the
president's performance as disapproved. Gallup polls showed that although
there had been a large decrease in the number of southern whites who approved of the president, there was not a comparably large increase among
those expressing disapproval. By far the greatest increase was in the number
of southerners who were uncertain about how to evaluate Eisenhower's performance. 33 This public indecision changed rapidly, however, with the dramatic events in Little Rock that followed closely on the heels of the president's signing of the 1957 Civil Rights Act.

"BY GOD I HATE HIS GUTS NOW"

Whatever distance Eisenhower had been able to maintain from civil rights
issues ended overnight with his decision to send federal troops into Little
Rock to uphold a federal court order to integrate Central High School.
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Eisenhower's confrontation with Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, who
had called out the Arkansas National Guard and ordered the troops to prevent black students from entering Central High, proved so costly in terms of
political support because it was no longer possible for Eisenhower to remain
in the background and allow others to take the heat. The press portrayed
events in Little Rock as a personal clash between President Eisenhower and
Governor Faubus. Typical was the front page of the Richmond Times-Dispatch the day after troops had been ordered into Little Rock, which placed
Faubus's picture in the upper left-hand corner and Eisenhower's in the upper
right. 34
After having made the decision to send troops in, Eisenhower made no effort to distance himself from the controversy. In the president's radio and
television address to the nation on September 24, explaining why he had sent
in troops, he left no doubt that it was his decision. No mention was made of
advice received from those within his administration or requests from local
officers in Arkansas. Similarly, at his first press conference after sending
troops into Little Rock, Eisenhower did not refer questioners to the attorney
general, nor did he redefine questions as purely legal ones that he was not
competent to answer. Press Secretary James Hagerty reiterated that "the
action taken in Little Rock was the President's responsibility and his
alone. " 35
This pose was necessary in part because for the president to seem disengaged from such a momentous decision would call into question his competence. It was also required because Governor Faubus was attempting to discredit the administration by portraying Brownell and the "palace guard" as
the cause of the problem.36 By not criticizing the president directly, Faubus
tried to avoid the impression that he was challenging presidential authority.
Faubus argued, in effect, that Brownell rather than he was the usurper. It
thus became essential for Eisenhower to make it clear to others that the conflict was between the president of the United States and a governor.
Thrust unprotected onto center stage, criticism rained down upon Eisenhower (Table 7.1). A Gallup poll conducted between September 19 and September 24, at the height of the showdown but before the decision to send in
troops, shows further deterioration in support for Eisenhower among southern whites. But it was the sending in of troops that caused Eisenhower's popularity among southerners to sink to unprecedented lows. A survey taken between October 10 and October 15, while federal troops were still in Little
Rock, found that almost twice as many southern whites disapproved (53
percent) of Eisenhower's performance in office as approved (28 percent)!
The president's approval rating among southern whites was close to forty
points below that which he received from the rest of the nation. Even after
the last of the federal troops had been withdrawn in November, Eisenhower's approval rating among southern whites still lagged about twenty
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points behind the support he received from the rest of the nation, a pattern
that endured for well over a year. An Arkansas woman summed up the feelings of a great number of southerners: "I voted for Ike twice, but by God I
hate his guts now. He's wrong, wrong, wrong. " 37
A flood of hostile letters to the editor revealed the depth of southern animosity toward the president. One letter expressed "shame" at having a president "so callous, so lacking in patriotism, and so lacking in judgment." Another believed Eisenhower had "shown himself to be incapable and
unworthy of public office," and another condemned him for his "super arrogance." Eisenhower was reviled for having shown "the spirit of a dictator." One reader suggested the formation of an "I don't like Ike club. " 38 Believing Eisenhower had "broken faith" with the South, many letters
demanded that we "get a new President."
The Mobile Register, which had expressed guarded disillusionment with
Eisenhower over his handling of the civil rights bill, now vilified Eisenhower
for his "horrifying" decision to send troops into Little Rock. The editors lamented: "Something has happened to the Eisenhower who was first elected
President in 1952. The old Eisenhower is gone from the White House. A different Eisenhower, an unfamiliar Eisenhower and a contradictory Eisenhower is there now." The Eisenhower of today was "unrecognizable as the
man who only last year pleaded earnestly for patience and understanding."
The Eisenhower of today, the editors complained, had joined with Brownell
to usher in dictatorship and drive out freedom. 39
The Register's assault on the president only intensified the following day.
It announced that "Dwight Eisenhower should be the last sample of career
military brass who will be seen in the White House as an elected President of
the United States." Eisenhower had proven that a military man could not be
trusted as president. "Behind the facade of Eisenhower's ingratiating manner stood a personality long accustomed to snapping military commands
that none dared disobey or ignore." Mindless of the inconsistency, the editors also maintained that Eisenhower's "military mind" had become "political putty recklessly influenced by men like the incompetent attorney general
Brownell. " 40
Previous criticisms of Brownell had accentuated the differences between
the opinions of the president and those of his attorney general, but the Register now referred to "the team of Eisenhower and Brownell." Before, the
nonpolitical Eisenhower had been contrasted to "the politicians" like
Brownell and Nixon, who were allegedly pandering to the black vote, but the
Register now spoke of the "high Republican politicians from Eisenhower
down. " 41 Little Rock had sullied Eisenhower's carefully cultivated image of
being above the political fray.
The confrontation in Little Rock over integration vividly reveals the limitations on a president's ability to use advisers to deflect criticism, a fact one
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might miss if one looked only at Eisenhower's overall national approval ratings, which throughout this period show little change (August 29-September
4: 59 percent; September 19-24: 59 percent; October 10-15: 57 percent; November 7-12: 58 percent; and January 2-7, 1958: 60 percent). It would be
easy but badly mistaken to interpret these national approval numbers as remarkable evidence of Eisenhower's invincible Teflon coating. Probing beneath the misleading national approval average shows that Eisenhower was
anything but Teflon coated in the case of Little Rock. Southern support for
Eisenhower dropped precipitously after the president sent federal troops
into Little Rock, and even after Brownell's resignation at the end of October,
southern support for Eisenhower remained substantially below pre-Little
Rock levels for well over a year.

POPULARITY AT WHAT PRICE?

Assessing presidential success or failure is, of course, far more complex than
determining whether a president's popularity rose or fell. Achievement of
policy objectives matters too. One can make a reasonable case that before
Little Rock, Eisenhower had significant success in deflecting responsibility
for the administration's civil rights agenda onto Attorney General Brownell.
After all, even after the Civil Rights Act had passed both houses of Congress
at the end of August 1957, twice as many southern whites approved of
Eisenhower's performance as disapproved. To what extent, though, did
Eisenhower's distancing of himself from crucial provisions of the 1957 civil
rights bill get in the way of achieving his administration's policy objectives?
The civil rights bill President Eisenhower signed into law on September 9,
1957, differed significantly from the original administration proposal. Gone
was section three, which would have empowered the attorney general to seek
injunctions against anyone interfering with civil rights broadly defined.
Amended to the bill was a jury-trial provision, which required that anyone
cited for contempt be given a jury trial if the sentence exceeded forty-five
days in jail or a $300 fine. Believing that no white jury would convict another white person for preventing a black person from voting, many black
leaders felt the bill had been so emasculated that they urged the president
not to sign it. 42 Indeed the president himself, after the Senate had passed an
earlier version of the jury-trial amendment that called for juries in all contempt cases, had blasted the amendment for making "largely ineffective the
basic purpose of the bill-that of protecting promptly and effectively every
American in his right to vote. " 43
The president's anger at the Senate for tacking on a jury-trial amendment
was genuine-he told the cabinet the next morning that the vote was "one of
the most serious political defeats of the past four years" 44-but the president
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himself was at least partly to blame for that serious defeat. On three separate occasions during the spring of 1957, he had asserted at news conferences that he didn't know enough to say whether a jury-trial amendment
"would be a crippling or disabling amendment"•s and had referred questions
about the subject to the attorney general. The president did not publicly
take a stand in opposition to the jury-trial amendment until July 31, just
two days before the Senate passed its amendment. Those opposed to the administration's civil rights policies were able to make Eisenhower's strategy of
distancing himself from controversial provisions of the civil rights bill serve
their own ends. By ceding Eisenhower his popularity, opponents of civil
rights legislation could achieve their own political ends.
Eisenhower's statement in his July 3 press conference that there were "certain phrases" in the civil rights bill he didn't "completely understand" was
particularly critical in giving southerners a means to attack the bill without
attacking Eisenhower. Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, who called the
bill the "most drastic and indefensible" legislation ever submitted to Congress, assured his Senate colleagues that President Eisenhower would not favor the civil rights bill in its present form "if he understood its provisions
and implications." 46 Virginia Senator Harry Byrd used the same opening
gambit to launch his attack upon the bill:
If there is any doubt about this being a bad bill, we can start with the
President of the United States as the first authority on the deception
which has been perpetrated on him, on the Congress, and on the public.
He has repeatedly said he looks on the bill primarily as covering only
so-called voting rights. But at a news conference several weeks ago, he
appeared to be getting a glimmer of the injustice to which he was being
made a party. He said he did not understand what he called the "legal
quirks" in the bill. Then at a later conference, he went further, and said
he had been reading the bill and did not understand all of its language.

Byrd then went on to analyze for his Senate colleagues twenty "quirks" that
he found in the bill. 47 Eisenhower's press conference remarks were successful
in deflecting criticism away from the president in large part because they enabled opponents of the civil rights bill to attack the administration's bill as
being inconsistent with the president's stated intentions.
Eisenhower's refusal to refute directly Senator Richard Russell's charge
that the bill was cunningly designed to hasten integration of southern
schools-Ike would say only that was not his intention-allowed the bill's
opponents to hammer away at those in the Justice Department for perverting the president's honorable intentions. Mississippi Senator John Stennis,
for instance, called the bill an evil concoction of some "crafty and designing
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lawyers," a sentiment echoed by the other senator from Mississippi, James
Eastland, who described the measure as "a slick, devious scheme. " 48
Section three of the civil rights bill was attacked not for the power it
would give to Eisenhower but for the power it would grant to Attorney General Brownell. Senator Ervin asserted that the bill would make the attorney
general "dictator of all the Southern states." It would "create a little Hitler
out of the Attorney General," declared South Carolina Senator Olin Johnston. Georgia Democrat Herman Talmadge told his Senate colleagues that
the provision would turn the attorney general into a "civil rights czar" superior to the Constitution. Echoing these statements, Harry Byrd warned that
the bill would make Brownell "a 20th century American Caesar. " 49
That Brownell rather than Eisenhower was attacked as an aspiring tyrant
may have helped Eisenhower maintain his personal popularity but it also
helped weaken the administration's civil rights bill. It is difficult, of course,
to determine whether these southern senators really believed Brownell was
the culprit or whether their motivation was purely tactical. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to observe that acquiescing in Eisenhower's
lightning rod strategy-by accentuating the divergence between the president
and the attorney general-helped further their aim of stripping the administration's civil rights bill of its most stringent provisions. 50
The charge that Eisenhower's performance, particularly at the July 3 news
conference, hurt the civil rights bill is not new. It was made by many contemporaries and has been repeated subsequently by several scholars. 51 What is
different is that rather than viewing this episode as an instance of Eisenhower's political ineptitude-the usual explanation-it can now be understood as the unintended result of an overall presidential strategy designed to
avoid blame and maintain political support. A lightning rod strategy is not a
presidential panacea, for considerable costs accompany its benefits. 52 Not
the least of these costs is that to the extent that presidential support is critical to realizing policy objectives, presidential distancing may come at the expense of achieving those objectives.

WHOSE VOICE?

The Little Rock episode reveals a further cost of using advisers as lightning
rods: it generates uncertainty as to whether one is hearing the president's
voice or the voice of the adviser. If, as Richard Neustadt argues, "the first
factor favoring compliance with a presidential order is assurance that the
President has spoken," 53 then a lightning rod strategy makes compliance
with a presidential directive less likely. It seems possible that Eisenhower's
reliance on Brownell as a lightning rod, by creating ambiguity in Governor
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Faubus's mind about Eisenhower's position, played a significant role in forcing the president to send federal troops into Little Rock .
Faubus and Eisenhower met on September 14 in Newport, Rhode Island,
to discuss the tense situation in Little Rock. After this meeting, Neustadt asserts, "there is no doubt that Faubus knew it was the President who wanted
something done." 54 If Faubus's own testimony is to be given credence, however, Neustadt's claim must be called into question. For, according to
Faubus, it was on precisely this point that the governor harbored doubts.
Faubus explained that he "felt that the only possibility of ironing it out
was through the innate good will and good nature of the President who, I always felt, was a good-intentioned man, who wanted to do the right thing."
From the moment the interview began, Faubus recalls, it was evident that
the president's advisers "simply hadn't informed him on anything." 55
Faubus proceeded to tell Eisenhower how far Arkansas had progressed in
desegregating public schools, universities, and even some private institutions. The president, Faubus recalled, was "impressed" by his presentation.
The governor then told Eisenhower that "the only hope of solving it right
now without the use of force is a delay, to give the tempers a chance to cool
off, to give emotions a chance to subside." Eisenhower seemed in agreement
with the governor on this. At this point, Faubus reports, the president called
in Brownell and asked him, "Can't you go down there and ask the court to
postpone the implementation of this order for a few days, ten days or three
weeks?" The attorney general, according to Faubus, responded, "No, that's
impossible. It isn't legally possible. " 56
The effect of this interview was to leave Faubus with the impression that it
was Brownell, and not the president, who wanted the court order enforced.
By having the attorney general play the "no-man," Eisenhower conveyed an
impression of sympathy for the governor's plight, consistent with the impression the president had communicated in conversation and correspondence with various other southern elites. 57 While effective as a means of
maintaining the support of southern whites, it was ill suited to getting Governor Faubus to comply with the president's wishes. By allowing Faubus to
believe that "the attitude of the federal government" did not express the
president's views but instead "was principally due to Brownell, " 58 Eisenhower had inadvertently given Faubus reason to hope that he could defy the
court order.
The Little Rock episode is thus best seen neither as an illustration of the
inherent limitations on presidential power nor as an example of the political
ineptitude of President Eisenhower. Rather, it reveals the weakness of a particular blame-avoidance style of presidential leadership. It was both the
strength and shortcoming of Eisenhower's style that it created ambiguity
about whether it was the president or the adviser speaking. In the case of
Little Rock, unfortunately, ambiguity over whose voice was being heard un-
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dermined Eisenhower's immediate objective, which was to prevent a public
showdown over integration between the president of the United States and a
governor of a southern state.

WHOSE POLICY?

Eisenhower's objectives in the case of Little Rock are clear enough. The
president wanted to uphold the federal law while at the same time avoid a
public showdown with Faubus that he felt would inflame race relations and
place the president in a politically vulnerable position. Faubus's refusal to
cooperate made it impossible for Eisenhower to avoid a public showdown if
he was also to uphold federal law, not to mention presidential power. Unlike
the case of Joseph McCarthy, whom Eisenhower helped to undercut without
ever having to go public, 59 Eisenhower was forced to meet Governor Faubus's
challenge by abandoning his low-profile, blame-avoidance posture in favor
of a highly visible, buck-stops-here mode of presidential leadership complete
with prime-time television announcements, presidential proclamations, and
unambiguous statements of presidential responsibility.
Determining President Eisenhower's objectives in the area of the civil
rights bill, on the other hand, is more difficult. 60 To what extent did the civil
rights bill reflect the goals of the president, and to what extent did delegating responsibility to the attorney general result in a bill that departed substantially from the president's own preferences? Put another way, was Eisenhower's public standoffishness toward certain elements in the civil rights bill
merely a strategic ploy disguising his private commitment to Brownell's public positions, or did his public behavior accurately reflect his ambiguous and
even confused private feelings? This question goes to the heart of the revisionist claim that there was a fundamental division between what Eisenhower said (and did) in public and what he said (and did) in private.
Was the president being disingenuous or was he genuinely confused about
the objectives of the civil rights bill when he informed reporters at his July 3
press conference that he didn't fully understand "certain phrases" of the
bill? A telephone conversation Eisenhower had with Brownell immediately
after the press conference indicates that the latter may be closer to the truth.
Eisenhower told Brownell (as reported by the president's personal secretary,
Ann Whitman) "that some two years ago when they had discussed civil
rights legislation, he had understood verbally from the Attorney General
that the right of the Attorney General to go into the South was to be concerned with interference of the right to vote." He wondered "whether this
bill was not somewhat more inclusive in that particular factor than had been
intended." Eisenhower added that he did not understand what "any civil
right" meant since "it varied from state to state and city to city. " 61 While re-
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affirming his commitment to ensuring the right to vote, the president insisted Uust as he had in the press conference) that it was not his intention to
go beyond the protection of voting rights.
The 1957 civil rights bill had its origins in a draft statement Brownell presented to the full cabinet on March 9, 1956, thus fulfilling a pledge in the
president's State of the Union Address that "there will soon be recommended to the Congress a program further to advance the efforts of the
Government, within the area of Federal responsibility" to ensure that "every
person [is] judged and measured by what he is, rather than by his color, race
or religion." The attorney general made four proposals: (1) creation of a bipartisan commission mentioned in the State of the Union message; (2)
amendment of existing statutes to further protect the right to vote; (3)
amendment of existing statutes to further protect other rights; and (4) creation of an assistant attorney general to head a new civil rights division.
In the subsequent discussion, Ezra Taft Benson, HEW Secretary Marion
Folsom, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, and Harold Stassen all questioned the wisdom of going beyond the establishment of a bipartisan commission. Progress, argued Humphrey, "must be evolutionary ... [and] must
accent moderation." Benson echoed that we must "be on the side of patience," and Folsom hoped the president would "find occasion to speak
clearly on [the] need for calmness and moderation." The "great danger,"
Stassen agreed, was in "moving too fast. " Brownell's counterargument was
that these proposals-by allowing the Department of Justice to employ civil
rather than criminal remedies-would give the department more flexibility
and enable them to avoid having to resort to more drastic measures such as
sending in troops. Without them, he maintained, "we have no basis for acting in these incidents except to throw people in jail. These would allow us to
take moderate action." This debate shows that both Brownell and his opponents on this issue were keenly attuned to the fact that to sway the president
it was necessary to show how one's suggestions served the cause of moderation. 62
The March 9 meeting shows Eisenhower in essential agreement with
Brownell's objectives. The president thought the four-point program was
"O.K." as long as the attorney general included in the presentation a statement "that what is needed is calmness and sanity." Eisenhower believed the
proposals-especially the emphasis on civil rather than criminal recoursewere, as Brownell claimed, "ameliorative," "moderate," and "mild" and
dissented from the critics' view that they were "moving too rapidly." The attorney general, Eisenhower concluded, "should put forward what he has got
here, but with a statement that many Americans understandably are separated by deep emotions on this subject," a message that Eisenhower tirelessly preached in all of his public statements on the subject. 63 Although Ike
closed by instructing Brownell to bring the revised statement back for a final
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review before submitting it to Congress, he gave no indication that he would
balk at any of these proposals. 64
A revised message, presented to the cabinet on March 23, began, as Eisenhower had requested, by recognizing the "deep emotions" that divided the
country on this issue and called for "restraint, calm judgment and understanding." This time, however, Brownell's proposal met with a decidedly
more chilly reception from the president. The session opened with Eisenhower telling Brownell that he was having a "terrible time getting through
your brief." As in the previous meeting, Brownell insisted that "going under
civil law rather than criminal would have a calming effect." But Eisenhower
now expressed doubts that section three would have the ameliorative effect
predicted by Brownell. The attorney general tried to reassure the president
that the Justice Department "wouldn't use the power to the extreme" and
argued that it would have "good preventive effect." Perhaps sensing the
president's concern, Brownell said he was "willing and eager to accept lay
judgement on this," admitting that "as lawyers we may take too technical a
view." What was needed, Eisenhower reminded Brownell, was "good sense
and moderation-rather than get[ting] more laws on [the] books only to
have them defied. " 65
The danger of legislating social mores, and the consequent need for a
more gradual approach, was echoed by Dulles, Benson, Folsom, and
Wilson. Folsom argued that the controversial sections should be left to the
bipartisan commission, a proposal that appealed to Eisenhower's instinct
for remaining aloof from controversy. 66 Realizing that he was losing the battle over the definition of what constituted a moderate program, Brownell
now retreated from his earlier tack and instead insisted that leaving the voting rights and wider civil rights provisions for a commission to study "would
be moderation but no progress."
Throughout the cabinet discussion, Eisenhower exhibited a bewildering
mix of conflicting sentiments. He wanted "to put something that [we] can
show as an advance" but also wanted "to make sure that we don't go further
than moderate intelligent people." Although the president still believed that
the voting rights section was "moderate," he could not deny Folsom's point
that the South "won't see it that way" and acknowledged that "any broadening of authority is going to be resented." While complaining that "Southern Democrats have gone so far that anything ameliorating we propose and
regard as an advance gets attacked," Eisenhower simultaneously criticized
civil rights advocates who didn't understand "how deep this emotion is in
the South" and would, by pressing too hard for advances, provoke a backlash that would set back race relations. The president finally confessed that
he was "at sea on this." With the cabinet at an impasse, the president asked
Brownell to come and see him later. 6'
That afternoon Brownell met with the president and gave him a revised
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statement of the civil rights program. Although Eisenhower repeated his
concern that "the program would be regarded in the southern states as an
extension of Federal power," he agreed to let Brownell "go ahead with it if
he wished." Eisenhower thus disregarded the advice of Sherman Adams and
Gerald Morgan that "the statement should not go up unless and until the
President was more convinced in his own mind that it was the right thing to
do." 68 Brownell has explained that Eisenhower allowed him to send up the
controversial parts of the program (as departmental rather than administration proposals) because he "knew how deeply I felt about the importance of
them. " 69 The president's decision to defer to Brownell, despite not being
fully persuaded that the program was "the right thing to do," is testimony to
the president's strong predisposition to allow (in the absence of strong, contrary presidential preferences) a trusted cabinet member like Brownell to
pursue what that cabinet member believed to be good public policy. 70
In view of Eisenhower's grave reservations about the wisdom of the Justice Department plan-particularly section three, which dealt with federal
protection of undefined "civil rights'~one should be wary of glib talk of
lightning rods. Brownell was not a passive agent announcing and administering Eisenhower's policy, as the lightning rod metaphor might suggest, but
instead was himself actively involved in the formulation of that policy. If
Brownell took most of the heat for section three it was only proper because
it was he, and not the president, who pressed for it. Delegation was thus not
without its hazards for Eisenhower, because it pulled him into controversies
that he might otherwise have avoided.
One must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the differences between
Eisenhower and his attorney general. The evidence does not support the
claim made by J. W. Anderson, in Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress
(1963), that there was a "profound difference [on the civil rights bill] . ..
between the President and his Justice Department," nor that Brownell had
"overstepped the line that divided initiative from insubordination" by sending up the voting rights provision and section three over White House objections." Some White House staff members might grumble about the "Department of Just Us," but Eisenhower himself did not. 72 Brownell did not,
as Anderson argues, slyly defy Eisenhower's wishes; rather, in the case of
section three Eisenhower deferred to the judgment of a cabinet member he
admired and trusted immensely, and in the case of the voting rights provision Eisenhower and Brownell were in close accord. 73
Although Eisenhower was at first reluctant to have himself publicly identified with the voting rights provision (and hence unwilling to put it on his
legislative "must" list in 1956), Eisenhower's private comments reveal that
he fully supported this provision-in contrast not only to section three but
also to the Brown decision about which he harbored severe misgivings. 1• As
he explained in a press conference the following year, "If in every locality ev-
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ery person ... is permitted to vote he has got a means of ... getting what
he wants in democratic government. ms He echoed these sentiments to Republican legislative leaders, telling them that section three had only "beclouded the issue," for if blacks can get the right to vote they can protect
themselves, and "the Republican party can stand on that. "'6
The president's strong commitment to the voting rights provision and his
uncertainty over section three can be seen from his sharply contrasting reactions to setbacks to the respective provisions. When Congress eliminated section three from the bill, Eisenhower expressed no regret, publicly or privately.77 Passage of the jury-trial amendment to the voting rights section,
however, put the president in a foul mood. He opened the cabinet meeting
the day after the Senate action by telling the assembled members that there
was "not much forgiveness in my soul. We've taken political defeats in the
past four years, but this one is the worst" because it affected "a basic principle of the United States. "'8 This private expression of disgust was followed
by a public statement excoriating the jury-trial amendment for tending to
"weaken our whole Judicial system" and making "largely ineffective the basic purpose of the bill-that of protecting promptly and effectively every
American in his right to vote. " 19
Until late July, Eisenhower had carefully maintained his distance from the
heated controversy over the jury-trial amendment. In public he repeatedly
said that such a question was too complicated and legalistic for a nonlawyer
like him. Go ask Brownell instead, he would say. In private, however, he expressed unqualified support for Brownell's position. It was "wrong," Eisenhower told Press Secretary James Hagerty in a prepress conference briefing
in mid-April, "to put [voting rights violations] in the hands of a jury. " 80
Eisenhower's handling of the jury-trial amendment thus reveals, as Greenstein's "hidden-hand" thesis predicts, a substantial discrepancy between the
public and private Eisenhower. Here Eisenhower's ambiguous public stance
does seem to have been part of a conscious (albeit, as we have seen above,
flawed) strategy to deflect responsibility for a controversial position that he
fully endorsed onto his attorney general.
But to see Eisenhower's behavior on the civil rights bill as fully vindicating Greenstein's hidden-hand thesis would be inaccurate. Although the hidden-hand thesis makes sense of Eisenhower's actions in the case of the jurytrial amendment, the concept does not do justice to Eisenhower's
involvement with section three of the bill. Here Eisenhower's public uncertainty mirrored his own private doubts and even confusion. Although his
own political instincts and his other political advisers clearly warned the
president of the political dangers of Brownell's more controversial proposals, Eisenhower reluctantly decided to defer to Brownell's judgment and
preferences. In part, this decision must be seen as evidence of Eisenhower's
own conflicting emotions on the subject of race, torn as he was between feel-
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ing that lasting progress on race relations required gradual measures that
moderate southern whites could accept and his equally strong feeling of the
injustice of denying blacks basic civil rights. But in part, too, the decision reveals Eisenhower's preference for deferring to trusted cabinet members
whenever possible. The evidence, in this case at least, points not to Machiavellian guile but to an administrator who genuinely believed in giving subordinates the authority to make their own judgments and mistakes.
Both the "hidden hand" Ike of the jury-trial amendment and the deferential Ike of section three are an integral part of the Eisenhower blame-avoidance leadership style. Indeed it was Eisenhower's delegation and deference
to trusted aides that made the periodic dissembling of his hidden hand possible. Because in so many cases he genuinely did defer to his aides' judgment
it then became possible in other cases for the president to avoid responsibility for views or policies he fully endorsed. To try the hidden hand without
the deference would soon expose any president to deafening, even disabling,
cries of deception, distortion, even lying.

LIMITS OF THE LIGHTNING ROD

Presidents who pursue a lightning rod strategy must be prepared for the
strategy's limits. Those limits are probably most evident in the Little Rock
confrontation. Eisenhower's decision to send federal troops into Little Rock
necessitated putting the president onto the front lines unflanked and unprotected. Such a decision had to be announced and defended publicly by the
president, and the president had to take full responsibility for it privately as
well. 81 Neither Brownell nor anyone else could protect Eisenhower at this
point from bearing the brunt of the wrath of southern whites. Moreover,
and more interesting, Eisenhower's reliance on Brownell as a lightning rod
before the showdown may have contributed to the need for a public confrontation by giving Faubus the mistaken impression that it was Brownell
rather than Eisenhower who wanted Faubus to comply with the federal court
order.
In the struggle over civil rights legislation, Eisenhower was faced with a
trade-off between deflecting blame onto Brownell and getting civil rights
legislation through Congress. 82 To defeat the administration's civil rights bill,
congressional opponents of the bill were more than willing to vilify the attorney general and grant that the president did not know what was in the
bill. In the case of the proposed jury-trial amendment, Eisenhower was confronted with the choice of publicly identifying himself with a controversial
provision of the bill or seeing the bill compromised by an amendment that
he privately opposed. Only in late July, far too late to affect congressional
deliberations, did the president publicly and unambiguously oppose the

LIMITS OF THE LIGHTNING ROD

143

jury-trial provision. To the extent that Eisenhower regarded such a compromise as making (in his words) "largely ineffective the basic purpose of the
bill," his strategy of distancing himself from this provision seems to have
poorly served his policy objectives.
Finally, the civil rights case study reveals limitations to the lightning rod
metaphor as such. More specifically, the metaphor can be misleading if one
assumes that a cabinet member who absorbs criticism is only announcing
and executing policy set by the president. In order to make Brownell a plausible lightning rod, Eisenhower delegated not only responsibility but authority. Brownell was not simply taking the heat for the president's policy; he
was instrumental in making that policy.
As Brownell's recently published memoirs make clear, it was the attorney
general and not the president who took the initiative in pressing for civil
rights legislation. "The initiatives," Brownell freely concedes, "rested on my
shoulders." Brownell admits that he "could have responded to the political
pressures on the administration to propose new civil rights legislation with a
weak bill that offered a lot of pious words about racial equality and simply
brought forward again the orthodox solutions previously proposed. " 83 Implicit here is the admission that Eisenhower would have had no difficulty
supporting Brownell if the attorney general had proposed a watered down
civil rights bill.
While Brownell received the greatest burden of public criticism for section
three, the attorney general was also the person responsible for the provision.84 Left to his own instincts for shunning controversy in this contentious
area, Eisenhower would certainly have preferred to avoid such a contentious
proposal, instead limiting the legislation to voting rights and proceeding in
the area of more broadly defined civil rights only where the federal government had clear authority to act unilaterally-as Eisenhower did in desegregating the armed forces-or where he could effect change indirectly and
gradually-as he did in appointing moderate federal judges. 85 Delegating decision-making power to Brownell, although intended to deflect criticism
away from the president, thus helped contribute to the very political firestorm that Eisenhower had hoped to avoid.
Having accented the limits of Eisenhower's lightning rod strategy, it is also
worth remembering what Eisenhower did achieve. After all, Eisenhower did
pass the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction, something that Franklin
Roosevelt and Harry Truman had failed to do. Though Eisenhower was genuinely upset about the inclusion of the jury-trial amendment, the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 did take a credible first step in the direction of protecting
voting rights for blacks. The opposition to the final bill among both black
civil rights leaders and southern segregationists, moreover, suggests that the
law struck the sort of balance between progress and moderation that Eisenhower originally sought. At the same time, before Little Rock Eisenhower
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had been able to contain much of the political fallout in the South. Though
hardly Teflon coated, Eisenhower did manage to deflect a substantial
amount of blame for the administration's civil rights positions onto
Brownell.
If Eisenhower would have done better, in view of his own misgivings, to
instruct Brownell unequivocally in the spring of 1956 to omit section three
from the bill, it is the type of mistake that inevitably accompanies an administrative style that gives cabinet members genuine autonomy and discretion.
Richard Neustadt might with reason chide Eisenhower for forgetting that
"no on else sits where he sits, or sees quite as he sees, " 86 yet it is equally true
that the president cannot afford to sit where everybody else sits. A president
who consistently tries to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of
even his most trusted aides is a president who will be continually overextended and overexposed. The president who is serious about blame avoidance must be prepared to cede not only responsibility but power. If that is a
limit of the lightning rod strategy, it is also its strength.

8
Blame Avoidance and
Political Accountability:
What Have We Learned?

The reader searching for the Rosetta stone that will turn presidential lore
into presidential laws will be sorely disappointed. We have unearthed no precise formulas for identifying let alone predicting the existence of lightning
rods. Nor have we discovered invariable laws that specify how presidents can
deflect blame onto subordinates. Politics, unfortunately, is not like physics.
The cases are too few, the variables too numerous, and our ability to hold
variables constant too limited.'
Generalizations about lightning rods must be constructed upon an inhospitable terrain in which exceptions leap readily to mind and contingency and
idiosyncrasy abound. For some people this will suggest that time spent on
such ground is wasted. Let us rather devote our limited time and resources,
some will suggest, to fields of inquiry better able to support cumulative
bodies of theory. But this allows methodological techniques to dictate the
questions we allow ourselves to ask. That we cannot bring a mathematical or
statistical precision to the lightning rod relationship does not make the relationship any less important. If a unified theory of lightning rods is too much
to expect, political scientists can still hope to contribute to our understanding of lightning rods by questioning the premises that political actors take
for granted. 2 Political science's contribution comes in showing how proverbial wisdom ("look before you leap") is contradictory ("he who hesitates is
lost") and thus empty or misleading. By identifying conditions under which
such claims are valid, political science can help reconcile the contradictory
certainties so characteristic of conventional wisdom. If this is a relatively
unheroic conception of political science, it is also a more relevant conception
for the enduring questions relating to political leadership in general and
blame avoidance in particular.
145
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THE LIGHTNING ROD CONCEPT REEXAMINED

What then have we learned about lightning rods and blame avoidance in the
modern presidency? The patient reader, having made her way through the
cases examined in this book, may have learned, at a minimum, to approach
the lightning rod concept with caution. Such caution is mandatory, first, because it is difficult empirically to distinguish presidential lightning rods
from liabilities and, second, because the metaphor often obscures critical aspects of the relationship between president, adviser, and audience. Such
caution, unfortunately, is all too often missing in journalistic accounts,
which use the term casually and on the basis of scant evidence.
More reason still to be skeptical of lightning rod claims is that they are
more often than not political claims. Lightning rod status is often ascribed
to justify or advance personal and policy agendas rather than to describe accurately an empirical relationship. 3 When James Watt and his allies, for instance, described Watt as a lightning rod, they were not trying to describe reality so much as to shape it. In claiming the mantle of lightning rod, Watt
could justify his actions (to himself and to others) as being in the best interests of the president and thus neutralize those critics calling for his resignation.
Watt is not alone in using the lightning rod designation to justify his
actions. In 1986, for instance, Reagan's communications director, Pat Buchanan, countered Democratic charges that his inflammatory rhetoric• had
been largely responsible for the defeat of a bill to aid the Nicaraguan contras
by insisting: "Pat Buchanan is a lightning rod ... . The Democrats attacked
Pat Buchanan because they are not comfortable attacking the President."'
Obscured by Buchanan's lightning rod self-designation is the question of
whether his rhetoric made it easier for Democrats to oppose the president's
policy. In the wake of the 1988 presidential campaign, to take another example, those around Dan Quayle peddled a version of the campaign that had
Quayle serving a valuable function as a lightning rod for President George
Bush. 6 A number of Democrats, too, bought into this version of events because it allowed them to attribute Michael Dukakis's defeat to strategic failures rather than to failures of party policy or ideology. That the evidence for
such claims was weak did not matter to the principals involved for whom
this was a political rather than a scientific question.
Talk of "lightning rods" is often little more than administration officials
attempting to put the best gloss on a bad situation. This is arguably the case,
for instance, with the previously mentioned comment (see Chapter 3) by an
unnamed presidential aide who told reporter Steve Weisman that President
Reagan "feels that he ought not to be answering questions about the B-1
bomber or anything else that specific. . .. His job is to announce broad policy. Let Cap Weinberger take the heat on the B-1. " ' Weisman does not point
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out that the unnamed aide's comment came only a few days after Reagan announced to reporters a plan to modernize U.S. forces by building one hundred B-1 bombers. After reading a prepared statement, Reagan announced
he would answer a few questions and then turn the podium over to Weinberger "for all the technical matters." But Reagan, as Lou Cannon observes,
"couldn't deal with even the nontechnical matters." After stumbling
through three or four questions, in what Cannon characterized as a "sorry
performance," Reagan turned the questions over to Weinberger. 8
As these examples suggest, the rhetoric of lightning rods is often little
more than a way of covering up failure, from oneself as well as from others.
Rather than opening up inquiry, the lightning rod label can become a way of
closing it off, of wrapping oneself or others in a righteous mantle of selfjustification while ignoring the damaging consequences of provocative or
inept behavior. That political actors try to portray themselves in the most
positive light is hardly remarkable. More surprising is that journalists so frequently and uncritically repeat these claims. Conventional wisdom is made,
unmade, and remade with such startling rapidity because its empirical underpinnings are so slight and its conceptual foundations so sloppy.
The lightning rod concept can be particularly unhelpful or misleading because of what it allows us to overlook or assume. By wrapping himself in the
lightning rod mantle, Pat Buchanan obscures the question of whether in the
absence of his charged rhetoric congressional Democrats might have supported the president's policy. One needs to ask not just Buchanan's question-are the Democrats attacking Buchanan because they don't want to attack the president directly-but also the question of effectiveness. Would the
Reagan administration have been more successful in achieving its ends in
this domain by taking a less confrontational approach? It would be dangerous indeed if presidents were to assume that a subordinate serving as a lightning rod was sufficient to justify the adviser's behavior, for it avoids the
tough counterfactual question of whether the president's policy objectives
would be better served by public confrontation or behind-the-scenes conciliation.
In the case of Watt, Reagan failed to ask himself this question early
enough. Even if Reagan had concluded that Watt's behavior was not damaging to him personally (a conclusion, I believe, that was mistaken, at least by
1982), he still needed to ask whether Watt's confrontational style was getting
in the way of achieving his objectives in environmental and land-use policy.
The evidence strongly suggests that Watt undermined these objectives by
discrediting Republican positions and bolstering the cohesiveness of the opposition. Moreover, the subsequent tenure of Donald Hodell suggests that
the Reagan administration was able to get much more of what it wanted at
less cost through Hodell's low-key approach than through Watt's high-voltage politics. 9
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To say that presidents need to think seriously about staying out of trouble
and avoiding blame is not, therefore, to recommend that a president rush
out to fill his ranks with confrontational cranks and vocal extremists. A concern for blame avoidance means, if anything, more rather than less compromise. Nor is it to suggest that high-visibility advisers are necessarily preferable to low-profile advisers. Quietly working behind the scenes to bring the
rival sides together may defuse conflict and keep the president out of trouble. To say that a president should think about blame avoidance is to say
that presidents need always to think about what will happen when (not if)
things go badly. Among the things that will help when things go wrong is
having subordinates of sufficient stature and independent authority that
they can plausibly serve as targets of criticism.
To think about lightning rods is inevitably to think counterfactually. Because we can never rerun the reel of history to definitively determine what
would have happened if a particular actor had behaved in one way rather
than another, lightning rod claims will always be politically contested. That
the lightning rod concept may be used for political purposes, however, does
not mean that the concept is empty or that we should abandon it. It is possible to marshal empirical evidence to falsify such claims through systematic
data collection and carefully chosen comparisons. Moreover, under whatever label the concept goes, the lightning rod idea raises questions that are
central to any political science worthy of that name: How is blame deflected
and attributed? How does presidential leadership style affect popular support? And how does what elites say affect what the wider public thinks?

THE BLAME GAME: IS IT DIFFERENT FOR ELITES
AND THE MASSES?
What is the relationship between a president's support among elites and a
president's approval among the mass public? How do elite criticisms of a
president or his advisers influence public opinion? Are the dynamics of the
lightning rod different for elites and for the mass public? We do not know,
as Bert Rockman points out with understatement, "all that we need to about
the causal dynamics between presidential esteem in various elite sectors and
that in the general public." 10 Presidential scholars do have a fairly good
sense of the ways in which public prestige affects presidential influence at
the elite level, 11 but they understand much less well how presidential effectiveness and elite judgments about that effectiveness affect a president's
popularity.
One school of thought suggests that a president's standing in the Washington political community bears at best only a tenuous relationship with his
popularity in the country as a whole. Because politics for most people is "a
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sideshow in the great circus of life," 12 the determinant of presidential approval at the mass level is not what elites say or how they say it, most of
which the public doesn't follow, so much as the outcomes, particularly economic ones, that directly affect the day-to-day life of citizens. "Behind [the
public's] judgments of [presidential] performance," Richard Neustadt argues, "lie the consequences in their lives ... paychecks, grocery bills, children's schooling, sons at war." 13 "Inside the beltway" stories about a president's administration, in this view, are too distant from people's lives to
shape their evaluation of a president.
Support for this theory comes from the striking success some economic
models have had in predicting the presidential vote. Using only a few basic
economic variables, Yale economist Roy Fair predicted Bush's 1988 victory
over Dukakis within three-tenths of a percent, without taking into account
any information about Boston Harbor, Willie Horton, or even Michael Dukakis. In 1992, however, Fair's model (indeed all economic models) fared
poorly: Fair predicted that Bush would receive 55. 7 percent of the two-party
popular vote when in fact he got less than 47 percent. 14 In the 1992 election
there was clearly significant slippage between objective economic reality and
the perception of that reality. Enter elite evaluations.
A second hypothesis is that the mass public's judgments about presidential performance are significantly cued by elite judgments. David Gergen articulates this view: "Once the Washington crowd takes your measure and
finds you wanting, that has a ripple effect. It's like throwing a stone into a
pond. It ripples out across the country and eventually does hurt a president." 15 This view of the relationship between elite judgments and public approval was frequently invoked to explain President Carter's difficulties.
Haynes Johnson, for example, argued that "private judgments [of Carter]
quickly became public ones-and were transmitted to the country at
large. " 16
Empirical support for this version of the elite-mass linkage can be found,
among other places, in Richard Brody's study of the determinants of presidential popularity. Brody demonstrates the crucial role played by politicians'
responses and media coverage in shaping public perceptions of a president's
performance. 11 Citizens rally around the flag in the face of an international
crisis not out of an instinctive patriotism, Brody shows, but because elite assessments of presidential performance become more positive during such
events. Even economic figures, Brody shows and Bush's experience confirms, do not directly impress themselves on citizens. Rather, these events are
mediated by elite evaluations.
Samuel Kernell reconciles these two rival hypotheses by suggesting that
during the time of Truman and Eisenhower it may have been true that a
president's standing among elites bore little relation to his approval in the
country but that this no longer holds for today's presidents. "Washington
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has changed," argues Kernell . This transformation came about not because
citizens have gotten more attentive to or more sophisticated about politics
but simply because "citizens are exposed to more-and more critical-information about the president than ever before." This transformation in the extent to which "the American public has become privy to political relations in
Washington" means that today, unlike in Eisenhower's time, "what others in
Washington have to say about the president may shape what the rest of the
country thinks of him. " 18
If Kernell is correct, his thesis has important implications for our understanding of blame avoidance. To begin with, it suggests that Eisenhower's
popularity (though not his support at the elite level) was largely unrelated to
his use of subordinates as lightning rods and to his hidden-hand strategy
more generally. It also means that contemporary presidents may become increasingly reliant on lightning rods to maintain public support. An additional implication of Kernell's argument is that conclusions drawn from
Eisenhower's time may be inapplicable to today's presidents.
Kernell's synthesis is intuitively plausible, but ultimately, I think, it fails. 19
To sustain his thesis, Kernell needs to show that citizens have become more
aware over time of "political relations in Washington." Because comparisons over time are fraught with difficulties, it is not easy to prove or disprove
such an assertion . In the early years of survey research , pollsters asked all
sorts of questions that probed what the public knew about politics. But the
results were so overwhelming-most of the public didn't know much-that
scholars soon lost interest in the subject and pollsters stopped asking such
questions. 20
One question that researchers have consistently asked over a long period
of time probes voters' ability to recall the name of congressional incumbents
and challengers. These questions indicate no change in public knowledge
over a thirty-year time span. Neither is there any evidence of an increase in
the public's political knowledge about which political party controls the
House of Representatives, a question that researchers have asked since 1960.
Questions that ask people what they like or dislike about a presidential candidate or political party show no appreciable increase in the number of responses offered. Nor has there been an increase over time in the electorate's
ability to perceive differences between the parties. 21 In short, those few questions that address change over time in the electorate's political knowledge
undercut Kernell's claim that there has been a change, let alone transformation, in public awareness of political relations in Washington since Eisenhower's time. 22
If we are to reconcile the two rival hypotheses about the elite-mass relationship, we must do it some other way than fitting the two into distinct,
chronological stages. Moreover, such a formulation must account both for
the continuing low levels of political awareness or knowledge and for the
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continuing discrepancies between objective, especially economic, indicators
and presidential support. Such a formulation must begin by recognizing the
tremendous variation in political awareness within the mass public and the
consequent variation in the levels of exposure to elite discourse.
Within the general public there is an extraordinary range of attentiveness
to and knowledge about politics. Many people are almost totally inattentive
to elite discourse. A 1986 National Election Study (NES), for instance,
found that close to 20 percent of the American public could not identify any
of the government jobs held by George Bush, Caspar Weinberger, William
Rehnquist, Paul Volcker, Robert Dole, or Tip O'Neill. 23 For this segment of
the electorate, attention to political relations in Washington is far too sporadic for elite discourse to have much, if any, impact upon how these voters
view a president. Presidential lightning rods can play no significant role
here.
At the other end of the spectrum is a highly informed segment of the population who, as Neustadt says, "make an avocation of the watchfulness vocationally imposed on Washingtonians. " 24 This part of the population
would certainly include the 4 percent of the general public who were able to
identify each one of the jobs held by Bush, Weinberger, Rehnquist, Volcker,
Dole, and O'Neill. It might also reasonably be extended to include the additional 13 percent who were able to identify four or five of these individuals.
This segment of the general public often pays sufficient attention to differentiate between the positions and personas of presidents and certain prominent subordinates. Moreover, though these people are attentive enough to be
influenced by elite discourse, they are probably not close enough to the
drama to be able to see through the lightning rod ruse. Among this highly
informed part of the population, then, we might expect lightning rods to
play an important role.
In between these extremes, of course, lies a range of attentiveness and
knowledge. It would be a mistake to write off more than four-fifths of the
population as totally immune to elite discourse about the presidency. Halfway through Eisenhower's second term, close to 60 percent of the general
public could "recall offhand" the name of the secretary of agriculture and
the secretary of state. 21 Indeed more people could recall the names of Ezra
Taft Benson and John Foster Dulles than could recall the name of their own
congressman. 26 Benson and Dulles were, to be sure, unusually visible cabinet
officials, but it is not uncommon for a third or more of the population to be
able to identify correctly the jobs of prominent cabinet officials. In the
above-mentioned 1986 NES survey, for instance, one-third of respondents
were able to identify Caspar Weinberger's job as secretary of defense. 27 Even
George Humphrey, Eisenhower's relatively low-profile treasury secretary,
was correctly identified by 28 percent of respondents. 28
Attentiveness to politics, moreover, varies not just among individuals but
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within individuals. For farmers, for instance, the Department of Agriculture
is more salient than are the Departments of Labor or Education. Individuals
who are inattentive to most issues may be highly attentive to a narrow band
of issues that directly affect them or people like them. The concrete, personal consequences of policies that Neustadt highlights thus may generate
closer attentiveness to the flow of elite messages on the part of particular
segments of the public in particular policy areas. This may, in turn , open up
an avenue for elite messages to shape public opinion and thus create the conditions necessary for the construction of presidential lightning rods.
Such a dynamic appears to have operated in the case of Benson. Farmers
were more likely to know who Benson was and to have an opinion about
Benson than was the general population. A survey conducted by Gallup at
the outset of 1958, for instance, found that the general population (44 percent) was almost twice as likely as farmers (23 percent) to have no opinion
about Benson's performance. 29 Because price-support policies affected
farmers directly, farmers paid significantly closer attention than the general
public to elite discourse in this area. 3°Contra Neustadt, the existence of a direct personal or group interest in a policy thus can generate the attentiveness
to elite messages necessary for a lightning rod strategy to affect public perceptions of a president.
Attentiveness and information are, of course, no obstacle to the effective
use of lightning rods at the elite level. Those within the Washington community pay close enough attention to national politics that they can readily differentiate between even the most subtle differences in administration personas and positions. One might thus expect lightning rods to be most viable
at the elite level. However, elites are also much more likely to be able to see
through the ruse. As participants rather than just spectators in the political
drama they are often in a position to know or at least strongly suspect that
an administration official is doing something at the direct request of a president.
Elites who see through the ruse, however, may still criticize a presidential
subordinate and spare the president direct attack for strategic reasons of
their own. After being selected Senate majority leader, Lyndon Johnson explicitly instructed his fellow Democrats to "lay off of Eisenhower. If you
want to attack somebody, attack one of his Cabinet members or something
of that sort, but just don't get yourself out on a limb harping at the President and get the party identified with too much opposition to Eisenhower. " 31 Many of the elite criticisms of Brownell, as we saw in Chapter 7,
are best viewed as a product of the strategic calculations of civil rights opponents not to criticize directly a popular president. Similar strategic calculations by elites can be found throughout presidential history, particularly
when an incumbent president is popular. 32
The strategic calculations made by elites in attributing blame make the
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blame-attribution process a significantly different phenomenon at the elite
than at the mass level. Because elites are players in the political game they
have interpersonal relations to preserve and objectives to gain. Who to
blame is thus in large part a strategic question. Political strategy, in contrast,
almost by definition plays no role in the public's decision about who to
blame. An explanation for the public's decision about where to place blame
can be framed almost exclusively in terms of the flow of information and the
social psychological ways that information is processed. 33
This is not to imply that all lightning rods at the elite level reflect elite
strategy. Indeed the need to preserve access can make the psychological pressures on political elites to believe in a leader's good intentions even greater.
Elites are no different from other people in wanting to believe that the president is sympathetic to their views. Strategy matters in understanding blame
avoidance at the elite level, not because elites are more clear headed or rational than the mass public, but rather because, unlike the mass public, political elites have strategic interests that can be rationally advanced by placing blame upon presidential subordinates.
Even at close proximity to a president, however, it is often extremely difficult for political elites to tell when a subordinate is speaking for a president
or for herself. Even Secretary of State Al Haig, as we saw in Chapter 6, professed to be uncertain whether what Ed Meese or Jim Baker said in public
reflected the president's or their own views on foreign policy. Because there
is an inevitable ambiguity about who is talking when a subordinate speaks in
the name of a president, skillful presidents have plenty of room, even at the
elite level, to create effective lightning rods.
That elites see through a lightning rod may, in any event, not matter
much, so long as elites carry on as if they believe it. For the attentive public,
it is not the motives of the critics but the critics' message that matters most
in their appraisal of presidential performance. Popularity thereby becomes
its own shield. Reluctant to criticize a popular president, elites aim their criticism at other targets, thus helping to sustain a president's popularity. But
the moment a president's popularity drops, the distinction introduced in
Chapter I between the "strong" lightning rod hypothesis-that critics attack a subordinate because they believe that person is corrupting a president's good intentions-and a "weak" lightning rod hypothesis-that opponents, for tactical reasons, choose to criticize the subordinate rather than the
president-becomes enormously consequential.
In Chapter 3, for instance, we saw that environmental elites were suspicious of Reagan from the start but initially held back from criticizing him
directly for tactical reasons. As Reagan's popularity began to tumble and
without any evidence that the president was or would become sympathetic
to their cause, environmental groups abandoned their initial strategy of targeting Watt alone in favor of direct attacks on President Reagan as well. The
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steady flow of negative elite evaluations badly tarnished Reagan's environmental image with the wider public until, by the beginning of 1983, he was
widely seen as a co-conspirator in the effort to despoil America's land, water, and air.
The general public, then, is far from immune to elite discourse. What
elites say does seem to matter to how the public evaluates a president. President Bush fell so far and so fast in public estimation in 1992 not just because
the economy was weak but also because when he appeared vulnerable, disaffected elites buried him with a volley of direct, personal criticism. This is not
to disregard the well-established maxim of survey research that the issues
and controversies that animate those inside the beltway often leave the larger
public untouched. It is well to remember that at the height of Watergate,
more than 30 percent of the American public admitted having never heard
the name ofH. R. (Bob) Haldeman. 34 And as David Stockman was supposedly becoming a "household name" as the point man for the Reagan administration's budget initiatives in the early 1980s, more than 40 percent of the
American public conceded that they hadn't heard enough about Stockman
to form an impression of him. 35 After Jim Baker had served four years as
Reagan's chief of staff, 50 percent of the American public confessed to being "not familiar with that person at all. " 36 Nothing new here .
But public opinion data also suggest that it would be a mistake to regard
the lightning rod phenomenon purely as an elite phenomenon. Significant
segments of the general public can identify prominent administration officials. Moreover, important segments of the public do make distinctions between their evaluation of a president and their evaluation of a subordinate.
In the case of Benson, for instance, close to 40 percent of the general public
(and 50 percent of farmers) with an opinion about both Eisenhower and
Benson evaluated the secretary differently than they did the president. Even
in the case of Dulles, where attitudes toward the president and secretary of
state were much more closely coupled, almost one quarter of the public evaluated Dulles and Eisenhower differently.37 Although the mass public cannot
be written out of the lightning rod equation, it must be conceded that as we
move the lightning rod concept into the area of elite-mass linkages we move
onto much more uncertain and uncharted ground. We know very little about
how criticism or praise at the elite level is processed at the mass public level.
We do not know, for instance, the extent to which elite criticisms of a presidential subordinate are processed by the mass public as negative evaluations
of the president himself. To answer this sort of question requires further research of a different, more experimental kind that goes beyond the scope of
this book. 38 It is research that needs to be done, however, if we are to get beyond the contradictory certainties that characterize conventional wisdom on
this topic.
If this book cannot speak as directly to this particular issue as one would
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like, the evidence compiled here does provide compelling reasons for rejecting Neustadt's view that elite discourse and public evaluations are largely independent realms and for rejecting Kernell's argument that the elite-mass
linkage has been transformed over the last several decades. The data from
the Eisenhower administration strongly suggest that any transformation in
public awareness of political relations in Washington had already taken
place by Eisenhower's time. What I want to highlight is neither the low levels
of public awareness of elite discourse, as Neustadt's model would, nor the
transformation in levels of public awareness of elite discourse over time, as
Kernell's model does, but rather the great variations in public awareness of
administration officials that occur within and across presidencies. Why in
some cases is the difference between how a president is perceived and how a
subordinate is perceived rather large and in other cases quite small? What, if
anything, is it possible to say about the conditions under which presidents
will be able to deflect blame and to distance themselves from controversial
policies or subordinates? These are the questions I want to take up in the
subsequent sections.

THE EISENHOWER MODEL: MAKING LIGHTNING
RODS WORK

What was it that enabled President Eisenhower to deflect blame onto key subordinates? Eisenhower certainly was not unique in wanting to deflect responsibility for negative outcomes or controversial policies onto subordinates. Any
number of accounts testify to the ubiquity of this impulse among modern presidents. Even Lyndon Johnson, despite his hunger for occupying the center of
the political stage, often expressed concern with keeping bad or controversial
news away from the president. On one occasion, for instance, when White
House aide Harry McPherson informed the president that House Ways and
Means chair Wilbur Mills and majority floor leader Carl Albert were contesting an anticipated Department of Agriculture decision on milk price supports,
the president responded, "Get Mills and Albert with [Secretary of Agriculture
Orville] Freeman and get [the] president out of this. " 39 Not long after the Kennedy assassination, Johnson told Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall: "I'm
from an oil state; oil's a very controversial subject. I want to have a relationship
that Roosevelt and Ickes had. I want you to make all the oil decisions, you to
run the oil program; I want oil out of the White House." Johnson instructed
Udall to go out and "tell the reporters this," which Udall promptly did, informing the press that the president "expects the major and final responsibility [on
oil prices] to rest with me and my department." 40
Such anecdotes suggest that President Johnson did try to use cabinet members as lightning rods. This should come as no surprise. He was a highly skilled
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politician and understood the risks of being drawn into politically controversial
or unpopular ventures. And if he forgot, members of his staff kept up a steady
stream of advice extolling the virtues of lowering the president's public profile
and building up cabinet members as lightning rods. White House special assistant Tom Johnson, for example, informed the president:
It is my view that you have become so closely associated with all the
major issues which face this country that you are suffering from it. . . .
I believe a better course would be to have your decisions and feeling on
a particular matter voiced through the Cabinet and through the agency
heads who are most directly concerned with the issue. Let them shoulder more of the burden for the faults of their programs. Rather than the
President losing popularity for weaknesses, it seems more appropriate
for the department head to receive the criticism. 41
The puzzle is explaining why such efforts failed.
The first impediment was Johnson's desire to get credit for all the good
things that happened on his watch. "Whenever an agency of the government
had good news," political scientist Nelson Pols by reports, "there was a
standing order to send it to the White House for announcement. " 42 This
practice of taking credit for the positive might seem, at first glance, to be
perfectly consistent with a lightning rod strategy of deflecting responsibility
for negative outcomes. But taking credit for all that is good makes it difficult to avoid being blamed for the bad. A credit-claiming strategy is incompatible with a blame-avoidance strategy. 43 For starters, good news can
quickly sour. A leader cannot credibly take credit for a positive turn of
events on one day, and the next day expect the blame to fall on others when
conditions suddenly deteriorate. The secret to President Eisenhower's success was that he allowed subordinates to take credit as well as blame. By
building subordinates up, they were also there to be torn down.
Johnson's difficulty, as Rowland Evans and Robert Novak put it, was that
he "did not care for limelight-sharing." 44 Perhaps more than any other president in American history, Johnson worried about being upstaged by subordinates getting positive press. 45 We have already shown the lengths Johnson
went to deny positive press to his vice president. Humphrey, however, was by
no means unique in this regard. National Security Assistant McGeorge
Bundy too found that "Johnson became annoyed when he felt that Bundy
was getting too much personal publicity. " 46 Perhaps one of the reasons that
Dean Rusk and Johnson got along so well was that, according to Rusk's biographer, "it was part of his [Rusk's] personality to be reserved, to stay out
of the spotlight. " 47 President Johnson's distrust of administration officials
engaging in self-aggrandizement manifested itself in a directive forbidding
any staff member to talk to the press without getting clearance from the
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press secretary. Violations of this order brought strict reprimand. For instance, when Joseph Califano wrote to President Johnson informing him
that he had met with journalist Joseph Kraft to discuss a number of issues
before Congress, including Medicare-Medicaid and tax credits for social
programs, a furious Johnson scrawled at the bottom of the memorandum:
"Joe-may I again-again ask you and all your associates to please meet
with press members during your association with my administration upon
request of Press Secretary [George] Christian only. This request has been
made before and will not be made again. " 48
In contrast, Eisenhower never expressed concern about subordinates receiving positive publicity. On the contrary, reports Milton Eisenhower, "during his presidency, as he had done as Supreme Commander in war, [Eisenhower] almost instinctively wished to 'build up' those who worked with
him. " 49 "If there was something favorable to be announced from one of his
Departments," recalls former White House aide Don Paarl berg, "the Secretary would do that. " 50 "You' d be amazed how much you can accomplish,"
Eisenhower told his associates, "if you're willing to see the credit go to
someone else. " 1 1 Moreover, Eisenhower understood, as Reagan did also, that
a president rarely has to worry about being upstaged by subordinates. When
things go right, the president gets the credit. 12
The image that Johnson propagated of a president in control of all facets
of government-a master of Congress as well as his own administrationundermined his halting efforts to get others to absorb blame. Fostering the
impression that Johnson was attentive to every policy arena had the benefit
for Johnson of instilling respect and fear in the political stratum. The disadvantage was that cabinet members, staff, and vice president, even when
prominently displayed, were widely perceived as little more than deputies executing a presidential directive. Generating the perception that government
was a one-man show could not be reconciled with a lightning rod strategy.
Attempts to deflect blame, moreover, only increased the perception of
Johnson as a dissembling politician, thus feeding the so-called credibility
gap. Those advisers who urged Johnson to set up lightning rods did not sufficiently appreciate the underlying conditions that made such a strategy unviable. It was not just a matter of giving cabinet members and staff a higher
public profile nor, as many within the administration argued, of the president being "overexposed. " SJ The root cause of Johnson's "flypaper presidency" was his reluctance to relinquish control over decision making.
Johnson wanted to fashion cabinet members into an extension of himself.
"When I looked out at the heads of my departments, " Johnson explained to
Doris Kearns, " I realized that while all of them had been appointed by me,
not a single one was really mine. I could never fully depend on them to put
my priorities first. ... I was determined to turn those lordly men into good
soldiers. " 14 To ensure that cabinet members followed presidential prefer-
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ences, Johnson instituted what one student has described as a "systematic
and extensive monitoring of departments and agencies" aimed at keeping
the president abreast of department activities and reminding the cabinet
member that the president was watching. 55
Eisenhower was able to deflect responsibility in large part because he was
willing to cede a significant degree of control over policy making to department heads. 56 The wide band of discretion that Eisenhower granted his cabinet members is evident in the relatively free hand they had in staffing their
departments,5' as well as their license to make public statements without
prior White House approval. 58 The cost of granting cabinet members autonomy, as with Brownell on civil rights, is that public policy may not always
develop in precisely the direction the president prefers. 59 The benefit is to
generate a climate in which it is plausible (rather than seeming disingenuous)
to blame a cabinet member for a policy gone amok.
The difference between Presidents Johnson and Eisenhower, then, was
not only that Eisenhower's hand was hidden while Johnson's was visible, but
that Eisenhower's hand was far less intrusive. Against the backdrop of the
"traditional" view of the Eisenhower presidency, one may be impressed by
Ike's behind-the-scenes activism, but, set against the standard of presidents
who came after, what stands out about Eisenhower is his genuine deference
toward and tolerance of cabinet members.
Eisenhower's political sagacity, to repeat, did not lie solely, or even
mainly, in his recognition that advisers could serve as lightning rods. Few are
the presidents who have been unaware of the utility of deflecting blame onto
subordinates. 60 Rather, what distinguishes Eisenhower from other presidents
is that his behavior-such as tolerating discrepancies between his preferences and departmental actions and not begrudging subordinates positive
publicity-contributed to a public perception that Eisenhower's subordinates operated with a significant degree of discretion. It was this perception
(a perception strongly rooted in reality) of subordinate discretion that enabled Eisenhower to build up a network of effective, because plausible,
lightning rods.
Detachment (or at least the appearance of detachment) from decision
making is a necessary but perhaps not sufficient condition for the creation
of effective lightning rods. To keep hostility targeted at the subordinate
rather than the president, relevant groups must believe that were the president better informed he would be more sympathetic to their policy position
than the adviser. My argument is that this belief is easier to sustain for those
leaders who cloak their stance in ambiguity (or who have a genuinely ambiguous position) because it allows them to be different things to different
people.
No modern president has been more successful in being different things to
different people than Dwight Eisenhower. 61 A Gallup survey conducted in
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May 1955 illustrates this phenomenon at the mass level. Asked whether they
considered President Eisenhower "to be liberal or conservative in his political views," 49 percent believed Eisenhower to be a conservative and 42 percent pronounced him a liberal. Moreover, of those respondents who thought
of themselves as liberals, 65 percent believed Eisenhower was, like them, a
liberal, and only 28 percent identified him as a conservative. Of those who
considered themselves conservatives, 61 percent thought the president was
also a conservative, while only 32 percent felt he was a liberal. 62
This proclivity to read into Eisenhower's political views one's own political preferences was not limited to the mass public. Highly sophisticated political elites exhibited the same tendency to see Eisenhower's underlying political predilections as being in sympathy with their own. To read memoirs or
oral histories of the period is to encounter the same tale over and over again:
the "real" Eisenhower was the one who agreed with the person relating the
story.
One example of this is Emmet Hughes's well-known memoir, The Ordeal
of Power. A liberal Republican and foreign-policy speech writer for Eisenhower, Hughes's account is suffused with the sense that Dulles's cold war
bellicosity was perverting the underlying pacific instincts of Eisenhower.
From Hughes's vantage point, there appeared to be a "chasm" between the
president and his secretary. To talk of a "Dulles-Eisenhower" foreign policy,
Hughes argued, was "no more sensibly descriptive than some fantastic diplomacy proclaiming itself 'radical-reactionary' or 'bellicose-pacific.' " 63
Eisenhower apparently did little to discourage Hughes's perception. In a
wide-ranging discussion of foreign and domestic policy lasting an hour and
a half, Hughes recalls, "We struck . .. not one troubling note of dissent between us. " 64
The only black man on the White House staff, E. Frederic Morrow, believed that Eisenhower "instinctively said and did the right thing" on civil
rights issues. Morrow attributed the president's hesitance about proceeding
in this area to his reliance on an old network of southern friends for advice. 65
Meanwhile southern Democrats blasted the liberal coterie of Sherman Adams, James Hagerty, and Herbert Brownell for leading astray a well-meaning, prosouthern president.
Chapter 2 documents this phenomenon with respect to agricultural policy.
Secretary Benson, as well as his defenders like Barry Goldwater, were convinced that Eisenhower was a fervent believer in applying free-market principles to agriculture. At the same time, a number of supporters of continued
high price supports, such as Senators Edward Thye and Milton Young, continued to believe that Eisenhower was sympathetic to their viewpoint.
In this respect, Eisenhower resembles Abraham Lincoln, who also had a
remarkable capacity to be different things to different people. 66 Lincoln
stated his war aims ambiguously enough that those in favor of eradicating
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slavery came away persuaded that the president intended to eliminate slavery, while those in favor of limiting the war effort to preserving the Union
were convinced that this was Lincoln's real aim. So profound was his ambiguity that historians today still argue about what it was that Lincoln really
intended.
President Reagan, particularly in the first term, differed from both Eisenhower and Lincoln in that his objectives tended to be unequivocal. Reagan's
conservative credentials were impeccable and his ideological agenda was, to
an extent unusual in American politics, explicitly laid out before and during
the 1980 campaign. Because conservatives believed, with good reason, that
his instincts were fundamentally conservative, he was usually able to deflect
right-wing criticism. The rallying cry, "Let Reagan be Reagan, " 67 reflected
conservatives' confidence that a Reagan free of the influence of "pragmatists" such as James Baker would pursue their policy agenda.
But Reagan's unmistakable ideological commitments left him exposed on
the left flank. As the case study of Watt showed, there was little, if any, sense
among critics of the administration's environmental policies that the president's preferences diverged from Watt's. Thus, although Reagan's ideological character insulated him from right-wing critics when he failed to push
conservative causes, it left him vulnerable to attack from liberals when pursuing the conservative agenda. As a result, Reagan often found it safer to
abandon the right-wing agenda. Witness his two major second-term initiatives-arms control and tax reform-both of which moved in directions
more likely to be criticized by conservatives than liberals.
Eisenhower's equivocal stance on most issues of the day, in contrast, often
protected him from both liberal and conservative critics. Many liberals felt
that, at heart, Eisenhower was really more liberal than his administration's
policies indicated and were consequently quick to blame conservative advisers (whether Benson, Dulles, or George Humphrey) for stunting his natural
liberalism. Many conservatives, on the other hand, felt that the president's
natural instincts were conservative and so faulted liberal advisers (whether
Herbert Brownell, Sherman Adams, or James Hagerty) for perverting the
president's good intentions.

IT WORKED FOR IKE, BUT WILL IT WORK TODAY?

Are Eisenhower's strategies and experiences relevant to today's presidents?
Have we entered a new era of the "postmodern" presidency in which old axioms and assumptions no longer hold? 68 Much is certainly different for contemporary presidents. The office is bigger, the responsibilities are greater,
and the citizenry is more suspicious of political leadership. Increasing demands coupled with decreasing support is not good news for presidents.
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Add to this an increasing ideological polarization among elites, and one has
plenty of reason to wonder whether lessons drawn from Eisenhower's tenure
are relevant today.
These objections force us to look beyond presidential style and strategy
and toward the environmental conditions that are largely beyond a president's control. This section focuses on two of these environmental conditions: (1) ideological polarization among political elites, and (2) expectations of presidential involvement among the general public. 69 In both of
these areas, there is reason to think that the political environment may have
been radically transformed since Eisenhower's time.
In the concluding chapter of The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Fred Greenstein explicitly confronts the question of the relevance of the Eisenhower
model for today's presidents. To those who dismiss the 1950s as "static and
politically uneventful," Greenstein points out that if the 1950s seemed uneventful it was in part a product of Eisenhower's leadership. Eisenhower,
Greenstein reminds us, "took office in the midst of a stalemated, unpopular
war" but achieved a truce within six months and refused to become entangled in further military conflicts in Vietnam. Moreover, Greenstein cautions
that "it is largely in retrospect that his presidency is remembered as conflictfree in the realm of foreign policy. There were sharp disagreements within
and between the parties over whether the nation's foreign policy should be
basically internationalist and over how aggressively the cold war should be
prosecuted." Add to this not only McCarthyism but "major domestic political conflicts over such issues as civil rights, education, welfare, and regulatory policy" and one has a decade that was both eventful and full of conflict. '0
Valuable as it is in dispelling popular myths about the allegedly serene
1950s, Greenstein's answer still leaves open a number of important questions
about change over time in political climate and context. Most political scientists will have little trouble accepting Greenstein's refutation of the popular
stereotype of the 1950s as a decade in which nothing happened and nobody
argued. Yet those same political scientists may still point to specific institutional and cultural changes-the rise of an adversarial media and a distrustful public; rising public expectations of presidential control combined with
diminished institutional capacity; increasingly polarized political partiesthat have arguably transformed the political landscape within which presidents act.
What is the evidence for these hypothesized changes, and what is the effect of those changes that can be reliably documented on the applicability of
Eisenhower's blame-avoidance model of leadership? Let us begin with the
issue of party polarization. Greenstein is right that there were sharp differences over American foreign policy throughout the 1950s. But the evidence
shows, too, that there was significantly less conflict, at least between parties,
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TABLE 8.1. Differences in support for the president between congressional
Republicans and Democrats.
House

Summed

Senate

Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Eisenhower
Key votes
Nonunanimous
LBJ/JFK
Key votes
Nonunanimous
Nixon/Ford
Key votes
Nonunanimous
Carter
Key votes
Nonunanimous
Reagan, 1981-1986
Key votes
Nonunanimous
Totals
Key votes
Nonunanimous

22
27

6
1

47
38

12
14

48
48

36
39

25
24

11
12

30
27

25
17

32
30

25
28

35
34

20
29

34
23

27
29

34
36

50
44

44
41

52
44

34
34

27
26

36
31

25
25

34

8

36

25

30

24

32

26

40

48

34

26

Source: Calculated from congressional support scores reported in George Edwards, At
the Margins (New Haven, Conn .: Yale University Press, 1989), 59-63. The numbers are arrived at by subtracting support among the opposition party from support among the
president's own party. The " summed " statisti cs on the right represent the average of the
sum of key votes and non unanimous votes in both the House and Senate.

on foreign policy questions in Eisenhower's time than in subsequent administrations.
Data compiled by George Edwards, for instance, show that on "key" foreign policy votes there was only a 6 percentage point difference between the
support Eisenhower received from House Republicans and the support he
received from House Democrats (see Table 8.l). 1 1 In contrast, Kennedy/
Johnson averaged a 36 percentage point difference, Nixon/ Ford a 25 percentage point difference, Carter a 20 percentage point difference, and
Reagan (through his first six years) a 50 percentage point difference. The
data on key votes from the Senate differ in important ways but still show a
similar gap between the relatively bipartisan Eisenhower pattern (a 12 percentage point gap between Republican and Democratic support) and the
highly polarized pattern of the Reagan years (a 52 percentage point gap between Republican and Democratic support). Using a summary statistic that
combines key votes and nonunanimous votes in the Senate and House, two
things stand out: the extraordinarily low degree of partisan polarization
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during Eisenhower's term and the extraordinarily high degree of partisan
polarization during the Reagan period. 12
If the data presented in Table 8.1 confirm a pattern of dramatic increases
in levels of party polarization in the foreign policy arena, the domestic policy arena tells a far different story that is much more supportive of Greenstein's argument. Comparing "key" votes again we find in Eisenhower's
term relatively low levels of polarization in the House (a 22 percentage point
difference between Republican and Democratic support) but relatively high
levels of polarization in the Senate (a 47 percentage point difference) . Indeed, no subsequent president has had more polarized support in the Senate. Averaging the sum of key votes and nonunanimous votes in both the
Senate and House, we find that Eisenhower's 34 percentage point gap between Republican and Democratic support is virtually identical to the average differential among all subsequent presidents. The evidence suggests a
somewhat increased polarization during the Reagan presidency in domestic
policy, but the overall picture in domestic policy is one of roughly comparable and quite high levels of party polarization throughout the last forty
years.
Further evidence that the 1950s were not nearly as consensual as conventional wisdom would have it comes from Herbert McClosky's seminal study
of 1956 national convention delegates. McClosky stressed that "despite the
brokerage tendency of American parties, their active members are obviously
separated by large and important differences. " 13 Consistent with the data
presented in Table 8.1, McClosky found that partisan differences on foreign
policy issues were significantly less pronounced than partisan differences in
domestic policy. Especially on issues involving the government's role in the
economy, the differences between Republican and Democratic delegates
were consistently large (see Table 8.2). 74
Subsequent studies of convention delegates have all reaffirmed this basic
pattern of large absolute differences between the parties on the issues of the
day.75 But have these partisan differences become larger since the l 950s?'6
This question is difficult to answer because issues and their importance in~vitably change over time. Yet some preliminary answers can be had by comparing questions McClosky asked of the 1956 delegates with questions
about preferred budgetary allocations asked of the 1984 convention delegates. 77 To facilitate comparisons across issue areas, McClosky constructed a
"ratio of support" index by "assigning a weight of 1.0 to each 'increase' response in the sample, of Oto each 'decrease' response, and of .50 to each 'remain as is' (or 'same') response. " 18 Using this "support ratio" index McClosky found that the average difference on domestic issues between
Democratic and Republican convention delegates was .22, and on foreign
policy issues, the average difference was .12 (see Table 8.2). If we construct
similar "ratio of support" scores for the budgetary allocation questions

TABLE 8.2.

Issue positions among 1956 convention delegates.

Public ownership of
natural resources
Republicans
Democrats
Level of farm
price supports
Republicans
Democrats
Federal aid to
education
Republicans
Democrats
Corporate income
tax
Republicans
Democrats
Government regulation of business
Republicans
Democrats
Tax on large
incomes
Republicans
Democrats
Slum clearing and
public housing
Republicans
Democrats
Reiulation of
pu lie utilities
Republicans
Democrats
Social Security
benefits
Republicans
Democrats
Tax on business
Republicans
Democrats
Minimum wage
Republicans
Democrats
Enforcement of
antimonopoly laws
Republicans
Democrats
Regulation of
trade unions
Republicans
Democrats

Increase

Same

Decrease

Ratio of
Support

12.9
57.5

35.2
23.8

51.9
18.6

.30
.69

6.7
43.4

25.8
28.5

67.4
28.1

.20
.58

22.3
66.2

34.5
20.4

43.2
13.4

.40
.76

4.0
32.3

34.5
44.4

61 .5
23.3

.21
.54

0.6
20.2

15.3
41.3

84.1
38.5

.08
.41

5.4
27.0

37.7
49.9

56.9
23.1

.24
.52

40.1
78.4

38.3
16.0

21.6
5.6

.59
.86

17.9
59.0

64.5
34.6

17.6
6.4

.50
.76

22.5
60.0

64.4
36.1

13.1
3.9

.55
.78

1.0
12.6

27.8
49.1

71.1
38.3

.15
.37

15.5
50.0

72.0
45.2

12.5
4.7

.52
.73

44.9
78.0

46.1
19.1

9.0
2.9

.68
.88

86.4
59.3

9.2
28.3

4.5
12.4

.91
.73

Diff. in
Ratios
.39

.38

.36

.33

.33

.28

.27

.26

.22
.22
.21

.20

.18
(Continued)

TABLE 8.2.

(continued)

Public control of
atomic energy
Republicans
Democrats
Enforcement of
integration
Republicans
Democrats
Tax on middle
incomes
Republicans
Democrats
Level of tariffs
Republicans
Democrats
Immigration
Republicans
Democrats
Tax on small
incomes
Republicans
Democrats
Restrictions on
credit
Republicans
Democrats
Reliance on United
Nations
Republicans
Democrats
American participation in military
alliances
Republicans
Democrats
Foreign aid
Repu blicans
Democrats
Defense spending
Republicans
Democrats
Domestic policy
average
Foreign policy
average
Domestic and
foreign policy
combined

.18
45.0
73.2

39.7
19.6

15.3
7.2

.65
.83

25.5
43.8

42.8
29.5

31.7
26.6

.47
.59

0.8
2.7

35.3
47.1

63.9
50.2

.18
.26

19.2
13.0

54.5
43.9

26.3
43.0

.46
.35

18.4
36.1

51.7
36.9

29.9
27.0

.44
.54

2.9
1.4

32.1
19.4

65.0
79.2

.19
.11

20.6
24.8

58.8
35.9

20.6
39.3

.50
.43

24.4
48.9

40.7
33.5

34.8
17.6

.45
.66

22.7
41.5

51 .6
40.9

25.7
17.6

.48
.62

7.6
17.8

30.7
31.1

61.7
51.0

.23
.33

13.6
20.7

52.8
44.8

33.6
34.4

.40
.43

.12

.12
.11

.10

.08

.07

.21

.14

.10

.03

.22
.12
.20

Source: Adapted from Herbert McClosky et al., " Issue Conflict and Consensus among
Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review 54 (June 1960): 410-15.
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TABLE 8.3.
delegates.

Preferred budgetary allocations among 1984 national convention

Education
Republicans
Democrats
Minorities
Republicans
Democrats
Medicare
Republicans
Democrats
Social Security
Republicans
Democrats
Science
Republicans
Democrats
Crime
Republicans
Democrats
Star Wars
Republicans
Democrats
MX missile
Republicans
Democrats
Foreign aid
Republicans
Democrats
Domestic policy
average
Foreign policy
average
Domestic and
foreign policy
combined

Increase

Same

Decrease

Ratio of
Support

14
77

36
19

50
4

.32
.87

3
40

43
46

64

14

.25
.63

6
44

56
50

38
6

.34
.69

6
37

65
56

29
6

.39
.65

40
52

45
41

15
8

.63
.73

52
46

40
49

8
5

.72
.71

57
4

29
11

14
84

.72
.10

32
2

45
11

23
88

.55
.08

2
9

25
41

73
50

.15
.30

Diff. in
Ratios
.55

.38

.35

.26

.10

.01

.62

.47

.15

.28
.41

.32

Source: Calculated from Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections:
Contemporary Strategies of American Electoral Politics, 8th ed . (New York: Free Press,
1991), 149.

asked of the 1984 delegates, we get an average difference on domestic issues
of .28 and an average difference on foreign policy issues of .41 (Table 8.3).' 9
The relatively small number of questions reported in the 1984 survey
counsel caution in interpreting these results, 80 yet it does seem possible to
draw a few conclusions from Tables 8.2 and 8.3 . First, one finds further con-
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firmation of the finding in Table 8.1 that foreign policy has become much
more polarized since Eisenhower's time. Contemporary presidents do seem
to face a degree of partisan polarization in foreign and defense policy that is
unlike anything faced by Eisenhower. Second, three of the nine issues
probed in 1984-federal spending on education, Star Wars, and the MX
missile-were much more polarized than the most polarized issue in 1956!
Two others-aid to minorities and federal spending on Medicare-would
have ranked among the top four polarized issues in 1956. In sum, then, these
data seem to lend strong support to the increasing polarization thesis, especially in the foreign-policy domain. 81
If politics has become more polarized at the elite level, what difference
does this make for presidents who want to deflect blame? Quite I bit, I
think . Partisan polarization presents a serious obstacle to a president trying
to deflect blame because to use lightning rods effectively requires that those
doing the blaming have a sense that a president is really on their side (but is
being thwarted or misinformed by advisers) or at least that the president can
be persuaded to take their side (and so better to blame the adviser and not
burn their bridges with the only president they have) . The more polarized
the political climate the more difficult it is for a president to sustain either of
these beliefs. The tighter the constraint across issue positions (i.e., knowing
a person's position on global warming, for instance, allows one to predict
that person's position on military intervention in Latin America, government spending on defense, and aid for the homeless), the more likely an opponent on one issue will be an opponent on the next issue. Polarization thus
weakens the force of what social scientists refer to as "crosscutting cleavages." Crosscutting cleavages moderate conflict by making opponents on
one issue into allies on the next. 82 But crosscutting cleavages also create incentives for political elites to avoid criticizing the president directly on issues
about which they may disagree in order to maintain the president's ear on
subsequent issues on which they may hope to find common ground. Increasing partisan polarization therefore makes it more difficult for presidents to
create effective lightning rods and to avoid blame.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that presidents are prevented from
deflecting blame simply because an issue is polarized. In view of our findings in Chapter 2 about Eisenhower's success in deflecting blame onto Secretary Benson, it is worth a second look at McClosky's data about elite attitudes regarding farm price support policies. Table 8.2 shows that
Democratic and Republican elites in 1956 were more divided on agricultural
price-support policies than on any other issue except public ownership of
natural resources. Among Republican elites only 7 percent favored increasing price supports, while 67 percent of Republican elites favored decreasing
them. In contrast, 43 percent of Democratic elites favored increasing price
supports and only 28 percent favored decreasing them. Even more striking,
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farm price supports was the only issue on which McClosky detected anything approaching significant evidence of polarization at the mass public
level. 83 Our case study of Eisenhower and Benson, then, strongly suggests
that lightning rods are not precluded by polarization.
What threatens the effective use of lightning rods may be less the extent of
polarization on any given issue than the extent of polarization across issue
domains. Lyndon Johnson, for example, instructed his fellow Democrats
not to attack Eisenhower personally not just because Eisenhower was popular but also because the Democrats needed and counted on Eisenhower's
support on other issues, especially on foreign-policy questions. George
Bush, though he self-consciously set out to emulate Eisenhower's inclusive,
consensual approach to governing, 84 faced a radically different situation
than did Eisenhower when he entered office. Democratic lawmakers who
disagreed with Bush on the environment, for example, were highly likely to
disagree with him on a whole range of other issues, including foreign policy.
With the battle lines in foreign policy drawn in much the same configuration
as the battle lines in domestic policy, 85 Bush could not count on Democratic
opponents drawing the same sort of fire line they created for Eisenhower.
Is Eisenhower's "low profile, anti-conflictual approach to politicking" 86 a
poor guide for presidents in an era of more polarized politics? Perhaps
Reagan's more confrontational, more ideological approach is better suited
to these more polarized times. This is the argument made by Thomas Edsall,
who argues that "Reagan's strength lay in his willingness to deal with a polarized electorate. Rather than seeking broad consensus-a goal that may be
currently impossible, given the conflicts within American society as a
whole-Reagan accepted a divided electorate. " 87 Edsall errs in positing increased polarization at the level of the mass public-study after study documents the lack of change among ordinary citizens 88-but Edsall's challenge
still remains: Is Reagan's model a better guide for contemporary presidents
than Eisenhower's model?
A stark dichotomy between the Eisenhower and Reagan presidential
models may be misleading, however, because in some crucial respects the
two presidencies are quite similar. Both Reagan and Eisenhower delegated
extensively and neither seemed concerned about being upstaged by subordinates. Both presidents focused their personal attention on a few issues and
kept themselves off the front lines as much as possible on most other issues.
Both presidents, in short, pursued a blame-avoidance rather than a creditclaiming strategy. Is it just a coincidence that the only two presidents to
serve two full terms in the last half century are also the only two presidents
who have consciously propagated public images emphasizing their detachment from White House decision making?
No doubt, growing elite polarization makes it more difficult to emulate
Eisenhower's success in being different things to different people . Bush's dif-
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ficulties in straddling rival positions would seem to confirm this. Yet one
should be careful about inferring too much from Bush's experience. Both
Eisenhower and Bush lacked the clear ideological agenda and convictions of
a Reagan or a Robert Taft, but Eisenhower, unlike Bush, did have a clear
sense of the direction he wanted to take the Republican party-from isolationism to internationalism in foreign policy and reconciling the party to the
New Deal in domestic policy. 89 Strategic ambiguity is one thing, an absence
of objectives quite another.9() Moreover, it is well to remember that Bush's average public approval score (61 percent) was actually substantially higher
than Reagan's (52 percent)-indeed of the postwar presidents Bush's average
public support ranks behind only Eisenhower (65 percent) and Kennedy (71
percent) .9' To remember Bush as a public opinion failure and Reagan as a
public relations success is thus to distort history. 92 Finally, as Chapter 3 documents, Reagan's firm ideological commitments impeded his ability to deflect blame and maintain support. Whatever success Reagan had at deflecting blame was in spite of rather than because of his clear ideological agenda.
Those pundits and politicians who have been confidently touting the "lesson" of the Reagan and Bush presidencies as something like, "nothing succeeds like high-definition presidents with a clear, unambiguous ideological
vision," will find that such an understanding of our recent past provides an
impoverished guide to success in the White House.
A more polarized politics makes blame avoidance more difficult, but it
does not fundamentally alter the basic requirements for success nor does it
diminish the desirability of a blame-avoidance posture. If anything , a more
contentious politics means presidents need to place an even greater premium
on a leadership style that keeps presidents out of the direct fire of competing
interests and views. Now as before, the key to keeping out of trouble is to
create ambiguity about where one stands, to let subordinates stand in the
limelight whenever possible, and to limit severely the number of issues on
which one becomes directly and extensively engaged. Presidents who do not
keep themselves off the front lines and out of harm's way are likely to find
their presidencies untenable.
Have there been changes at the mass public level that might affect a president's ability to deflect blame? One of the recurrent themes in the presidency literature over the past two decades has been the theme of rising and
increasingly unrealistic public expectations about presidential roles and responsibilities.93 If such a change in public expectations has occurred it has
important implications for contemporary presidents' ability to deflect
blame. For the success of a lightning rod strategy is contingent on the degree
to which people expect a president to be in command of a policy area. The
greater the expectation of presidential involvement and control, the less
likely a president will be able to deflect blame for administration actions
onto subordinates. We need to ask therefore whether changes over the last
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forty years in what the public expects from a president have so radically altered the political environment as to narrow greatly or even foreclose the effective use of lightning rods. Are public expectations today such that it is impossible for contemporary presidents to distance themselves from particular
policy areas in the same manner that Eisenhower did?
The rising expectations position is compelling. Rising, unrealizable expectations are said to account for the string of troubled presidencies that the
United States has experienced since the late 1960s. 94 Others have suggested
that rising expectations account for presidents' increasing tendency to centralize operations in the White House and to politicize the bureaucracy. 95
Moreover, the thesis comports with the public's own feeling that the public's
expectations of the president are higher than in the past. 96 The rising expectations thesis has almost become enshrined as the common-sense understanding of presidential development. But, as Jagdish Bhagwati usefully reminds us, "common sense is precisely the quality that makes people assert
that the earth is flat, since that is how it appears to the naked eye. " 91
What evidence is there of a rising tide of public expectations? The answer,
somewhat surprisingly in view of the widespread acceptance that this proposition engenders, is very little.98 One of the only studies that marshals empirical evidence in support of the claim that public "expectations about [presidential] roles and responsibilities have grown substantially in recent years" is
Stephen Wayne's essay on "Expectations of the President. " 99 Wayne arrives
at this conclusion by comparing the results of surveys conducted in 1968 and
1979. The 1968 survey asked, "In making the nation's foreign policy (policy
in economic or welfare laws)(policy dealing with racial problems) who do
you think should have the major responsibility-the president, Congress, or
both about equal," and found that on average 62 percent said "about
equal," 11 percent chose the president, and 27 percent chose Congress. The
1979 survey posed the question, "Some people think that the president
ought to have the major responsibility for making policy, while other people
think that Congress ought to have the major responsibility. In general,
which do you think should have the major responsibility for setting policy?"
and found that 22 percent said both, 37 percent said the president, and 36
percent said Congress. 100
Although these differences may capture change over time in the public's
view of presidential roles and responsibilities, at least several other more or
at least equally plausible interpretations are possible. As Wayne himself
concedes, the observed differences may reflect little more than the particular
historical circumstances. In 1968 the country was in the midst of an unpopular "presidential" war, while in 1979 the country was perceived as suffering
from weak executive leadership. 101 More troubling still is the significantly
different wording employed in the two questions. In view of what we know
about the power of question wording to affect responses (especially where
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respondents do not have firmly held attitudes), it is a strong possibility that
the different results are simply an artifact of different questions. 102
Other survey results that predate the 1968 study provide further grounds
for treating the rising expectation thesis with skepticism-at least in so far as
the thesis is intended to distinguish the 1950s from the contemporary period.
In a 1966 article, Roberta Sigel reported the results of a survey conducted in
Detroit, Michigan, in the early 1960s, which showed that more people preferred presidential leadership than preferred congressional leadership. 103 Indeed it was against the backdrop of such evidence that Glenn Parker had
originally presented the 1968 survey results as a "challenge [to] the premise
held by some that the populace prefers presidential, in contrast to congressional, leadership in public policy." 104
More damaging still to the thesis of rising public expectations is evidence
from New York Times/ CBS News surveys conducted during the 1980s that
showed the public placed the locus of responsibility for governing squarely
on the shoulders of Congress. In November 1985, at the peak of President
Reagan's popularity, respondents were asked, "Who should have the most
say about what cuts should be made to balance the budget-the president or
Congress?" Seventy-one percent answered Congress, and only 20 percent
answered the president. At the outset of Reagan's second year in office, the
same polling organization asked a roughly similar question-"In your opinion, whose responsibility for balancing the budget is greater, the president's
or that of Congress'?.._and got roughly similar results. Sixty-three percent
placed the responsibility with Congress, and only 23 percent said the president's responsibility was greater. 105 Most striking of all, Gallup asked exactly
the same question in 1936, and there was actually a slightly higher percentage back then saying that balancing the budget was a presidential responsibility (31 percent) and somewhat lower percentage saying balancing the
budget was a congressional responsibility (50 percent)! 106
The available survey evidence, in sum, offers scant support for the thesis
that today's presidents are afflicted with a rising tide of public expectations
about their roles and responsibilities. At best, we could render the Scotch
verdict of "not proven." Moreover, it would be unwise to ignore or even
downplay the tremendous public expectations that faced President Eisenhower. Eisenhower was still president when Richard Neustadt wrote that
"everybody now expects the man inside the White House to do something
about everything.'' 101 We can agree with contemporary scholars that today's
presidents are hampered by a gap between public expectations and institutional capacity, but we must remind ourselves that this was the starting point
for Louis Brownlow's analysis fifty years ago. "The nation," Brownlow reported, "expects more of the President than he can possibly do. " 108 It was
true then, and it is true today.
My purpose is not to deny that public expectations of the presidency have
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seen a massive transformation during the past century or even that public
expectations of the president are often unrealistically high. What I do want
to suggest is that the undeniable transformation in public expectations
about the role of the president had largely taken place by Eisenhower's time.
Eisenhower, in this respect at least, inhabits much the same modern universe
that today's presidents inhabit-a universe in which presidents are at the
center of public attention and are expected to maintain peace, prosperity,
and national security.
Institutions, attitudes, and expectations, of course, do change. Elite partisan polarization in foreign policy seems to be one such area where substantial change does appear to have occurred. The decline in public trust in political leaders in Washington appears to be another, 109 as does the rise of a more
adversarial media." 0 We need to take note of these changes and their consequences for governing. But we should be wary of too readily writing off the
hard-earned experiences of past presidents as irrelevant to our contemporary
problems. Presidential leadership, then and now, is a hazardous proposition-doubters need only remember that Eisenhower's predecessor in office,
Harry Truman, has the lowest average approval scores of any president for
which Gallup has polling data."' We would do well to heed the warning of
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that it is necessary to "avoid the fallacy of self-pity
that leads every generation to suppose that it is peculiarly persecuted by history." "2 Among journalists especially there is too often a born-yesterday
quality to analysis and a too ready willingness to accept that things are totally different today than yesterday. 111
Whatever the changes that have occurred during the last forty years-and
they are often greatly exaggerated-they have not altered the basic choice in
leadership style that presents itself to every modern president. That is a
choice between a leadership style premised on blame avoidance and one
based on credit claiming. 11 • In this sense, Eisenhower's blame-avoidance
model (with all of its limitations" 5) is just as relevant today as it was in the
1950s.

WHERE ARE PRESIDENTS LIKELY TO FIND
THE MOST EFFECTIVE LIGHTNING RODS?

What can this study tell us about the positions within an administration that
are most likely to be able to sustain effective lightning rods? Is it better to set
up lightning rods in what Thomas Cronin styles the "inner cabinet" or the
"outer cabinet?" 116 Should presidents try to build their cabinet members into
lightning rods, or will those within the White House work just as well? What
about president's wives? Have changes in the importance of some offices,
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like the vice-presidency, meant changes in the office's utility as a source of
lightning rods?
The deflection of blame onto subordinates is easiest in those policy areas
where public expectations of presidential involvement and control are least
pronounced. Thus we might expect the most successful lightning rods are
likely to emerge from the ranks of the outer cabinet-Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Interior, Labor, and Transportation. It is in these more peripheral domestic-policy areas, where the president is not necessarily expected to be engaged or knowledgeable, that lightning rods are most likely to
flourish.
What made Benson a successful lightning rod was not only Eisenhower's
blame-avoidance leadership style but also the widespread expectation that a
president had other duties that took precedence over agricultural policy
making. In the context of the outer cabinet, presidential claims of ignorance
or Jack of involvement are both more plausible and Jess damaging. Presidents, of course, may act in ways that connect them more closely with the
actions of these departments. Reagan's well-publicized antienvironmental
views helped link him in the public mind with the actions of the Interior Department and the Environmental Protection Agency. In a different way,
Bush tied himself to the fate of these departments by promising to be the environmental president. And Clinton has done much the same by personally
attending, indeed presiding over, a Northwest forest summit in the opening
months of his presidency.
If the outer cabinet's distance from the president can make these department heads effective lightning rods, that same distance from the president
can also make it more difficult to get the sort of media coverage that is necessary to become an effective lightning rod. The departments of the outer
cabinet tend to get much less media coverage than the big four-Defense,
State, Treasury, and Justice (Cronin's inner cabinet). In his study Washington Reporters, Stephen Hess found a large discrepancy between press coverage of the inner and outer cabinets, especially in television network news.
Stories about the inner cabinet made up 19 percent of Washington stories,
while the outer cabinet constituted only 4 percent of the total. The discrepancy was smaller among newspaper stories, but even here 12 percent of coverage of Washington stories involved the inner cabinet compared with 9 percent involving the outer cabinet. 111 My own research has shown a similar
imbalance between news coverage of the outer and inner cabinets and also
replicates Hess's findings that the imbalance is significantly greater in television news, although this overall imbalance is significantly skewed by the tremendous amount of coverage the secretary of state typically receives (see Table 8.4). In the years I examined, 1981 and 1989, the secretary of state made
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TABLE 8.4.

Media coverage of department secretaries.
1989

1981

Times

Television

Times

646
272
156
121

745
356
239
153

322
148
24
100

225
94
64
98

1,195

1,493

594

481

63
73
38
10
72
24
20
90
31

184
64
52
19
100
54
60
73
64

18
32
3
42
12
14
6
45
12

30
58
6
60
12
29
15
32
30

421

670

184

272

Percent of stories
on inner cabinet

74

69

76

64

Percent of stories
on inner cabinet
minus State

55

53

60

48

Television
State
Defense
Treasury
Attorney General
Inner cabinet
Interior
HHS
Agriculture
HUD
Labor
Energy
Education
Transportation
Commerce
Outer cabinet

Sources: Computed from entries in the New York Times Index and Vanderbilt Television
News Index and Abstracts.

up 54 percent of the television coverage and slightly under one-half of the
newspaper coverage received by the inner cabinet.
As Table 8.4 indicates, as does evidence previously presented in Chapter 5,
the secretary of state is by far the most visible member of the president's
cabinet. With such visibility, the secretary of state would seem to be an ideal
candidate for lightning rod status. However, we saw in Chapter 5 that even in
the cases of the three most influential and prominent postwar secretaries of
state, little evidence showed that they served as public lightning rods. Kissinger, whose stature (80 percent of the public could identify him before he'd
even been appointed secretary of state) and circumstances (President Ford
had never been elected) were highly exceptional, probably did serve as a
lightning rod for the fall of Cambodia and the North Vietnamese takeover
of Vietnam, but for the most part Kissinger seems to have upstaged Ford
rather than to have deflected blame. For John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson, there was little evidence of a lightning rod role, at least at the level of the
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mass public. The ups and downs in the popularity of both were closely tied
to the fortunes of their president.
The widely shared expectation that a president is uniquely responsible for
the conduct of foreign relations makes it difficult for a president to avoid
blame in the area of foreign policy. This is particularly true concerning war
or major international crises such as the U-2 affair or the Bay of Pigs. Although Truman delegated a great deal of authority to Acheson, it did not
prevent public anger over the Korean War from being directed at the president. Similarly, although Johnson sent out a number of prominent spokesmen (Dean Rusk, Hubert Humphrey, Walt Rostow, among others) to defend
the war effort, this did not prevent him from being blamed for setbacks in
Vietnam. Just as the Korean War was Truman's war (and the War of 1812
had been Madison's war), so Vietnam became Johnson's war. The costs of
seeming not to be in control during a major international crisis, moreover,
are such that no president can afford to let subordinates take the heat. More
likely, presidents will have to bear the blame for events that they tried to prevent or decisions that were not of their making.
Similarly, the public's well-documented tendency to hold the president responsible for the general state of the economy limits the extent to which a
president can distance himself from economic performance. Presidents are
less likely to create lightning rods out of their secretary of treasury than they
are to take the blame (or credit) for economic conditions not of their making. Although this book has not examined the treasury secretary specifically,
one cannot but be struck by how infrequently modern presidents have made
any concerted effort to fashion a lightning rod out of the head of the Treasury Department. 11 8 Eisenhower's treasury secretaries, George Humphrey
and Robert Anderson, for instance, were both highly influential players
within the administration, yet neither ever served any sort of lightning rod
function. Not long after Bill Clinton selected Senate finance chair and
former Democratic vice-presidential nominee Lloyd Bentsen to be his treasury secretary, the president immediately felt it necessary to tell reporters
that he, Bill Clinton, would "be the chief economic adviser in my Administration" and that he personally "would take responsibility for addressing
both the short and long-term economic challenges facing us." 11 9 Even discounting Clinton's proclivity to immerse himself in the details of policy
making, it is hard to imagine him needing or wanting to make such statements in the areas of transportation, education, labor, or even the environment.
One of the defining changes in the presidency over the last half century
has been the tremendous growth in the White House staff and the increasing
involvement of White House staff in departmental operations. 120 What are
the implications of this increased centralization for a president's ability to
deflect blame? Can staffers make effective lightning rods, or are they likely
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to be limited by their proximity to the president? By bringing problems and
policies into the White House, the president may indeed find it harder to distance himself from problems when they go unsolved or policies when they
go awry. By virtue of the problem being brought into the White House it has
become a presidential problem. Moreover, staffers are largely creatures of
the president who lack the independent standing of cabinet members. If this
makes cabinet members less controllable that is also part of their value. To
presidents already overburdened with decisions and demands, delegating
real decision-making authority to those outside the White House helps presidents focus on the decisions about which they and their followers care
most. '2'
Yet it must also be noted that Reagan's experience in the Iran-contra affair
suggests that sometimes the key may be less the degree of White House involvement in decisions than the degree (perceived at least) of presidential involvement in White House decisions. That Admiral John Poindexter and
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North were within the White House certainly
meant that the Iran-contra scandal damaged Reagan much more directly
and personally than it would have had some comparable scheme been uncovered in the State Department. Yet at the same time, Reagan was able to
secure deniability and was able to recover in part because his claims of noninvolvement fit with a widespread understanding of his decision-making
style. That Reagan was "out of the loop" did not seem implausible to many
in the Washington community who had been saying much the same thing
for several years before the scandal.
Senior staffers' proximity to the president is a double-edged sword. Their
positions of power, particularly in the case of the chief of staff, make them
natural targets for critics who dislike the direction an administration is going. Disgruntled elites blaming the leader's errors on the influence of evil advisers are a perennial feature of human history. But the internal power of a
chief of staff also stems from his ability to faithfully reflect the president's
preferences, and the willingness of others to listen to and follow the chief of
staff's directives depends on their believing that he speaks for the president.
Thus a chief of staff serving as a lightning rod may simultaneously be undermining his ability to act as an effective staff person. The lightning rod
role is thus an especially unstable and precarious role for chiefs of staff.
Moreover, as a controversy becomes something more than inside-the-administration griping and blossoms into a full-blown public debate, chiefs of
staff are particularly unlikely to make effective lightning rods. As we saw in
Chapter 3, sustained scrutiny of the Bush administration's environmental
policy record ultimately led critics to conclude that someone as close to the
president as John Sununu must be expressing the president's own policy
preferences. When the chief of staff publicly speaks out on an issue, it is dif-
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ficult for a president to disown knowledge or involvement without seeming
at best dangerously disengaged and at worst disingenuous or even dishonest.
We saw in Chapter 6 how difficult it was for Nixon to distance himself from
Haldeman's public statement charging critics of the Vietnam War with
"consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States." Most
elites interpreted Nixon's distancing as further evidence of the president's
duplicity.
If proximity militates against distancing where does that leave the president's spouse? For most of American history this point has been moot because presidents' wives have largely taken on nonpolitical tasks, have usually
been relatively noncontroversial, and are thus often more popular than their
husbands. 122 Barbara Bush fit this pattern particularly well, as did Rosalynn
Carter and Betty Ford. 123 All this has changed with the presidency of Bill
Clinton. Of particular importance is President Clinton's decision to appoint
Hillary Rodham Clinton as head of the task force on health reform, but also
of note is her extensive role in the appointments process, particularly in the
areas of domestic policy.
At the time of her appointment to head the task force on health reform, a
number of voices were raised expressing misgivings about the decision on
the grounds that it would become difficult for Bill Clinton to deflect blame
if things went badly. Sheila Tate, Nancy Reagan's former press secretary, explained that "the problem is that if her task force is a stink bomb, Bill Clinton can't distance himself. It lays the responsibility right at his feet." 12•
Moreover, if Hillary Clinton becomes a liability (and any lightning rod can
rapidly become a liability), Clinton can not jettison his wife in the same way
that Eisenhower dumped Adams, Reagan dismissed Regan and Watt, or
Bush got rid of Sununu.
On the other hand, the peculiar dynamics of a husband-wife relationship
could make Hillary Rodham Clinton an effective lightning rod, at least at
the elite level. Among conservative and moderate Democrats as well as
among once-hopeful Republicans, Hillary Clinton is bearing much of the
blame for diverting the Clinton administration away from the president's
Democratic Leadership Council instincts and in the direction of a more liberal, activist agenda. 125 A few like Mickey Kaus of the New Republic have
suggested that her influence may be rooted in the leverage she has over the
president as a result of her knowledge of the president's "wrongdoing." 126
Others have implied that romantic attachment may obscure policy judgment
or that the president's understandable desire to "do what Hillary wants"
may come at the expense of Clinton's own more conservative policy preferences. Such explanations allow critics to absolve Bill Clinton of the responsibility for the perceived leftward tilt of the Clinton administration.
Yet it is not clear how much good this really does Bill Clinton. Because
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Clinton can't dismiss his wife there is no incentive for political elites to single
out Hillary Clinton instead of directly attacking the president. Criticism
might as well be aimed directly at the president. Elite critics of Sununu or
Watt or Benson or Brownell hoped to indicate displeasure with a particular
policy direction without permanently alienating the president. Who will feel
that the way to keeping the president's ear is to criticize his wife? Combine
this with Clinton's well-publicized penchant for showing how much he
knows about every conceivable policy area (and he does know a lot), not the
least of which is health policy, and the prospects for an effective Hillary
lightning rod seem dim indeed. But then Bill Clinton is anything but a
blame-avoidance president.
What, finally, about the vice-presidential role? Humphrey's status as
lightning rod, as suggested in Chapter 4, may have been undermined not
only by Johnson's leadership style but also by the vice-presidential role itself, which allowed Humphrey little or nothing in the way of a policy-making role. Humphrey was essentially little more than a cheerleader on the
sidelines, and while cheerleaders may distract or irritate they cannot be
blamed for what is happening on the playing field. Since Humphrey's tenure, however, the vice presidents' policy-making role has become substantially more important. Indeed, political scientist Paul Light suggests that
"as Vice-Presidents have moved beyond ceremonial duties into the political
and policy arenas, they have come to resemble senior members of the White
House staff. " 121 And indeed they have. But, as Light also recognizes, a number of things still distinguish the vice-presidential role. Intense presidential
ambition for one.
In marked contrast to the largely dead-end job of chief of staff, 128 the vice
president, at least since Nixon's time, always has one eye on the presidency
and one eye on the president. Vice presidents must loyally serve the needs of
their presidents (both to be renominated and to gain the president's blessing
when the baton is passed), but they must also carefully mind their own needs
if their presidential ambitions are to be fulfilled. They cannot afford to go
down in flames, in the manner of Adams, Haldeman, Regan, or Sununu.
Nor can they afford too much of the sort of negative press doled out to Benson or Watt. The political ambitions of vice presidents thus tend to place
limits on how they will allow themselves to be used by the president.
Vice presidents differ from senior staff, too, in that the former's loyalty to
the president must always, to a lesser or greater degree, be in question. Senior staffers are picked for their loyalty to the president; 129 vice presidents are
selected for their political appeal to key constituencies. They may even, as in
the case of Reagan and Bush, have been rivals for the nomination. Because
of their independent political base and because a vice president's interests
cannot always be the same as the president's interests, presidents and their
staffs may view with suspicion vice presidents' assuming a prominent public
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profile in a policy area. "Credit claiming and posturing [by a vice president
or his staff]," Light writes, "are highly threatening to the White House." 130
Vice presidents may react to this anxiety on the part of presidents and their
staff, as Bush did, by exercising their influence quietly. Fear of stealing the
show and thereby incurring presidential disapproval encourages contemporary vice presidents to keep a low profile on public policy issues, and thus
undermines their availability as lightning rods.
An individual's availability and effectiveness as a lightning rod, in sum,
depends not only on the president's leadership style or the subordinate's
actions but also on the particular pattern of expectations and incentives that
accompany a given institutional role. Although one would be hard-pressed
to predict in advance which individuals would serve as lightning rods simply
by virtue of the role they occupy, the preceding discussion suggests it is possible to anticipate the types of problems and dilemmas that each role poses
for a president who wants to think seriously about staying out of trouble.

LIGHTNING RODS AND POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY

Lightning rods may be good for presidents, but how should we as citizens
look on the phenomenon of presidential lightning rods? As a lie by which
presidents avoid accountability, or as a justifiable means for beleaguered
presidents to maintain their authority and effectiveness? One's answer to
this question depends on one's view of the nature of the American political
system and of the president's place within that system.
American political science has a long and honored tradition which maintains that the fundamental weakness of the American political system is its
"division of authority and concealment of responsibility." Among the earliest advocates of this view was Woodrow Wilson who, in his classic treatise
Congressional Government, argued that it is "manifestly a radical defect of
our federal system that it parcels out power and confuses responsibility."
The American political system, Wilson lamented, allows "every suspected
culprit .. . [to] shift the responsibility upon his fellows." With power divided, Wilson asked rhetorically, "how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to
know which boy needs the whipping?"' 3 '
Modern-day advocates of "responsible parties" have shared Wilson's concern with making it easier for the public to assign blame when things go
awry. The division of power between the legislative and executive branches,
party government advocates contend, not only makes for a less effective
government, but hopelessly confuses the poor voter. In "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," the American Political Science Association's
Committee on Political Parties advanced its members' vision of a political
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system in which the governing party (with the president at its head) would
have the power to carry out a clearly articulated program, on which the electorate could then pass judgment."' Only by concentrating authority, in this
view, can the electorate hold elected officials responsible for their behavior.
Wilson's concern with making government more "responsible" is also
echoed in modern writings on public administration. The report issued by
the first Hoover Commission, for instance, began from the premise that
"the President ... must be held responsible and accountable to the people
. .. for the conduct of the executive branch." This goal was being thwarted,
the commission reported, because power within the executive branch was
diffused and lines of authority were confused. Without "a clear line of command from top to the bottom" it was impossible to have "a return line of responsibility and accountability from bottom to the top." The executive
branch (which the commission described as "a chaos of bureaus and subdivisions") was consequently both weak and unaccountable. 133
If one sides with the Wilsonian tradition that the flaw in the American political system is that fragmented authority (both within the executive branch
and between the executive and legislative branches) produces "irresponsible" government, then the use of advisers as lightning rods, by providing yet
another skirt for presidents to hide behind, must be condemned as only exacerbating the political system's existing deficiencies. Presidential lightning
rods make an already irresponsible system even more irresponsible. From
this point of view, lightning rods are symptomatic of the inadequacies of
American politics.
Echoes of this scholarly tradition can be heard all around us. Presidents,
we are told, should articulate their program (in the singular, as if it were all
of a piece) clearly and unambiguously. 134 They should tell us where they
stand on everything from gun control to abortion to offshore oil drilling.
Presidents should, moreover, be publicly visible . Attempts to retreat from
public (particularly press) scrutiny are regarded as cowardly or manipulative
or both.
A very different way of viewing presidential lightning rods is suggested by
an alternative tradition in American political science, perhaps best exemplified by the writings of Pendleton Herring, 135 which stresses the need to minimize conflict within society and maintain public support for authority.
Rather than concentrating government power to make it more effective,
Herring was concerned with facilitating the adjustment of conflicting interests. Making presidents more responsible for government actions, Herring
believed, would only result in discrediting the president and incapacitating
the political system .
Unlike a British prime minister, who can be removed by a parliamentary
vote of no-confidence if people lose faith in him or her, an American president serves a fixed term. Because of this, Herring argued, it is important for
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presidents to insulate themselves from the daily policy battles to avoid becoming discredited before their term expires. "In halcyon days," Herring
warns, "a discredited occupant of the White House is an inconvenience; in
times of emergency such institutionalized futility may become tragic. " 136
Herring's political theory begins from the premise that the United States
executive branch more closely resembles a "feudal pattern of fiefs, baronies,
and dukedoms than ... an orderly and symmetrical pyramid of authority." 137 Given that a president's power over his subordinates is severely limited, Herring suggests that a president is well advised to redefine his job in
such a way that expectations of what the president is responsible for more
closely coincide with the president's limited ability to control the decisions
of subordinates. 138 In contrast to the Wilsonian tradition, which advocates
systemic change to increase both presidential power and responsibility, Herring's tack is to assume that presidential power is relatively fixed and to
avoid overload by decreasing presidential responsibility.
Herring's sensitivity to the dangers of overloading a president with responsibilities that will outstrip his resources is evident in his concern for insulating presidents from the work of independent commissions. In marked
contrast to the Brownlow Committee, which recommended that independent
commissions be brought under the control of the president (so as "to restore
our constitutional ideal of a fully coordinated Executive Branch responsible
to the President" 139), Herring suggested that "independent commissions,
while sometimes inconvenient to presidential policy, may yet relieve the chief
executive of a greater burden of political responsibility than any one man
can effectively carry. " 140 Those who advocate having all roads of responsibility lead to the White House door, Herring intimates, are, contrary to their
intentions, weakening rather than strengthening the presidency.
Pervading Herring's political theory is a feeling for the frailty of the
American political system.1• 1 Herring acknowledges that the American political system's dispersal of authority and responsibility "does not appeal to
men of strictly logical mind" but defends the institutional arrangement on
the grounds that "it at least tempers the intensities of feeling that arise when
the onus of decision making is centered upon one governing agency or even
one individual." 1• 2 Diffusion of responsibility, in this view, helps to diffuse
conflict and thus sustain societal consensus.
Herring applauds evasion and ambiguity for their role in muting conflict.
In contrast to Wilson, who urged "an open war of principle against principle," Herring counseled "caution, and even reticence, ... when disagreements arise." 1• 3 Just as a rigid adherence to truth-telling in one's personal life
would soon result in the deterioration of personal relations, Herring argued,
so in the political realm harmonious relations depend to some extent on
equivocation, hedging, and even deception. 144 Indeed if the president is to be
a "president of all the people" (given that "the people" are rarely if ever
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agreed on a course of action), he must cloak his intentions in ambiguity.
Lightning rods thus enable a president to govern while still fulfilling his
function as chief of state.
From the perspective of proponents of consensus government, advocates
of responsible party government who recommend the president assume
command of "his" party are flirting with a dangerously divisive mode of
politics. Herring's emphasis on consent leads to a preference not only for a
less visible president but for a president who emphasizes the more detached
role as chief of state over that of party head. 145 While fears of system breakdown may be exaggerated (though not unfounded as the South's secession in
response to Lincoln's election in 1860 demonstrates), polarization, at least
among the political stratum, must be expected if a president is to follow the
script of party responsibility. 146
"The politics of combat," to be sure, is not without its virtues. 1• 1 Vigorous, open debate about pressing issues of the day may help to clarify those
issues and to expose the weaknesses of proposed policies. 148 A president who
avoids the controversial issues or puts off the "tough choices" may be keeping out of trouble at the expense of allowing the country to travel down the
road to ruin. Indeed, some would maintain that the definition of leadership
is taking unpopular stands and letting the chips fall where they may. A
blame-avoidance strategy, in this view, is thus akin to abdicating leadership.
Certainly, as we saw in the case study of Eisenhower and the civil rights issue, it is difficult for a president simultaneously to pursue a blame-avoidance strategy and to mobilize support for his objectives. Without the public
backing of the president, a cabinet member will find it difficult if not impossible to enlist the necessary public or congressional support for a controversial initiative. The Reagan White House's decision to package social security reform as Dick Schweiker's plan rather than Ronald Reagan's ensured,
as Schweiker recognized, that it would be "dead on arrival" when it got to
Capitol Hill. 149 When a president doesn't care intensely about an outcome,
blame avoidance may be a fitting strategy, but when a president feels
strongly about achieving something he will probably have little choice but to
put his prestige on the line.
Eisenhower's conduct as president was largely consistent with the political
theory of consensus government. 150 His leadership was aimed more at minimizing conflict and obtaining consent than enacting programs. It was a leadership strategy that stemmed from a belief that the president not only should
not, but could not afford to dominate the political system. Contrary to received wisdom about his presidency, 15 1 Eisenhower well understood the nonhierarchical character of presidential authority in the United States and consequently directed his efforts as much or more toward sustaining political
support as toward exercising presidential power.
One may concede that Eisenhower pursued a leadership strategy designed
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to avoid rancorous divisions within society, maintain personal popularity,
and build up presidential authority, and yet still question the wisdom of
such a strategy. The McCarthy episode, the halting efforts toward civil rights
legislation, and the dragging out of the controversy over the Bricker amendment could all be cited as illustrating the limitations of Eisenhower's blameavoidance leadership style.
The question of whether a president should put a premium on keeping out
of trouble (as Eisenhower did) or doing good (as Johnson and Carter did) is
thus intimately tied up with evaluations about the nature and purpose of the
American political system. Although the debate about what a president is
responsible for is inextricably tied up with these larger philosophical debates
about accountability and the scope of the federal government, these traditionally opposed conceptions of presidential responsibility may still find
common ground.
Champions of a strong programmatic presidency have traditionally urged
a more active and visible president, in whom power and responsibility are
concentrated, but today's supporters of presidential effectiveness might do
well to look for scaled-back presidential power. 152 Given the president's position as the "most important continuing story that the media deal with," 153
maintaining presidential authority and effectiveness may entail ceding
power and dispersing responsibility for particular policies. Presidents may
have to be more selective about the areas in which they want to have an impact. 154 Placing a premium on keeping out of trouble, far from conflicting
with effective presidential leadership, may turn out to be a prerequisite for
doing good.

Appendix

Many of those who argue that public expectations of presidential leadership
have risen during the last three or four decades cite indirect evidence drawn
from analyses of changes in media coverage of the presidency. Following the
cue of Elmer Cornwell's seminal work on "the expansion of the Presidential
image," they proceed "on the assumption that a measure of Presidential
news content in a representative sample of the media can be taken as a rough
measure of the relative public preoccupation with the Presidential office."'
Cornwell examined front-page headlines in the New York Times and Providence Journal in selected years from 1885 to 1957 and documented what he
argued was "a long-term upward trend in overall Presidential news, both in
absolute terms and relative to news about Congress. " 2 Cornwell is correct
that his data provide incontrovertible evidence of an increase in the absolute
number of presidential stories but is wrong that his data support the proposition that presidential news increased relative to congressional news. Although the ratio of presidential to congressional news shows short-term fluctuations there is no evidence of a long-term change over time (see Table
A. l) . Still, one can accept Cornwell's basic conclusion of an expanding presidential image without it touching our immediate concern, which is whether
that image has expanded so much since the 1950s as to make lessons drawn
from one era potentially misleading in another era.
More directly relevant for us is a study by Alan Balutis, which updated
Cornwell's study through 1974. Balutis found what he claimed was a continuation of the trends identified by Cornwell . In fact, however, his data suggested important differences between the period examined by Cornwell and
the period studied by Balutis. Cornwell's data identified a clear break between the period before World War I, which averaged 226 column inches of
presidential news in the New York Times, and the period after the war,
which averaged 809 column inches in the Times. But Balutis's research
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TABLE A.1 . Ratio of presidential to congressional news.
New York Times

1885
1893
1901
1909
1917
1925
1933
1941
1949
1957

Providence Journal

1.3
2.5

1894
1899
1906
1910
1914
1922
1926
1930
1934
1949
1954

10.5
2.4

1.9
2.0
6.4
1.7

0.8
2.8

1.7

3.1
2.3
2.5
2.6

2.2
1.1

0.8
2.8
1.0
1.0

Source: Calculated from Table 1 in Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., " Presidential News: The Expanding Public Image," in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., The Presiden cy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969),
314.

showed that for the entire period between 1958 and 1974, presidential news
coverage in the Times averaged 707 column inches, actually somewhat below
the average obtained in Cornwell's survey. Moreover, within the period surveyed by Balutis there was no evidence of any progressive increase over time
in the front-page space that the Times allotted to presidential stories (Table
A.2). 3
Interestingly, though, if one looks at the ratio of presidential to congressional news reported by Balutis, one finds an unmistakably strong pattern of
increasing coverage of the presidency relative to Congress (Table A.2) . In
this respect, too, Balutis's data are quite different from Cornwell's, which
provide no evidence of change over time in the ratio of presidential to congressional news. What Balutis's data suggest is less an expanding presidential image than a declining congressional image. Caution is needed, however,
in interpreting the data in Table A.2 because of the distorting effect of extraordinary years. For example, omitting 1972 and 1973 would lower the raTABLE A.2. Front-page coverage of the presidency in the New York Times.

1957-1960
1961-1968
1969-1974

Column
Inches

President/Congress
News Ratio

779
642

1.8

776

3.5

2.6

Sources: Calculated from Table 1 in Alan P. Balutis, " Congress, the President and the
Press, " Journalism Quarterly 53 (Autumn 1976), 511 ; 1957 data calculated from Elmer E.
Cornwell, Jr., " Presidential News: The Expanding Public Image," in Aaron Wildavsky,
ed ., The Presidency (Boston : Little, Brown, 1969), 314.
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tio of presidential to congressional news for the Nixon years from 3.5 to 2.2,
a figure that is only slightly higher than the average ratio for Eisenhower's
years. Even if one accepts that Balutis's data indicate an increasing relative
prominence for the president, one could hardly conclude that they support
the view that Eisenhower inhabited a qualitatively different universe than his
successors.
A final word of caution is necessary in interpreting the Cornwell-Balutis
data. Coding decisions made by Cornwell and subsequently by Balutis mean
that the numbers showing the presidency predominating in the contemporary media may be highly misleading. Cornwell opted to count as congressional stories only those that included the terms "Congress," "Senate,"
"House," or the name of a specific congressional committee in the headline.
Excluded altogether were headlines that named individual legislators, even
though Cornwell chose to count as presidential stories those that included
not only the words "president," "presidency," and "White House," but the
name of the incumbent president. Thus headlines such as "Majority Leader
Mitchell Responds to Bush's Speech" or "Republican Senators Successfully
Filibuster Clinton's Plan" would be coded as presidential stories! Also pictures of presidents (even pictures of a president meeting with congressional
leaders) were counted as presidential news, while pictures of congressmen
were not counted as congressional news.•
Subsequent research by Stephen Hess confirms that the Cornwell-Balutis
data probably greatly exaggerate presidential dominance of print journalism. For one week in April 1978, Hess analyzed the coverage of 22 newspapers and found that of the 921 stories about the president and the Congress,
54 percent of the time the subject of the story was the Congress, and 46 percent of the time the subject was the president. "Newspaper stories," Hess
concluded emphatically, "do not pay more attention to the president [than
to Congress]." 5
Perhaps the most reliable evidence of the print media's increasing attention to the president comes from Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha
Joynt Kumar's study of the New York Times and Time magazine from 1953
through 1978. 6 Grossman and Kumar show that for Time magazine there is
a clear increase in the amount of coverage devoted to the White House beginning with the presidency of Richard Nixon (Table A.3). The New York
Times, however, tells a somewhat different story, with the significant increase in coverage occurring with the Kennedy presidency. From Kennedy
through Carter, however, Grossman and Kumar's evidence suggests no appreciable change in attention given to White House stories-a finding that is
largely consistent with a careful reading of Balutis's data gathered from the
Times. '
On balance, then, the evidence from newspapers (especially from the New
York Times) tends not to support the thesis that the last thirty to forty years
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TABLE A.3. White House stories in each issue or broadcast, by
administration.

Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter'

Time

New York Times

CBS News

3.2
3.8
2.8
5.1
4.5
5.9

6.6
9.1
8.3
11.1
8.8
9.3

4.2
3.8
3.7

Source: Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, Portraying the President:
The White House and the Media (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 259.
Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.
•Data for Carter through 1978 only.

have seen the sort of massive increase in media attention to the presidency
that would make Eisenhower's experience irrelevant. 8 It does suggest that the
pattern of coverage in the latter half of the twentieth century is radically different from the nineteenth- or early twentieth-century pattern,9 but that is
not the relevant issue here. The evidence from news magazines like Time and
Newsweek, on the other hand, does suggest an impressive increase in attention to presidents in recent decades. 10 Without better data about how the increase in coverage of presidential news compares with changes in congressional news, however, it is often difficult to interpret the significance of the
increase in presidential news in news magazines. 11
Unmistakable evidence of presidential dominance comes from studies of
national television network news. Particularly striking is a study by Robert
Gilbert, who examined lead stories on all three major networks for 1975,
1979, 1981 , and 1985 and found that presidential stories dwarfed congressional news: the president garnered 934 lead stories and 235,640 seconds,
while Congress had only 76 lead stories and 14,550 seconds. 12 Hess, too,
found that television network stories paid more attention to the president,
though his numbers (59 percent to 41 percent) are much less overwhelming,
probably because he analyzed the entire news segment rather than just lead
stories. 11 Michael J. Robinson, who examined television network news in
1969 and 1977, confirms Hess's findings that the presidency has about a
sixty percent to forty percent edge on Congress. 1•
Each of the above studies confirms that television news today pays significantly greater attention to the presidency than to Congress. The evidence is
more mixed, however, on the question of change over time. Gilbert does find
that the presidential advantage in news coverage was significantly less in
1975 than in subsequent years, but it is difficult to know whether 1975 was
an atypical year. Grossman and Kumar, who surveyed coverage on CBS in
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every year from 1968 to 1978, found high levels of attention to the White
House but detected no evidence of any increase over time (Table A.3). Similarly, Robinson's comparison of 1969 and 1977 uncovers no evidence of increased network attention to the presidency, although some evidence suggests a slight decline in stories focusing on the legislative branch. 15 None of
these studies, moreover, goes back to the Eisenhower era, so it is difficult to
say precisely how or whether television coverage of the presidency has
changed since then. 16 Even if it were true that newspaper and television coverage of presidents had changed only modestly, the public's increasing reliance on television news relative to newspapers might still lead one to expect
that the presidency would assume greater salience in people's minds.
This conclusion may err, however, in two respects. First, though the data
do indicate important and unquestionable change toward greater reliance on
television, one should not exaggerate the changes of the last forty years. 11
Television was an important source of information during the Eisenhower
period, and newspapers remain an important source of information for
people today. Indeed by some measures, W. Russell Neuman finds that
newspapers "have remained dominant in terms of the primary flow of political communications." Studies have found, for instance, that "in a single day
only 23 percent of the adult population see a network newscast, while 69
percent see a newspaper. " 18 Second, many people who indicate to pollsters
that they rely on television for their news rely primarily or even exclusively
on local news rather than national network news. And local television news,
it appears from a 1987-1988 study by Steven Hess, is markedly different in
its coverage of the president than network news. Hess found that "local
broadcasts covered executive and legislative branches of the national government in about equal proportions" and that if one leaves out appearances by
executive officials other than the president, Congress has about a two to one
edge on the president. Moreover, "the 'quality of the legislators' appearances on local news is better ... in that they are more often seen and heard,
while the president is more often merely mentioned." 19
Whatever the patterns of media coverage, it is well to return to more direct
measures of how people think about the president's role in the political system. As early as 1968, a poll showed that close to 70 percent of the public reported that of the three branches of the national government, they followed
the presidency most closely. Only 23 percent named the Congress. Yet in
spite of this, the same poll showed that more people believed the Congress
affected their day-to-day life than thought the president did. And more
people believed Congress should have the greater say in decision making
than believed the president should. Even in 1978, at a time when studies have
shown presidential news swamping congressional news on television, the
public was evenly divided about whether Congress or the president should
have a greater role in decision making. Moreover, in the 1980s, as the Reagan
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presidency was dwarfing Congress in national network coverage, far more
people felt that balancing the budget was Congress's responsibility than felt
it was the president's. Such findings suggest that one needs to be extremely
cautious about inferring too much about popular expectations of presidential roles from media coverage.
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rights" (Mayer, "Eisenhower's Conditional Crusade," 412-13).
76. Legislative Leadership Meeting, August 6, 1957, Legislative Meeting Series,
Office of the Staff Secretary, EL.
77. "In the interests of gradual education and progress," he informed a friend, "I
had no objection to the elimination of Section III" (Eisenhower to R. W. Woodruff,
August 6, 1957, Name Series, AWF, EL).
78. Cabinet Meeting, August 2, 1957, Cabinet Series, Office of the Staff Secretary, EL. Sherman Adams described Eisenhower as "bitterly disappointed" by the
passage of the jury-trial amendment. (Firsthand Report [New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1961), 342).
79. Statement by the president on the civil rights bill, August 2, 1957, Public Papers, 587. At his next press conference, Eisenhower reiterated his belief that the jurytrial amendment "would be most damaging to the entire Federal judiciary" (News
Conference, August 7, 1957, Public Papers, 601).
80. Prepress Conference Briefing, April 17, 1957, DDE Diary Series, AWF, EL.
81. See Eisenhower to Richard Russell, September 27, 1957, Administration Series, AWF, EL.
82. The same tradeoff is evident in the battle over the Bricker amendment. Duane
Tananbaum has shown that Eisenhower's behind-the-scenes maneuverings against
the amendment during 1953 allowed him to maintain cordial relations with Senator
Bricker and made Brownell and Dulles the target of Bricker's wrath, but also allowed
the conflict to drag on for much longer than it would have had Eisenhower taken a
strong, public stand from the outset. Ensuring defeat of the measure required that
Eisenhower take a firm public stand against the measure, which he finally did in January 1954. Having declared his unambiguous opposition to the amendment, Eisenhower became, for the first time, a direct target for Bricker's public attacks (The
Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower's Political Leadership
[Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987], esp. 78-79, 137-38, 190, 217-18).
83. Advising Ike, 218; also see 217.
84. Brownell recounts the development of the idea of section three entirely in the
first person: "I initially concentrated almost exclusively on voting rights .. . . Then I
began thinking about all the equal-protection matters that might come up during my
testimony before Congress, and I decided that a more ambitious bill was necessary.
So I created on my own, almost out of whole cloth, a set of proposals that would
give the attorney general power to enforce civil rights; these proposals would become
the controversial but important section three of the eventual bill" (Advising Ike,
218). Brownell also concedes that Eisenhower "was at times [disturbed about what I
was doing], especially in civil rights" (301).
85. Administration actions in these areas are described in Maxwell Rabb, Oral
History-265, October 16, 1970, COHP, EL; and Mayer, "Eisenhower's Conditional
Crusade," esp. 495-501.

NOTES TO PAGES 144-46

245

86. Neustadt , Presidential Power, 8.

CHAPTER 8. BLAME AVOIDANCE AND POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
1. A number of scholars, with their eyes on the substantial successes of statistical
methods of analysis in the fields of voting behavior and congressional studies, have
urged practitioners in the field to look for "statistical patterns in the presidency."
Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale, for instance, write that "presidential research is at a
stage analogous to that at which the discipline of economics found itself in the 1950s
and the study of the U.S. Congress found itself in the 1960s" (Gary King and Lyn
Ragsdale, The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency
[Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988], 484). The implication is
that presidential studies can reach the dizzy heights achieved by these fields of study
through emulating their usage of statistical techniques.
It is to be expected that fields that have had less success in explanation and prediction will look for guidance to those fields that have been more successful. But a
method appropriate to one field of study may prove inappropriate in another. One
thinks, for instance, of the checkered history of importing biological concepts of
function and natural selection into the social sciences. I find it difficult to share King
and Ragsdale's optimism about the future of presidential studies, because the success
of statistical analysis rests largely upon having a large number of units, such as votes
or survey responses, that are amenable to numerical quantification. In some areasthe relationship between presidential popularity and the state of the economy being a
notable example-the statistical method promises to be fruitful. In other areas, such
as the relationship between leadership styles and presidential success, there is considerably less we can hope to achieve from statistical techniques. My reasons are elaborated in "What Can 19th Century Presidents Teach Us about the Twentieth Century
Presidency," delivered at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, San Francisco, Calif., September 1990.
2. As Nelson W. Polsby has recently written, pundits and politicians' loyalties are
to their conclusions rather than their premises. It is political scientists, Polsby reminds us, who are paid to "think about the premises, and ... whether or not they
are well founded" ("Where Do You Get Your Ideas?" PS: Political Science & Politics
26 [March 1993]: 86).
3. The same political motives are often at work in reverse when opponents label
an adviser a liability to the president. Critics who portrayed Ezra Taft Benson as a liability to Eisenhower, for example, were interested in persuading the president to
dump an adviser whom they believed to be hostile to their objectives and, in the case
of farm-state congressmen, an obstacle to their chances for reelection. That they
tagged Benson a liability to the president may in fact be evidence that the secretary
was serving as a lightning rod-if, as seems to be the case, they believed that without
Benson the president's policies would have been significantly different.
4. Buchanan had said, "With the vote on contra aid, the Democratic Party will reveal whether it stands with Ronald Reagan and the resistance-or Daniel Ortega and
the communists" (John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of
Communications and the Management of Presidential News [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992], 208).
5. Bernard Weinraub, "Eating Lightning Bolts and Liking the Taste, " New York
Times, March 25, 1986, A28.
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6. See Phil Duncan, "Quayle: The Right Man for the Right Job," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, June 23, 1990, 2014, and Lee Atwater's comments in the
New York Times, December 29, 1989, Al 6.
7. Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Dissipates Heat by Delegating Authority," New
York Times, October 11, 1981, V:4 .
8. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1991), 168-69.
9. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Tilting on Development," National Journal, February 7, 1987, 313-18.
10. Bert A. Rockman, "The Modern Presidency and Theories of Accountability:
Old Wine and Old Bottles," Congress and the Presidency 13 (Autumn 1986): 143 .
11 . See George C. Edwards III, Presidential Influence in Congress (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980), chap. 4; Douglas Rivers and Nancy L. Rose, "Passing
the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress,"
American Journal of Political Science 29 (May 1985): 183-96; and George C.
Edwards III, At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), esp. chapters 6-8.
12. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), 305.
13 . Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The
Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York : Free Press, 1990), 80,
82.
14. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Significance of the 1992 Election," P.S.:
Political Science and Politics 26 (March 1993): 7-16.
15. McNeil-Lehrer News Hour, March 10, 1989.
16. Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power (New York: Viking, 1980), 168 . In
the same vein, Nelson W. Polsby has argued that "in time, Mr. Carter's natural allies
despaired of cooperating with him, as did leaders of many of the interest groups-especially labor unions-who were natural allies of a Democratic President. All these
negative attitudes drifted downward to the general public and sooner or later began
to be reflected in low scores for the President in public opinion surveys measuring
general confidence in the way he was doing his job" (Nelson W. Pols by, Congress and
the Presidency, 4th ed. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986], 65).
17. Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and
Public Support (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1991). Also see John R.
Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
18. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 2d
ed. (Washington , D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1993), 194, 196.
19. A further difficulty with Kernell's argument is that it fails to explain why
models of presidential popularity based largely on economic numbers do least well
for President Eisenhower (see Samuel Kernell's own "Explaining Presidential Popularity," American Political Science Review 72 [June 1978): 518; as well as Charles W.
Ostrom, Jr., and Dennis M. Simon, "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model
of Presidential Popularity," American Political Science Review 79 [June 1985) : 351).
If Kernell's formulation were correct one would expect to find that models built upon
objective economic indicators would do most well for a president like Eisenhower
and would do least well for a more recent president like Reagan . But in fact we find
the reverse. Reagan's popularity can be much more precisely modeled using basic
economic indicators than can Eisenhower's. This suggests that, if anything, elite cues
and media portrayals may have been more important for Eisenhower's popularity
than for Reagan's.
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20. My discussion here draws on Eric R. A. N. Smith, The Unchanging American
Voter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 159-60. A study that surveyed
"all available questions" measuring political knowledge asked between 1947 and
1962 found that whereas in the first eight years there was an average of eleven such
questions a year, in the last four years that average had dropped to one question a
year. The study cited is Hazel G. Erskine, "The Polls: Textbook Knowledge," Public
Opinion Quarterly 27 (1963): 133-41.
21. Smith, Unchanging American Voter; 163-69. Also see Stephen Bennett,
"Trends in Americans' Political Information , 1967-1987," American Politics Quarterly 17 (October 1989): 422-35; and Michael X . Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter,
"Stability and Change in the U.S. Public's Knowledge of Politics," Public Opinion
Quarterly 55 (Winter 1991): 583-612.
22. Why has a transformation in the public's information levels about politics not
resulted from the undeniable transformation in the volume of information transmitted? Part of the explanation may lie in the nature of television. Studies have consistently found that while reading a newspaper has a substantial impact on people's
knowledge of politics, television has little or no effect (Smith, Unchanging American
Voter; 186) . People's ability to recall what they have seen on network news broadcasts
is often quite limited (see W. Russell Neuman , "Patterns of Recall among Television
News Viewers," Public Opinion Quarterly 40 [Spring 1976]: 115-23) . To the extent
that people have become more reliant on television for their news (Roper Organization, Trends in Attitudes toward Television and Other Media: A Twenty-Four Year
Review [New York: Television Information Office, 1983], but also see the useful cautionary remarks in W. Russell Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge
and Opinion in the American Electorate [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1986], 139-45), they may actually be learning less about Washington political
relations. They may, as Kernell claims, be exposed to more messages about the president than ever before, but the increase in the number of messages may be offset by a
decrease in the informational content of those messages.
Moreover, though the total amount of information available about Washington
may have increased, that does not mean that people are utilizing this increased information . As Eric Smith concludes, looking at data spanning from 1956 to 1976, " Total media use did not change ... . Instead there was a change in the mix of media
that people used to follow politics" (Unchanging American Voter; 184-85) . The cable communications explosion of the 1980s has meant people can watch news twentyfour hours a day and can follow congressional floor debates and committee hearings
almost around the clock. But the growth of cable also means people have more opportunities to watch movies, music videos, sitcoms, and sports. As W. Russell
Neuman points out, the net result of more viewing options will be that "the proportion of news viewing will actually go down" (Paradox of Mass Politics, 139).
Several scholars have suggested that declining political interest may be the culprit
behind the absence of improvement, despite increasing education levels, in public
awareness of political relations in Washington (Bennett, "Trends in Americans' Political Information"; Bennett, "Know-nothings Revisited: The Meaning of Political
Ignorance Today," Social Science Quarterly 69 [June 1988]: 476-90; Neuman, Paradox of Mass Politics; and Carpini and Keeter, " U .S. Public's Knowledge of Politics," 607). In 1987, 23 percent of the public said they were very interested in "politics and national affairs," and 34 percent said they were not at all or only slightly
interested in politics. In contrast, in 1967, 35 percent described themselves as very interested, and only 27 percent said they were not at all or only slightly interested. Lack
of interest, Stephen Earl Bennett explains, "reduces motivation to take in and retain
political information" ("Trends in Americans' Political Information," 433).
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23. 1986 National Election Study, cited in Bennett, "Trends in Americans' Political Information," 423 .
24. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, 74.
25. AIPO-594, January 24-29, 1958. AIPO-598, April 16-21, 1958.
26. A 1957 Gallup poll found only 35 percent of respondents able to recall the
name of their congressman. Surveys conducted by Michigan's Survey Research Center before the midterm elections of 1958, 1966, 1970, and 1974 found that the percentage of people who could recall the name of the congressional incumbent never
exceeded 44 percent. See Thomas E. Mann, Unsafe at any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 27.
27. 1986 National Election Study. Data graciously provided by Stephen Earl Bennett. In a Gallup poll taken in the summer of 1985, 24 percent were able to correctly
identify Weinberger from a photograph shown to them (June 22-July 13, 1985).
28 . Survey no. 561, March 8-13, 1956, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion,
1935-1971, 3 vols. (New York: Random House, 1972), 2:1410.
29. AIP0-593, January 2-7, 1958. Also see AIPO-561, March 8-13, 1956. Interestingly, the approval rates were roughly equal among farmers and the general public
(29 and 28 percent respectively). The difference lay in the disapproval rates, which
reached 48 percent among farmers compared with only 29 percent among the general
public.
30. Farmers were much more likely to have an opinion about the administration's
price-support policies. Asked in 1954 whether they were "satisfied or dissatisfied
with the way the Republican Administration is handling the problem of farm prices
and farm price supports," 21 percent of farmers expressed no opinion as opposed to
39 percent of urban residents (Survey no . 535, August 5-10, 1954, Gallup Poll,
2: 1267). Repeating the question again in 1955, Gallup found that 35 percent of nonfarmers had no opinion, as compared with only 14 percent of farmers (Survey no.
557, December8-13, 1955, GallupPoll, 2:1392).
31. This according to Jack Bell, at the time Senate correspondent and chief political reporter for the Associated Press (Bell, Oral History-167, CO HP, EL,
15).
32. In the first months of the Clinton administration, Jerry Lewis, Republican
representative from California, advised his fellow Republicans not to "take the president on personally" (Kenneth J. Cooper and Kevin Merida, "Republicans Strategize
to Get Their Message Out," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 8-14,
1993, 15). And Republican strategist Ed Rollins counseled Republicans to "just hold
[Clinton's] coat. ... Wish him well for the good of the country. And the moment he
falters, be prepared to put the kick in his side on the way down" (David Van Drehle,
"In the Big Game of Politics, Clinton is a Winner-So Far," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, April 5-11, 1993, 14).
33. The social psychological literature on blame attribution is vast. See, for example, Kelly G. Shaver, The Attribution of Blame: Causality, Responsibility, and
Blameworthiness (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985); and Kathleen M. McGraw,
"Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts,"
American Political Science Review 85 (December 1991): 1133-57.
34. Gallup, August 3-6, 1973. Similarly, 28 percent said they had never heard of
John Ehrlichman.
35. Los Angeles Times, January 3-7, 1982.
36. Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, April 30-May 2, 1985.
37 . AIPO-593, January 2-7, 1958. In Benson's case, 55 percent of the general
public (compared with about 75 percent of farmers) and in Dulles's case close to two-
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thirds of the public had an opinion about the president as well as the secretary in
question. These data are more fully reported in Chapters 2 and 5.
38 . Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder's News That Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) is a model of the type of research that needs to be
done in this area.
39. Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCulley, White House Operations: The
Johnson Presidency (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 145 .
40. Richard L. Schott and Dagmar S. Hamilton, People, Positions, and Power:
The Political Appointments of Lyndon Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago
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"fundamental" (Aaron Wildavsky, "Are American Political Parties Pretty Much the
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tations "appear to be growing," only a footnote referring to George Edwards's Public Presidency. On the cited page of Edwards's volume, one finds repeated the claim
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1. Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "Presidential News : The Expanding Public Image," reprinted in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 310,
311. Also see Alan P. Balutis, "Congress, the President and the Press," Journalism
Quarterly 53 (Autumn 1976): 510.
2. Cornwell, "Presidential News, " 318 . Cornwell selected out six sample weeks in
each of the years he studied.
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increase in attention to presidential news, from an average of 327 column inches of
front-page coverage in the years 1958-1960 to 496 column inches in 1961-1968 to 566
column inches in 1969-1973. These averages are calculated from Table 1 in Balutis,
"Congress, the President and the Press," 511.
4. Coding procedures are explained in Cornwell, "Presidential News," 312-13;
and Balutis, "Congress, the President and the Press," 510-11.
5. Stephen Hess, The Washington Reporters (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 98. Hess did find that the president appears in the headlines more often than the Congress, but he also found that of stories with neither Congress nor the
president in the headlines, many more are about Congress.
6. Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, Portraying the President: The White House and the Media (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1981). For this study, three coders read White House stories at fifteen-day intervals
for a twenty-five-year period, from Eisenhower's inauguration through August 1978.
They compiled 5,270 stories from the New York Times and 2,550 stories from Time
magazine (254).
7. Samuel Kernell updated Grossman and Kumar's study through 1983 and found
that for the Times Reagan's coverage was actually lower than Carter's and not significantly higher than Kennedy's. Only for Time magazine does Kernell's data show a
relatively steady upward climb that continues into the Reagan era. Kernell altered the
study somewhat by including only the second and third years of a president's first
term in his analysis (Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), 180-81).
8. Nor, if we take Hess's comprehensive survey seriously, does it support the thesis
that there is a massive imbalance in attention given to the presidency relative to Congress. Also see Susan Miller, "News Coverage of Congress: The Search for the Ultimate Spokesman," Journalism Quarterly 54 (Autumn 1977): 461.
9. Compare the above studies with Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson , "Congress and the Presidency as News in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Politics 49
(November 1987): 1016-35.
10. Data gathered by Herbert Gans in a content analysis of Newsweek magazine
for the years 1967, 1971, and 1975 indicated a progressive increase in the percentage
of column inches in the magazine devoted to incumbent presidents (from 12 to 20 to
23 percent). Also suggestive but difficult to interpret was the finding that the percentage of column inches in the magazine devoted to members of the House and Senate
dropped from 10 in 1968 and 12 in 1971 to 4 in 1975. Without more data points it is
impossible to say whether 1975 is part of a trend or an atypical year. See Herbert J.
Gans, Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon, 1979), 10. Newsweek and
Time's concentration on the presidency is also confirmed by Bruce Miroff's finding
from the mid-1970s that more than half to almost two-thirds of lead stories "dealt
primarily with presidential activities" ("Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics," in Thomas E. Cronin, ed., Rethinking
the Presidency [Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 221).
11. This is a particular problem with John Orman's "Covering the American
Presidency: Valenced Reporting in the Periodical Press, 1900-1982," Presidential
Studies Quarterly 14 (Summer 1984): 382. Orman examined The Reader's Guide to
Periodical Literature and found a steady and dramatic increase in the number of
presidential stories over time. But without some measure of the ratio of presidential
to congressional news, it is unclear how much of this increase is attributable either to
an overall growth in attention to national news or to a proliferation of periodical
magazines.
12. Robert E. Gilbert, "President versus Congress: The Struggle for Public Atten-
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tion," Congress and the Presidency 16 (Autumn 1989): 86, 87. Michael J. Robinson
and Margaret A . Sheehan found that close to 60 percent of all the lead stories on
CBS network news during the 1980 campaign involved the presidency (Over the Wire
and on TV.· CBS and UPI in Campaign '80 [New York: Russell Sage, 19831, 192) .
13 . Hess, Washington Reporters, 98. Hess analyzed all three networks for one
week in 1978. Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan compared CBS network news with UPI in 1980 and found that as a percentage of all news stories CBS
paid almost twice as much attention to the White House as did the wire service, although on stories not connected to the campaign the gap was considerably smaller
(Over the Wire and on TV, 191-92). A discordant note is introduced by Herbert
Gans, who compared CBS network news and Newsweek magazine for 1967 and
found that television actually gave more coverage to members of Congress (17 percent of the 918 television stories about "known" leaders) than to the incumbent president (11 percent) whereas the news magazine gave slightly greater coverage to the incumbent president (12 percent of column inches about "knowns") than to members
of Congress (IO percent). See Gans, Deciding What's News, 10.
14. Michael J. Robinson , "Three Faces of Congressional Media, " in Thomas E.
Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 91 n37 .
15 . Ibid.
16. And few studies are likely to since the Television News Archives at Vanderbilt
University, the data base that most scholars use, has film beginning in August 1968.
17. Polls conducted by the Roper organization show a steady increase in the public's reliance on television news, from 51 percent in 1959 to 65 percent in 1974. During
the same time, newspapers have steadily declined as the public's primary news source,
from 57 percent to 47 percent in 1974. The question Roper asks is, "First, I'd like to
ask you where you usually get most of your news about what's going on in the world
today-from the newspapers or radio or television or magazines or talking to other
people or where?" Respondents were allowed to name more than one source. This
and other relevant data are reported in Smith, Changing American Voter, 181.
18. W. Russell Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion
in the American Electorate (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1986),
144- 45 .
19. Stephen Hess, Live from Capitol Hill: Studies of Congress and the Media
(Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1991), 53, 140-41.
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Richard Ellis explores the widely discussed but poorly understood
phenomenon of presidential "lightning rods"-cabinet officials
who "take the heat" instead of their bosses. Whether by intent or
circumstance, these officials divert criticism and blame away from
their presidents. The phenomenon is so common that it's assumed
to be an essential item in every president's managerial toolbox. But,
Ellis argues, such assumptions can oversimplify our understanding
of this tool.
"His articulate and informative analysis of the politics of blame
avoidance represents a refreshing contribution to the study of the
modern presidency."-Congress & the Presidency
"By exploring many of the nuances that typify one set of relationships
between presidents and their advisers, Ellis demonstrates how the
journalistic use of a common metaphor lacks both subtlety and
precision. The research lays the groundwork for future explorations
of the link between mass attitudes and elite strategies, an important
and largely unexplored question."-Journa/ of Politics
"EIiis's study is very thorough, well written, and meticulously documented and adds to scholarly understanding of how presidents
enhance and maintain their reputations for effective leadership."
-Choice
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